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Abstract
This thesis examines three topics. The first chapter, entitled "Persistent Effects of
Peru's Mining Mita" utilizes regression discontinuity to examine the long-run im-
pacts of the mita, an extensive forced mining labor system in effect in Peru and
Bolivia between 1573 and 1812. Results indicate that a mita effect lowers house-
hold consumption by around 25% and increases the prevalence of stunted growth in
children by around six percentage points in subjected districts today. Using data
from the Spanish Empire and Peruvian Republic to trace channels of institutional
persistence, I show that the mita's influence has persisted through its impacts on
land tenure and public goods provision. Mita districts historically had fewer large
landowners and lower educational attainment. Today, they are less integrated into
road networks, and their residents are substantially more likely to be subsistence
farmers.
The second chapter, entitled "Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug War"
examines how drug traffickers' economic objectives influence the direct and spillover
effects of Mexican policy towards the drug trade. Drug trade-related violence has es-
calated dramatically in Mexico during the past five years, claiming over 40,000 lives.
By exploiting variation from close mayoral elections and a network model of drug
trafficking, the study develops three sets of results. First, regression discontinuity
estimates show that drug trade-related violence in a municipality increases substan-
tially after the close election of a mayor from the conservative National Action Party
(PAN), which has spearheaded the war on drug trafficking. This violence consists
primarily of individuals involved in the drug trade killing each other. The empirical
3
evidence suggests that the violence reflects rival traffickers' attempts to wrest control
of territories after crackdowns initiated by PAN mayors have challenged the incum-
bent criminals. Second, the study predicts the diversion of drug traffic following
close PAN victories by estimating a model of equilibrium routes for trafficking drugs
across the Mexican road network to the U.S. When drug traffic is diverted to other
municipalities, drug trade-related violence in these municipalities increases. More-
over, female labor force participation and informal sector wages fall, corroborating
qualitative evidence that traffickers extort informal sector producers. Finally, the
study uses the trafficking model and estimated spillover effects to examine the allo-
cation of law enforcement resources. Overall, the results demonstrate how traffickers'
economic objectives and constraints imposed by the routes network affect the policy
outcomes of the Mexican Drug War.
The third chapter, entitled "Insurgency and Long-Run Development: Lessons
from the Mexican Revolution" exploits within-state variation in drought severity to
identify how insurgency during the Mexican Revolution, a major early 20th century
armed conflict, impacted subsequent government policies and long-run economic de-
velopment. Using a novel municipal-level dataset on revolutionary insurgency, the
study documents that municipalities experiencing severe drought just prior to the
Revolution were substantially more likely to have insurgent activity than municipal-
ities where drought was less severe. Many insurgents demanded land reform, and
following the Revolution, Mexico redistributed over half of its surface area in the
form of ejidos: farms comprised of individual and communal plots that were granted
to a group of petitioners. Rights to ejido plots were non-transferable, renting plots
was prohibited, and many decisions about the use of ejido lands had to be counter-
signed by politicians. Instrumental variables estimates show that municipalities with
revolutionary insurgency had 22 percentage points more of their surface area redis-
tributed as ejidos. Today, insurgent municipalities are 20 percentage points more
agricultural and 6 percentage points less industrial. Incomes in insurgent municipal-
ities are lower and alternations between political parties for the mayorship have been
substantially less common. Overall, the results support the hypothesis that land
reform, while successful at placating insurgent regions, stymied long-run economic
development.
Thesis Supervisor: Daron Acemoglu
Title: Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics
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Chapter 1
Persistent Effects of Peru's Mining
Mita
1.1 Introduction
The role of historical institutions in explaining contemporary underdevelopment has
generated significant debate in recent years.1 Studies find quantitative support for an
impact of history on current economic outcomes (Nunn, 2008; Glaeser and Shleifer,
2002; Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Hall and Jones, 1999) but have not focused on
channels of persistence. Existing empirical evidence offers little guidance in distin-
guishing a variety of potential mechanisms, such as property rights enforcement,
inequality, ethnic fractionalization, barriers to entry, and public goods. This paper
uses variation in the assignment of an historical institution in Peru to identify land
tenure and public goods as channels through which its effects persist.
Specifically, I examine the long-run impacts of the mining mita, a forced labor
'See for example Coatsworth, 2005; Glaeser et al., 2004; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Acemoglu
et al., 2001, 2002; Sachs, 2001; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997.
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system instituted by the Spanish government in Peru and Bolivia in 1573 and abol-
ished in 1812. The mita required over 200 indigenous communities to send one
seventh of their adult male population to work in the Potosi silver and Huancavelica
mercury mines (Figure 1). The contribution of mita conscripts changed discretely
at the boundary of the subjected region - on one side all communities sent the same
percentage of their population, while on the other side all communities were exempt.
This discrete change suggests a regression discontinuity (RD) approach for eval-
uating the long-term effects of the mita, with the mita boundary forming a multi-
dimensional discontinuity in longitude-latitude space. Because validity of the RD
design requires all relevant factors besides treatment to vary smoothly at the mita
boundary, I focus exclusively on the portion that transects the Andean range in
southern Peru. Much of the boundary tightly follows the steep Andean precipice
- and hence has elevation and the ethnic distribution of the population changing
discretely at the boundary. In contrast, elevation, the ethnic distribution, and other
observables are statistically identical across the segment of the boundary on which
this study focuses. Moreover, specification checks using detailed census data on local
tribute (tax) rates, the allocation of tribute revenue, and demography - collected just
prior to the mita's institution in 1573 - do not find differences across this segment.
The multi-dimensional nature of the discontinuity raises interesting and important
questions about how to specify the RD polynomial, which will be explored in detail.
Using the RD approach and household survey data, I estimate that a long-run
mita effect lowers equivalent household consumption by around 25% in subjected
districts today. Although the household survey provides little power for estimating
relatively flexible models, the magnitude of the estimated mita effect is robust to a
number of alternative specifications. Moreover, data from a national height census of
school children provide robust evidence that the mita's persistent impact increases
16
childhood stunting by around six percentage points in subjected districts today.
These baseline results support the well-known hypothesis that extractive historical
institutions influence long-run economic prosperity (Acemoglu et al., 2002). More
generally, they provide microeconomic evidence consistent with studies establishing
a relationship between historical institutions and contemporary economic outcomes
using aggregate data (Nunn, 2008; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Glaeser and Shleifer,
2002).
After examining contemporary living standards, I use data from the Spanish Em-
pire and Peruvian Republic, combined with the RD approach, to investigate channels
of persistence. Though a number of channels may be relevant, to provide a parsi-
monious yet informative picture I focus on three that the historical literature and
fieldwork highlight as important. First, using district level data collected in 1689,
I document that haciendas - rural estates with an attached labor force - developed
primarily outside the mita catchment. At the time of the mita's enactment, a landed
elite had not yet formed. In order to minimize the competition the state faced in
accessing scarce mita labor, colonial policy restricted the formation of haciendas
in mita districts, promoting communal land tenure there instead (Garrett, 2005;
Larson, 1988). The mita's effect on hacienda concentration remained negative and
significant in 1940. Second, econometric evidence indicates that a mita effect low-
ered education historically, and today mita districts remain less integrated into road
networks. Finally, data from the most recent agricultural census provides evidence
that a long-run mita impact increases the prevalence of subsistence farming.
Based on the quantitative and historical evidence, I hypothesize that the long-
term presence of large landowners in non-mita districts provided a stable land tenure
system that encouraged public goods provision. The property rights of large landown-
ers remained secure from the 17th century onward. In contrast, the Peruvian govern-
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ment abolished the communal land tenure that had predominated in mita districts
soon after the mita ended, but did not replace it with a system of enforceable peas-
ant titling (Jacobsen, 1993; Dancuart and Rodriguez, 1902, vol. 2, p. 136). As a
result, extensive confiscation of peasant lands, numerous responding peasant rebel-
lions, as well as banditry and livestock rustling were concentrated in mita districts
during the late 19th and 20th centuries (Jacobsen, 1993; Bustamante Otero, 1987, p.
126-130; Flores Galindo, 1987, p. 240; Ramos Zambrano, 1985, p. 29-34). Because
established landowners in non-mita districts enjoyed more secure title to their prop-
erty, it is probable that they received higher returns from investing in public goods.
Moreover, historical evidence indicates that well-established landowners possessed
the political connections required to secure public goods (Stein, 1980). For exam-
ple, the hacienda elite lobbied successfully for roads, obtaining government funds for
engineering expertise and equipment and organizing labor provided by local citizens
and hacienda peons (Stein, 1980, p. 59). These roads remain and allow small-scale
agricultural producers to access markets today, though haciendas were subdivided
in the 1970s.
The positive association between historical haciendas and contemporary eco-
nomic development contrasts with the well-known hypothesis that historically high
land inequality is the fundamental cause of Latin America's poor long-run growth
performance (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997). Engerman and Sokoloff argue that
high historical inequality lowered subsequent investments in public goods, leading to
worse outcomes in areas of the Americas that developed high land inequality dur-
ing the colonial period. This theory's implicit counterfactual to large landowners
is secure, enfranchised smallholders, of the sort that predominated in some parts of
North America. This is not an appropriate counterfactual for Peru, or many other
places in Latin America, because institutional structures largely in place before the
18
formation of the landed elite did not provide secure property rights, protection from
exploitation, or a host of other guarantees to potential smallholders.2 The evidence
in this study indicates that large landowners - while they did not aim to promote
economic prosperity for the masses - did shield individuals from exploitation by a
highly extractive state and ensure public goods. Thus, it is unclear whether the
Peruvian masses would have been better off if initial land inequality had been lower,
and doubtful that initial land inequality is the most useful foundation for a theory of
long-run growth. Rather, the Peruvian example suggests that exploring constraints
on how the state can be used to shape economic interactions - for example, the extent
to which elites can employ state machinery to coerce labor or citizens can use state
guarantees to protect their property - could provide a particularly useful starting
point for modeling Latin America's long-run growth trajectory.
In the next section, I provide an overview of the mita. Section 3 discusses iden-
tification and tests whether the mita affects contemporary living standards. Section
4 examines channels empirically. Finally, Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
1.2 The Mining Mita
1.2.1 Historical Introduction
The Potosi mines, discovered in 1545, contained the largest deposits of silver in the
Spanish Empire, and the state-owned Huancavelica mines provided the mercury re-
quired to refine silver ore. Beginning in 1573, indigenous villages located within a
contiguous region were required to provide one seventh of their adult male popula-
2This argument is consistent with evidence on long-run inequality from other Latin American
countries, notably Acemoglu et al. (2008) on Cundinamarca, Colombia and Coatsworth (2005) on
Mexico.
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tion as rotating mita laborers to Potosi or Huancavelica, and the region subjected
remained constant from 1578 onwards.3 The mita assigned 14,181 conscripts from
southern Peru and Bolivia to Potosi and 3,280 conscripts from central and southern
Peru to Huancavelica (Bakewell, 1984, p. 83).4 Using population estimates from the
early 17th century (Cook, 1981), I calculate that around 3% of adult males living
within the current boundaries of Peru were conscripted to the mita at a given point
in time. The percentage of males who at some point participated was considerably
higher, as men in subjected districts were supposed to serve once every seven years. 5
Local native elites were responsible for collecting conscripts, delivering them to
the mines, and ensuring that they reported for mine duties (Cole, 1985, p. 15;
Bakewell, 1984). If community leaders were unable to provide their allotment of
conscripts, they were required to pay in silver the sum needed to hire wage laborers
instead. Historical evidence suggests that this rule was strictly enforced (Garrett,
2005, p. 126; Cole, 1985, p. 44; Zavala, 1980; Sanchez- Albornoz, 1978). Some com-
munities did commonly meet mita obligations through payment in silver, particularly
those in present-day Bolivia who had relatively easy access to coinage due to their
proximity to Potosi (Cole, 1985). Detailed records of mita contributions from the
17th, 18th, and early 19th centuries indicate that communities in the region that this
paper examines contributed primarily in people (Tandeter, 1993, p. 56, 66; Zavala,
3 The term mita was first used by the Incas to describe the system of labor obligations, primarily
in local agriculture, that supported the Inca state (D'Altoy, 2002, p. 266; Rowe, 1946, 267-269).
While the Spanish co-opted this phrase, historical evidence strongly supports independent assign-
ment. Centrally, the Inca m'ita required every married adult male in the Inca Empire (besides
leaders of large communities), spanning an area far more extensive than the region I examine, to
provide several months of labor services for the state each year (D'Altoy, 2002, p. 266; Cieza de
Le6n (1967 [1551])).
4Individuals could attempt to escape mita service by fleeing their communities, and a number
pursued this strategy (Wightman, 1993). Yet fleeing had costs - giving up access to land, community,
and family; facing severe punishment if caught; and either paying additional taxes in the destination
location as a 'foreigner' (forastero) or attaching oneself to an hacienda.
5 Mita districts contain 17% of the Peruvian population today (INEI, 1993).
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1980, II, p. 67-70). This is corroborated by population data collected in a 1689
parish census (Villanueva Urteaga, 1982), described in the appendix, which shows
that the male-female ratio was 22% lower in mita districts (a difference significant
at the 1% level).6
With silver deposits depleted, the mita was abolished in 1812, after nearly 240
years of operation. Sections 3 and 4 will discuss historical and empirical evidence
showing divergent histories of mita and non-mita districts.
1.2.2 The Mita's Assignment
Why did Spanish authorities require only a portion of districts in Peru to contribute
to the mita, and how did they determine which districts to subject? The aim of
the Crown was to revive silver production to levels attained using free labor in the
1550s, before epidemic disease had substantially reduced labor supply and increased
wages. Yet coercing labor imposed costs: administrative and enforcement costs,
compensation to conscripts for traveling as much as 1,000 kilometers each way to
and from the mines, and the risk of decimating Peru's indigenous population, as had
occurred in earlier Spanish mining ventures in the Caribbean (Tandeter, 1993, p.
61; Cole, 1985, p. 3, 31; Cafiete, 1973 [1794]; Levillier, 1921 [1572], 4, p. 108). To
establish the minimum number of conscripts needed to revive production to 1550s
levels, Viceroy Francisco Toledo commissioned a detailed inventory of mines and
production processes in Potosi and elsewhere in 1571 (Bakewell, 1984, p. 76-78;
Levillier, 1921 [1572], 4). These numbers were used, together with census data
collected in the early 1570's, to enumerate the mita assignments. The limit that the
6 While colonial observers highlighted the deleterious effects of the mita on demography and
well-being in subjected communities, there are some features that could have promoted relatively
better outcomes. For example, mita conscripts sold locally produced goods in Potosi, generating
trade linkages.
21
mita subject no more than one seventh of a community's adult male population at a
given time was already an established rule that regulated local labor drafts in Peru
(Glave, 1989). Together with estimates of the required number of conscripts, this
rule roughly determined what fraction of Andean Peru's districts would need to be
subjected to the mita.
Historical documents and scholarship reveal two criteria used to assign the mita:
distance to the mines at Potosi and Huancavelica and elevation. Important costs of
administering the mita, such as travel wages and enforcement costs, were increasing in
distance to the mines (Tandeter, 1993, p. 60; Cole, 1985, p. 31). Moreover, Spanish
officials believed that only highland peoples could survive intensive physical labor in
the mines, located at over 4000 meters (13,000 feet) (Golte, 1980). The geographic
extent of the mita is consistent with the application of these two criteria, as can
be seen in Figure 1.' This study focuses on the portion of the mita boundary that
transects the Andean range, which this figure highlights in white, and the districts
along this portion are termed the study region (see Appendix Figure 1 for a detailed
view). Here, exempt districts were the ones located furthest from the mining centers
given road networks at the time (Hyslop, 1984).8 While historical documents do not
7An elevation constraint was binding along the eastern and western mita boundaries, which
tightly follow the steep Andean precipice. The southern Potosf mita boundary was also constrained,
by the border between Peru and the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata (Argentina) and by the geographic
divide between agricultural lands and an uninhabitable salt flat.
'This discussion suggests that exempt districts were those located relatively far from both Po-
tosi and Huancavelica. The correlation between distance to Potosi and distance to Huancavelica
is -0.996, making it impossible to separately identify the effect of distance to each mine on the
probability of receiving treatment. Thus, I divide the sample into two groups - municipalities to
the east and those to the west of the dividing line between the Potosi and Huancavelica mita catch-
ment areas. When considering districts to the west (Potosi side) of the dividing line, a flexible
specification of mita treatment on a cubic in distance to Potosi, a cubic in elevation, and their
linear interaction shows that being 100 additional kilometers from Potosi lowers the probability of
treatment by 0.873, with a standard error of 0.244. Being 100 meters higher increases the proba-
bility of treatment by 0.061, with a standard error of 0.027. When looking at districts to the east
(Huancavelica side) of the dividing line and using an analogous specification with a polynomial
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mention additional criteria, concerns remain that other underlying characteristics
may have influenced mita assignment. This will be examined further in Section 3.2.
1.3 The Mita and Long Run Development
1.3.1 Data
I examine the mita's long run impact on economic development by testing whether
it affects living standards today. A list of districts subjected to the mita is obtained
from Saignes (1984) and Amat y Junient (1947) and matched to modern districts
as detailed in the online appendix, Table Al. Peruvian districts are in most cases
small political units that consist of a population center (the district capital) and its
surrounding countryside. Mita assignment varies at the district level.
I measure living standards using two independent datasets, both geo-referenced
to the district. Household consumption data are taken from the 2001 Peruvian Na-
tional Household Survey (ENAHO) collected by the National Institute of Statistics
(INEI). To construct a measure of household consumption that reflects productive
capacity, I subtract the transfers received by the household from total household
consumption, and normalize to Lima metropolitan prices using the deflation fac-
tor provided in ENAHO. I also utilize a micro census dataset, obtained from the
Ministry of Education, that records the heights of all six to nine year old school
children in the region. Following international standards, children whose heights are
more than two standard deviations below their age-specific median are classified as
stunted, with the medians and standard deviations calculated by the World Health
Organization from an international reference population. Because stunting is related
in distance to Huancavelica, the marginal effect of distance to Huancavelica is negative but not
statistically significant.
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to malnutrition, to the extent that living standards are lower in mita districts, we
would also expect stunting to be more common there. The height census has the
advantage of providing substantially more observations from about four times more
districts than the household consumption sample. While the height census includes
only children enrolled in school, 2005 data on primary school enrollment and comple-
tion rates do not show statistically significant differences across the mita boundary,
with primary school enrollment rates exceeding 95% throughout the region examined
(MINEDU, 2005b). Finally, to obtain controls for exogenous geographic character-
istics, I calculate the mean area weighted elevation of each district by overlaying
a map of Peruvian districts on 30 arc second (one kilometer) resolution elevation
data produced by NASA's Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM, 2000), and I
employ a similar procedure to obtain each district's mean area weighted slope. The
online appendix contains more detailed information about these data and the living
standards data, as well as about the data examined in Section 4.
1.3.2 Estimation Framework
Mita treatment is a deterministic and discontinuous function of known covariates,
longitude and latitude, which suggests estimating the mita's impacts using a regres-
sion discontinuity approach. The mita boundary forms a multi-dimensional disconti-
nuity in longitude-latitude space, which differs from the single-dimensional thresholds
typically examined in RD applications. While the identifying assumptions are iden-
tical to those in a single-dimensional RD, the multi-dimensional discontinuity raises
interesting and important methodological issues about how to specify the RD poly-
nomial, as discussed below. Before considering this and other identification issues in
detail, let us introduce the basic regression form:
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Cidb - a + -y mitad + XJ3 + f(geographic locationd) + #b + Eidb (1.1)
where Cidb is the outcome variable of interest for observation i in district d along
segment b of the mita boundary, and mitad is an indicator equal to 1 if district
d contributed to the mita and equal to zero otherwise. Xid is a vector of covari-
ates that includes the mean area weighted elevation and slope for district d, and
(in regressions with equivalent household consumption on the lefthand side) demo-
graphic variables giving the number of infants, children, and adults in the household.
f(geographic locationd) is the RD polynomial, which controls for smooth functions
of geographic location. Various forms will be explored. Finally, #b is a set of bound-
ary segment fixed effects that denote which of four equal length segments of the
boundary is the closest to the observation's district capital.' To be conservative,
all analysis excludes metropolitan Cusco. Metropolitan Cusco is composed of seven
non-mita and two mita districts located along the mita boundary and was the capital
of the Inca Empire (Cook, 1981, p. 212-214; Cieza de Le6n, 1959, p. 144-148). I
exclude Cusco because part of its relative prosperity today likely relates to its pre-
mita heritage as the Inca capital. When Cusco is included, the impacts of the mita
are estimated to be even larger.
The RD approach used in this paper requires two identifying assumptions. First,
all relevant factors besides treatment must vary smoothly at the mita boundary. That
is, letting ci and co denote potential outcomes under treatment and control, x denote
longitude, and y denote latitude, identification requires that E[c1 Ix, y] and E[colx, y]
9Results (available upon request) are robust to allowing the running variable to have hetero-
geneous effects by including a full set of interactions between the boundary segment fixed effects
and f(geographic locationd). They are also robust to including soil type indicators, which I do
not include in the main specification because they are highly collinear with the longitude-latitude
polynomial used for one specification of f(geographic locationd).
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are continuous at the discontinuity threshold. This assumption is needed for individ-
uals located just outside the mita catchment to be an appropriate counterfactual for
those located just inside it. To assess the plausibility of this assumption, I examine
the following potentially important characteristics: elevation, terrain ruggedness, soil
fertility, rainfall, ethnicity, pre-existing settlement patterns, local 1572 tribute (tax)
rates, and allocation of 1572 tribute revenues.
To examine elevation - the principal determinant of climate and crop choice in
Peru - as well as terrain ruggedness, I divide the study region into twenty by twenty
kilometer grid cells, approximately equal to the mean size of the districts in my
sample, and calculate the mean elevation and slope within each grid cell using the
SRTM data.10 These geographic data are spatially correlated, and hence I report
standard errors corrected for spatial correlation in square brackets. Following Conley
(1999), I allow for spatial dependence of an unknown form. For comparison, I report
robust standard errors in parentheses. The first set of columns of Table 1 restricts the
sample to fall within 100 kilometers of the mita boundary and the second, third, and
fourth set of columns restrict it to fall within 75, 50, and 25 kilometers, respectively.
Row 1 shows that elevation is statistically identical across the mita boundary.11 I
next look at terrain ruggedness, using the SRTM data to calculate the mean uphill
slope in each grid cell. In contrast to elevation, there are some statistically significant,
but relatively small, differences in slope, with mita districts being less rugged.'
10 All results are similar if the district is used as the unit of observation instead of using grid cells.
1'Elevation remains identical across the mita boundary if I restrict the sample to inhabitable
areas (<4800 m) or weight by population, rural population, or urban population data (SEDAC,
2007).
"I also examined data on district soil quality and rainfall (results available upon request; see data
appendix for more details). Data from the Peruvian Institute for Natural Resources (INRENA,
1997) reveal higher soil quality in mita districts. I do not emphasize soil quality because it is
endogenous to land usage. While climate is exogenous, high resolution data are not available and
interpolated climate estimates are notoriously inaccurate for the mountainous region examined in
this study (Hijmans et al., 2005). Temperature is primarily determined by altitude (Golte, 1980;
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Row 3 examines ethnicity using data from the 2001 Peruvian National Household
Survey. A household is defined as indigenous if the primary language spoken in the
household is an indigenous language (usually Quechua). Results show no statistically
significant differences in ethnic identification across the mita boundary.
Spanish authorities could have based mita assignment on settlement patterns,
instituting the mita in densely populated areas and claiming land for themselves in
sparsely inhabited regions where it was easier to usurp. A detailed review by Bauer
and Covey (2002) of all archaeological surveys in the region surrounding the Cusco
basin, covering much of the study region, indicates no large differences in settlement
density at the date of Spanish Conquest. Moreover, there is not evidence suggesting
differential rates of population decline in the forty years between conquest and the
enactment of the mita (Cook, 1981, p. 108-114).
Spanish officials blamed demographic collapse on excessive, unregulated rates of
tribute extraction by local Hispanic elites (encomenderos), who received the right to
collect tribute from the indigenous population in return for their role in Peru's mil-
itary conquests. Thus Viceroy Francisco Toledo coordinated an in depth inspection
of Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador in the early 1570's to evaluate the maximum tribute
that could be demanded from local groups without threatening subsistence. Based
on their assessment of ability to pay, authorities assigned varying tribute obligations
at the level of the district - socioeconomic group, with each district containing one
or two socioeconomic groups. (See the appendix for more details on the tribute as-
Pulgar-Vidal, 1950), and thus is unlikely to differ substantially across the mita boundary. To
examine precipitation, I use station data from the Global Historical Climatology Network, Version
2 (Peterson and Vose, 1997). Using all available data (from stations in 50 districts located within
100 km of the mita boundary), mita districts appear to receive somewhat higher average annual
precipitation, and these differences disappear when comparing districts closer to the mita boundary.
When using only stations with at least twenty years of data (to ensure a long-run average), which
provides observations from twenty different stations (eleven outside the mita catchment and nine
inside), the difference declines somewhat in magnitude and is not statistically significant.
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sessment.) These per capita contributions, preserved for all districts in the study
region, provide a measure of Spanish authorities' best estimates of local prosperity.
Row 4 of Table 1 shows average tribute contributions per adult male (women, chil-
dren, and those over age fifty were not taxed). Simple means comparisons across the
mita boundary do not find statistically significant differences. Rows (5) through (8)
examine district level data on how Spanish authorities allocated these tribute rev-
enues, divided between rents for Spanish nobility (encomenderos, row (5)), salaries
for Spanish priests (row (6)), salaries for local Spanish administrators (justicias, row
(7)), and salaries for indigenous mayors (caciques, row (8)). The data on tribute
revenue allocation are informative about the financing of local government, about
the extent to which Spain extracted local revenues, and about the relative power
of competing local administrators to obtain tribute revenues. Table 1 reveals some
modest differences: when the sample is limited to fall within 100 km or 75 km from
the mita boundary, we see that Spanish nobility received a slightly lower share of
tribute revenue inside the mita catchment than outside (60% versus 64%), whereas
Spanish priests received a slightly higher share (21% versus 19%). All differences
disappear as the sample is limited to fall closer to the mita boundary.
In the ideal RD setup, the treatment effect is identified using only the variation
at the discontinuity. Non-parametric RD techniques can be applied to approximate
this setup in contexts with a large number of observations very near the treatment
threshold (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). While non-parametric techniques have the
advantage of not relying on functional form assumptions, the data requirements that
they pose are particularly high in the geographic RD context, as a convincing non-
parametric RD would probably require precise geo-referencing: for example, each
observation's longitude-latitude coordinates or address." This information is rarely
13A notable example of a multi-dimensional non-parametric RD is Sandra Black's (1999) study
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made available due to confidentiality restrictions, and none of the available Peruvian
micro datasets contain it. Moreover, many of the datasets required to investigate
the mita's potential long-run effects do not provide sufficiently large sample sizes
to employ non-parametric techniques. Thus, I use a semi-parametric RD approach
that limits the sample to districts within 50 kilometers of the mita boundary. This
approach identifies causal effects by using a regression model to distinguish the treat-
ment indicator, which is a nonlinear and discontinuous function of longitude (x) and
latitude (y), from the smooth effects of geographic location. It is important for the
regression model to approximate these effects well, so that a nonlinearity in the coun-
terfactual conditional mean function E[co Ix, y] is not mistaken for a discontinuity, or
vice versa (Angrist, 2009). To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to
utilize a multi-dimensional, semi-parametric RD approach.
Because approaches to specifying a multi-dimensional RD polynomial have not
been widely explored, I report estimates from three baseline specifications of
f(geographic locationd). The first approach uses a cubic polynomial in latitude and
longitude.14 This parametrization is relatively flexible; it is analogous to the standard
single-dimensional RD approach; and the RD plots, drawn in "x-y-outcome" space,
allow a transparent visual assessment of the data. For these reasons, this approach
appears preferable to projecting the running variable into a lower-dimensional space
- as I do in the other two baseline specifications - when power permits its precise
estimation. One drawback is that some of the necessary datasets do not provide
of the value that parents place on school quality. Black compares housing prices on either side of
school attendance district boundaries in Massachusetts. Because she employs a large and precisely
geo-referenced dataset, Black is able to include many boundary segment fixed effects and limit
the sample to observations located within 0.15 miles of the boundary, ensuring comparison of
observations in extremely close proximity.
14Letting x denote longitude and y latitude, this polynomial is X + y + X2 + y2 + zy + x 3 + y3 +
x2 y ± xy2 ,
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enough power to precisely estimate this flexible specification. The multi-dimensional
RD polynomial also increases concerns about overfitting at the discontinuity, as a
given order of a multi-dimensional polynomial has more degrees of freedom than the
same order one-dimensional polynomial. This point is discussed using a concrete
example in Section 4.3. Finally, there is no a priori reason why a polynomial form
will do a good job of modeling the interactions between longitude and latitude. I
partially address this concern by examining robustness to different orders of RD
polynomials.
Given these concerns, I also report two baseline specifications that project geo-
graphic location into a single dimension. These single-dimensional specifications can
be precisely estimated across the paper's datasets and provide useful checks on the
multi-dimensional RD. One controls for a cubic polynomial in Euclidean distance
to Potosi, a dimension which historical evidence identifies as particularly important.
During much of the colonial period, Potosi was the largest city in the Western Hemi-
sphere and one of the largest in the world, with a population exceeding 200,000.
Historical studies document distance to Potosi as an important determinant of lo-
cal production and trading activities and access to coinage (Tandeter, 1993, p. 56;
Glave, 1990; Cole, 1985).'5 Thus, a polynomial in distance to Potosi is likely to cap-
ture variation in relevant unobservables. However, this approach does not map well
into the traditional RD setup, though it is similar in controlling for smooth variation
and requiring all factors to change smoothly at the boundary. Thus I also examine a
specification that controls for a cubic polynomial in distance to the mita boundary.
I report this specification because it is similar to traditional one-dimensional RD
"Potosf traded extensively with the surrounding region, given that it was located in a desert
14,000 feet above sea level and that it supported one of the world's largest urban populations
during the colonial period.
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designs, but to the best of my knowledge neither historical nor qualitative evidence
suggest that distance to the mita boundary is economically important. Thus, this
specification is most informative when examined in conjunction with the other two.
In addition to the two identifying assumptions already discussed, an additional
assumption often employed in RD is no selective sorting across the treatment thresh-
old. This would be violated if a direct mita effect provoked substantial out-migration
of relatively productive individuals, leading to a larger indirect effect. Because this
assumption may not be fully reasonable, I do not emphasize it. Rather I explore
the possibility of migration as an interesting channel of persistence, to the extent
that the data permit. During the past 130 years, migration appears to have been
low. Data from the 1876, 1940, and 1993 population censuses show a district level
population correlation of 0.87 between 1940 and 1993 for both mita and non-mita
districts.16 Similarly, the population correlation between 1876 and 1940 is 0.80 in
mita districts and 0.85 in non-mita districts. While a constant aggregate population
distribution does not preclude extensive sorting, this is unlikely given the relatively
closed nature of indigenous communities and the stable linkages between hacien-
das and their attached peasantry (Morner, 1978). Moreover, the 1993 Population
Census does not show statistically significant differences in rates of out-migration
between mita and non-mita districts, though the rate of in-migration is 4.8% higher
outside the mita catchment. In considering why individuals do not arbitrage income
differences between mita and non-mita districts, it is useful to note that over half
of the population in the region I examine lives in formally recognized indigenous
communities. It tends to be difficult to gain membership and land in a different
indigenous community, making large cities - which have various disamenities - the
primary feasible destination for most migrants (INEI, 1993).
16 The 2005 Population Census was methodologically flawed, and thus I use 1993.
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In contrast, out-migration from rnita districts during the period that the mita
was in force may have been substantial. Both Spanish authorities and indigenous
leaders of mita communities had incentives to prevent migration, which made it
harder for local leaders to meet mita quotas that were fixed in the medium run and
threatened the mita's feasibility in the longer run. Spanish authorities required in-
dividuals to reside in the communities to which the colonial state had assigned their
ancestors soon after Peru's conquest to receive citizenship and access to agricultural
land. Indigenous community leaders attempted to forcibly restrict migration. De-
spite these efforts, the state's capacity to restrict migration was limited, and 17th
century population data - available for 15 mita and 14 non-mita districts - provide
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that individuals migrated disproportionately
from mita to non-mita districts.' 7 To the extent that flight was selective and certain
cognitive skills, physical strength, or other relevant characteristics are highly heri-
table, so that initial differences could persist over several hundred years, historical
migration could contribute to the estimated mita effect. The paucity of data and
complex patterns of heritability that would link historically selective migration to
the present unfortunately place further investigation substantially beyond the scope
of the current paper.
I begin by estimating the mita's impact on living standards today. First, I test
for a mita effect on household consumption, using the log of equivalent household
consumption, net transfers, in 2001 as the dependent variable. Following Deaton
(1997), I assume that children aged 0 to 4 are equal to 0.4 adults and children aged 5
to 14 are equal to 0.5 adults. Panel A reports the specification that includes a cubic
17According to data from the 1689 Cusco parish reports (see the appendix), in the 14 non-mita
districts 52.5% of individuals had ancestors who had not been assigned to their current district of
residence, as compared to 35% in the 15 mita districts.
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polynomial in latitude and longitude, Panel B the one that uses a cubic polynomial in
distance to Potosi, and Panel C the one that includes a cubic polynomial in distance
to the mita boundary. The first column of Table 2 limits the sample to districts
within 100 kilometers of the mita boundary, and columns (2) and (3) restrict it to
fall within 75 and 50 kilometers, respectively.18 Columns (4) through (7) repeat this
exercise, using as the dependent variable a dummy equal to one if the child's growth
is stunted and equal to zero otherwise. Column (4) limits the sample to districts
within 100 kilometers of the mita boundary, and columns (5) and (6) restrict it to
fall within 75 and 50 kilometers, respectively. Column (7) limits the sample to only
those districts bordering the mita boundary. When combined with the inclusion of
boundary segment fixed effects, this ensures that I am comparing observations in
close geographic proximity.
1.3.3 Estimation Results
Columns (1) through (3) of Table 2 estimate that a long-run mita effect lowers
household consumption in 2001 by around 25 percent in subjected districts. The
point estimates remain fairly stable as the sample is restricted to fall within narrower
bands of the mita boundary. Moreover, the mita coefficients are economically similar
across the three specifications of the RD polynomial, and I am unable to reject that
they are statistically identical. All of the mita coefficients in Panels B and C, which
report the single-dimensional RD estimates, are statistically significant at the 1% or
5% level. In contrast, the point estimates using a cubic polynomial in latitude and
longitude (Panel A) are not statistically significant. This imprecision likely results
18The single-dimensional specifications produce similar estimates when the sample is limited to
fall within 25 kilometers of the mita boundary. The multi-dimensional specification produces a very
large and imprecisely estimated mita coefficient because of the small sample size.
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from the relative flexibility of the specification, the small number of observations
and clusters (the household survey samples only around one quarter of districts),
and measurement error in the dependent variable (Deaton, 1997).
Columns (4) through (7) of Table 2 examine census data on stunting in children,
an alternative measure of living standards which offers a substantially larger sample.
When using only observations in districts that border the mita boundary, point
estimates of the mita effect on stunting range from 0.055 (s.e. = 0.030) to 0.114 (s.e.
= 0.049) percentage points. This compares to a mean prevalence of stunting of 40%
throughout the region examined.1 9 11 of the 12 point estimates reported in Table 2
are statistically significant, and I cannot reject at the 10% level that the estimates
are the same across specifications.
The results can be seen graphically in Figure 2. Each sub-figure shows a district
level-scatter plot for one of the paper's main outcome variables. These plots are
the three-dimensional analogues to standard two-dimensional RD plots, with each
district capital's longitude on the x-axis, its latitude on the y-axis, and the data
value for that district shown using an evenly-spaced monochromatic color scale, as
described in the legends. When the underlying data are at the micro level, I take
district level averages, and the size of the dot indicates the number of observations
in each district. Importantly, the scaling on these dots, which is specified in the
legend, is nonlinear, as otherwise some would be microscopic and others too large to
display. The background in each plot shows predicted values, for a finely spaced grid
of longitude-latitude coordinates, from a regression of the outcome variable under
consideration on a cubic polynomial in longitude-latitude and the mita dummy. In
"A similar picture emerges when I use height in centimeters as the dependent variable and
include quarter x year of birth dummies, a gender dummy, and their interactions on the righthand
side.
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the typical RD context, the predicted value plot is a two-dimensional curve, whereas
here it is a three-dimensional surface, with the third dimension indicated by the
color gradient.2 0 The shades of the data points can be compared to the shades of
the predicted values behind them to judge whether the RD has done an adequate
job of averaging the data across space. The majority of the population in the region
is clustered along the upper segment of the mita boundary, giving these districts
substantially more weight in figures showing predicted values from micro-level re-
gressions.
Table 3 examines robustness to fourteen different specifications of the RD poly-
nomial, documenting mita effects on household consumption and stunting that are
generally similar across specifications. The first three rows report results from alter-
native specifications of the RD polynomial in longitude-latitude: linear, quadratic,
and quartic. The next five rows report alternative specifications using distance to
Potosi: linear, quadratic, quartic, and the mita dummy interacted with a linear or
quadratic polynomial in distance to Potosi.2 Next, rows (9) through (13) examine
robustness to the same set of specifications, using distance to the mita boundary as
the running variable. Finally, row (14) reports estimates from a specification using
ordinary least squares. The mita effect on consumption is always statistically sig-
nificant in the relatively parsimonious specifications: those that use non-interacted,
single-dimensional RD polynomials and ordinary least squares. In the more flexi-
ble specifications - the longitude-latitude regressions and those that interact the RD
polynomial with the mita dummy - the mita coefficients in the consumption regres-
"Three-dimensional surface plots of the predicted values are shown in Figure A2 of the appendix,
and contour plots are available upon request.
2 1The mita effect is evaluated at the mean distance to Potosi for observations very near (<10
km from) the mita boundary. Results are broadly robust to evaluating the mita effect at different
average distances to Potosi - i.e. for districts < 25 km from the boundary, for bordering districts,
or for all districts.
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sion tend to be imprecisely estimated. As in Table 2, the household survey does not
provide enough power to precisely estimate relatively flexible specifications, but the
coefficients are similar in magnitude to those estimated using a more parsimonious
approach. Estimates of the mita's impact on stunting are statistically significant
across most specifications and samples.22
Given broad robustness to functional form assumptions, Table 4 reports a number
of additional robustness checks using the three baseline specifications of the RD
polynomial. To conserve space, I report estimates only from the sample that contains
districts within 50 km of the mita boundary. Columns (1) through (7) examine the
household consumption data and columns (8) through (12) the stunting data. For
comparison purposes, columns (1) and (8) present the baseline estimates from Table
2. Column (2) adds a control for ethnicity, equal to one if an indigenous language
is spoken in the household and zero otherwise. Next, columns (3) and (9) include
metropolitan Cusco. In response to the potential endogeneity of the mita to Inca
landholding patterns, columns (4) and (10) exclude districts that contained Inca
royal estates, which served sacred as opposed to productive purposes (Niles, 1987,
p. 13). Similarly, columns (5) and (11) exclude districts falling along portions of
the mita boundary formed by rivers, to account for one way in which the boundary
could be endogenous to geography. Column (6) estimates consumption equivalence
flexibly, using log household consumption as the dependent variable and controlling
for the ratio of children to adults and the log of household size. In all cases, point
estimates and significance levels tend to be similar to those in Table 2. As expected,
the point estimates are somewhat larger when metropolitan Cusco is included.
Table 4 investigates whether differential rates of migration today may be respon-
22Results (not shown) are also robust to including higher order polynomials in elevation and
slope.
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sible for living standards differences between mita and non-mita districts. Given
that in-migration in non-mita districts is about 4.8% higher than in mita districts
(whereas rates of out-migration are statistically and economically similar), I omit
the 4.8% of the non-mita sample with the highest equivalent household consumption
and least stunting, respectively. Estimates in columns (7) and (12) remain of similar
magnitude and statistical significance, documenting that migration today is not the
primary force responsible for the mita effect.
If the RD specification is estimating the mita's long-run effect, as opposed to
some other underlying difference, being inside the mita catchment should not affect
economic prosperity, institutions, or demographics prior to the mita's enactment. In
a series of specification checks, I first regress the log of the mean district 1572 tribute
contribution per adult male on the variables used in the stunting regressions in Table
2. I then examine the shares of 1572 tribute revenues allocated to rents for Spanish
nobility, salaries for Spanish priests, salaries for local Spanish administrators, and
salaries for indigenous mayors. Finally, also using data from the 1572 census, I
investigate demographics, with the population shares of tribute paying males (those
aged 18 to 50), boys, and women as the dependent variables. These regressions,
reported in Table 5, do not show statistically significant differences across the mita
boundary, and the estimated mita coefficients are small.
To achieve credible identification, I exploit variation across observations located
near the mita boundary. If the boundary is an unusual place, these estimates may
have little external validity. To examine this issue further, I use ordinary least
squares to estimate the correlation between the mita and the main outcome variables
(including those that will be examined in Section 4), limiting the sample to districts
located between 25 km and 100 km from the mita boundary. The estimates are
quite similar to those obtained from the RD specifications (results available upon
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request). Moreover, correlations between the mita and living standards (measured
by both consumption and stunting) calculated along the entire mita boundary within
Peru are consistent in magnitude with the effects documented above." In summary,
the RD evidence appears informative about the mita's overall impacts.
Why would the mita affect economic prosperity nearly 200 years after its aboli-
tion? To open this black box, I turn to an investigation of channels of persistence.
1.4 Channels of Persistence
This section uses data from the Spanish Empire and Peruvian Republic to test chan-
nels of persistence. There exist many potential channels, but to provide a picture
that is both parsimonious and informative, I focus on three that the historical lit-
erature and fieldwork suggest as important: land tenure, public goods, and market
participation. The results document that the mita limited the establishment of large
landowners inside the mita catchment and, combined with historical evidence, sug-
gest that land tenure has in turn affected public goods provision and smallholder
participation in agricultural markets.
The tables in the main text report three specifications, which use a cubic polyno-
mial in latitude and longitude, a cubic polynomial in distance to Potosi, or a cubic
polynomial in distance to the mita boundary. Appendix Table A3 reports results
from the fourteen additional specifications examined in Table 3. In most cases, the
point estimates across these specifications are similar. When not, I note it explic-
itly.24
23 When considering observations in Peru within 50 kilometers of any point on the mita bound-
ary, being inside the mita catchment is associated with 28.4 percent lower equivalent household
consumption and an increase of 16.4 percentage points in the prevalence of stunting.
24 As in Table 3, the more flexible specifications in Table A3 are less likely than the parsimonious
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1.4.1 Land Tenure and Labor Systems
This section examines the impact of the mita on the formation of haciendas - rural
estates with an attached labor force permanently settled on the estate (Keith, 1971,
p. 437). Critically, when authorities instituted the mita in 1573 (forty years after the
Spanish conquest of Peru), a landed elite had not yet formed. At the time, Peru was
parceled into encomiendas, pieces of territory in which appointed Spaniards exercised
the right to collect tribute and labor services from the indigenous population but
did not hold title to land (Keith, 1971, p. 433). Rivalries between encomenderos
provoked civil wars in the years following Peru's conquest, and thus the Crown began
to dismantle the encomienda system during the 1570's. This opened the possibility
for manipulating land tenure to promote other policy goals, in particular, the mita.25
Specifically, Spanish land tenure policy aimed to minimize the establishment of
landed elites in mita districts, as large landowners - who unsurprisingly opposed
yielding their attached labor for a year of mita service - formed the state's principal
labor market competition (Larson, 1988; Sanchez-Albornoz, 1978).26 Centrally, as
Bolivian historian Brooke Larson concisely articulates: "Haciendas secluded peas-
ants from the extractive institutions of colonial society" (1988, p. 171). Moreover,
by protecting native access to agricultural lands, the state promoted the ability of
the indigenous community to subsidize mita conscripts, who were paid substantially
below subsistence wages (Garrett, 2005, p. 120; Tandeter, 1993, p. 58-60; Cole,
1985, p. 31). Similarly, authorities believed that protecting access to land could be
ones to estimate statistically significant effects.
2 5Throughout the colonial period, royal policy aimed to minimize the power of the (potentially
revolutionary) landed class - landowners did not acquired the same political clout as mine owners,
the most powerful colonial interest group (Tandeter, 1993; Cole, 1985).
26 For example, land sales under Philip VI between 1634 and 1648 and by royal charter in 1654
played a central role in hacienda formation and were almost exclusively concentrated in non-mita
districts (Brisseau, 1981, p. 146; Glave and Remy, 1978, p. 1).
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an effective means of staving off demographic collapse (Larson, 1982, p. 11; Cook,
1981, p. 108-114, 250; Morner, 1978). Finally, in return for ensuring the delivery
of conscripts, local authorities were permitted to extract surplus that would have
otherwise been claimed by large landowners (Garrett, 2005, p. 115).
I now examine the concentration of haciendas in 1689, 1845, and 1940. 1689 data
are contained in parish reports commissioned by Bishop Manuel de Mollinedo and
submitted by all parishes in the bishopric of Cusco, which encompassed most of the
study region. The reports list the number of haciendas and the population within
each subdivision of the parish and were compiled by Horacio Villanueva Urteaga
(1982). For haciendas in 1845, I employ data collected by the Cusco regional gov-
ernment, which had jurisdiction over a substantial fraction of the study region, on
the percentage of the rural tributary population residing in haciendas (Peralta Ruiz,
1991). Data from 1845, 1846, and 1850 are combined to form the c. 1845 dataset. 7
Finally, data from the 1940 Peruvian Population Census are aggregated to the dis-
trict level to calculate the percentage of the rural population residing in haciendas.
Table 6, column (1) (number of haciendas per district) and column (2) (number
of haciendas per 1000 district residents) show a very large mita effect on the concen-
tration of haciendas in the 17th century, of similar magnitude and highly significant
across specifications. 28 The median coefficient from Column (1), contained in Panel
C, estimates that the mita lowered the number of haciendas in subjected districts by
11.3 (s.e.= 2.1), a sizeable effect given that on average mita districts contained only
one hacienda. Figure 2, Panel C clearly demonstrates the discontinuity. Moreover,
Table 6 provides reasonably robust support for a persistent impact. Column (3)
27When data are available for more than one year, figures change little, and I use the earliest
observation.
28Given the mita's role in provoking population collapse (Wightman, 1990, p. 72), the latter
measure is likely endogenous, but nevertheless provides a useful robustness check.
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estimates that the mita lowered the percentage of the rural tributary population in
haciendas in 1845 by around 20 percentage points (with estimates ranging from 0.13
to 0.21), an effect that is statistically significant across specifications. Column (4)
suggests that disparities persisted into the twentieth century, with an estimated ef-
fect on the percentage of the rural labor force in haciendas that is somewhat smaller
for 1940 than for 1845 - as can be seen by comparing Panels D and E of Figure 2 -
and not quite as robust. The median point estimate is -0.12 (s.e.= 0.045) in Panel
C, the point estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level in Panels B and C,
but the longitude-latitude specification estimates an effect that is smaller, at -0.07,
and imprecise.
Table 6 also documents that the percentage of the rural population in haciendas
nearly doubled between 1845 and 1940, paralleling historical evidence for a rapid ex-
pansion of haciendas in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This expansion was
spurred by a large increase in land values due to globalization and seems to have been
particularly coercive inside the mita catchment (Jacobsen, 1993, p. 226-237; Favre,
1967, p. 243; Nufiez, 1913, p. 11). No longer needing to ensure mita conscripts,
Peru abolished the communal land tenure predominant in mita districts in 1821 but
did not replace it with enforceable peasant titling (Jacobsen, 1993; Dancuart and
Rodriguez, 1902, vol. 2, p. 136). This opened the door to tactics such as the inter-
dicto de adquirir, a judicial procedure which allowed aspiring landowners to legally
claim "abandoned" lands that in reality belonged to peasants. Hacienda expansion
also occurred through violence, with cattle hustling, grazing estate cattle on peas-
ant lands, looting, and physical abuse used as strategies to intimidate peasants into
signing bills of sale (Avila, 1952, p. 22; Roca-Sanchez, 1935, p. 242-43). Numerous
peasant rebellions engulfed mita districts during the 1910's and 1920's, and indis-
criminate banditry and livestock rustling remained prevalent in some mita districts
41
for decades (Jacobsen, 1993; Ramos Zambrano, 1984; Tamayo Herrera, 1982; Hazen,
1974, p. 170-78). In contrast, large landowners had been established since the early
17th century in non-mita districts, which remained relatively stable (Flores Galindo,
1987, p. 240).
In 1969, the Peruvian government enacted an agrarian reform bill mandating the
complete dissolution of haciendas. As a result, the hacienda elite were deposed and
lands formerly belonging to haciendas were divided into "Agricultural Societies of
Social Interest" (SAIS) during the early 1970's (Flores Galindo, 1987). In SAIS,
neighboring indigenous communities and the producers acted as collective owners.
By the late 1970s, attempts to impose collective ownership through SAIS had failed,
and many SAIS were divided and allocated to individuals (Mar and Mejia, 1980). The
1994 Agricultural Census documents that when considering districts within 50 km
of the mita boundary, 20% of household heads outside the mita catchment received
their land in the 1970s through the agrarian reform, versus only 9% inside the mita
catchment. Column (5), using data from the 1994 Agricultural Census, documents
somewhat lower land inequality in non-mita districts. This finding is consistent
with those in columns (1) through (4), given that non-mita districts had more large
properties that could be distributed to smallholders during the agrarian reform. 29
1.4.2 Public Goods
Table 7 examines the mita's impact on education in 1876, 1940, and 2001, providing
two sets of interesting results. 30 First, there is some evidence that the mita lowered
"The 1994 Agricultural Census also documents that a similar percentage of households across
the mita boundary held formal titles to their land.
30Education, roads, and irrigation are the three public goods traditionally provided in Peru
(Portocarrero and Zimmerman, 1988). Irrigation has been almost exclusively concentrated along
the coast.
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access to education historically, though point estimates are imprecisely estimated by
the longitude-latitude RD polynomial. In column (1), the dependent variable is the
district's mean literacy rate, obtained from the 1876 Population Census. Individuals
are defined as literate if they could read, write, or both. Panels B and C show a highly
significant mita effect of around two percentage points, as compared to an average
literacy rate of 3.6% in the region I examine. The estimated effect is smaller, at
around one percentage point, and not statistically significant, when estimated using
the more flexible longitude-latitude specification.3' In column (2), the dependent
variable is mean years of schooling by district, from the 1940 Population Census.
The specifications reported in Panels A through C suggest a long-run negative mita
effect of around 0.2 years, as compared to a mean schooling attainment of 0.47
years throughout the study region, which again is statistically significant in Panels
B and C. While this provides support for a mita effect on education historically,
the evidence for an effect today is weak. In column (3), the dependent variable is
individual years of schooling, obtained from ENAHO 2001. The mita coefficient is
negative in all panels, but is of substantial magnitude and marginally significant only
in Panel A." It is also statistically insignificant in most specifications in Table A3.
This evidence is consistent with studies of the Peruvian educational sector, which
emphasize near-universal access (Saavedra, 2002; Portocarrero, 1988).
What about roads, the other principal public good in Peru? I estimate the mita's
"In some of the specifications in Appendix Table A3 that interact the RD polynomial with
the mita dummy, the estimated mita effect is near 0. This discrepancy is explained by two mita
districts with relatively high literacy located near the mita boundary, to which these specifications
are sensitive. When these two observations are dropped, the magnitude of the effect is similar
across specifications.
32Data from the 1981 Population Census likewise do not show a mita effect on years of schooling.
Moreover, data collected by the Ministry of Education in 2005 reveal no systematic differences in
primary or secondary school enrollment or completion rates. Examination of data from a 2006 cen-
sus of schools likewise showed little evidence for a causal impact of the mita on school infrastructure
or the student-to-teacher ratio.
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impact using a GIS road map of Peru produced by the Ministry of Transportation
(2006). The map classifies roads as paved, gravel, non-gravel, and trocha carrozable,
which translates as "narrow path, often through wild vegetation ... that a vehicle
can be driven on with great difficulty" (Real Academia Espafiola, 2008). The total
length (in m) of district roads is divided by the district surface area (in km 2 ) to
obtain a road network density.
Column 1 of Table 8 suggests that the mita does not impact local road networks,
which consist primarily of non-gravel and trocha roads. Care is required in interpret-
ing this result, as the World Bank's Rural Roads program, operating since 1997, has
worked to reduce disparities in local road networks in marginalized areas of Peru. In
contrast, there are significant disparities in regional road networks, which connect
population centers to each other. Column (2), Panel A estimates that a mita ef-
fect lowers the density of regional roads by a statistically significant -29.3 meters of
roadway for every km 2 of district surface area (s.e. = 16.0). In Panels B and C, the
coefficients are similar, at -32.6 and -35.8 respectively, and are significant at the 1%
level. This large effect compares to an average road density in mita districts of 20.
Column (3) breaks down the result by looking only at the two highest quality road
types, paved and gravel, and a similar picture emerges. 33
If substantial population and economic activity endogenously clustered along
roads, the relative poverty of mita districts would not be that surprising. While
many of Peru's roads were built or paved in the interlude between 1940 and 1990,
aggregate population responses appear minimal. The correlation between 1940 dis-
trict population density and the density of paved and gravel roads, measured in 2006,
is 0.58; when looking at this correlation using 1993 population density, it remains at
3318% of mita districts can be accessed by paved roads versus 40% of non-mita districts (INEI,
2004).
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0.58.
In summary, while I find little evidence that a mita effect persists through ac-
cess to schooling, there are pronounced disparities in road networks across the mita
boundary. Consistent with this evidence, I hypothesize that the long-term presence
of large landowners provided a stable land tenure system that encouraged public
goods provision.34 Because established landowners in non-mita districts controlled
a large percentage of the productive factors and because their property rights were
secure, it is probable that they received higher returns to investing in public goods
than those inside the mita catchment. Moreover, historical evidence indicates that
these landowners were better able to secure roads, through lobbying for government
resources and organizing local labor, and these roads remain today (Stein, 1980, p.
59).35
1.4.3 Proximate Determinants of Household Consumption
This section examines the mita's long-run effects on the proximate determinants of
consumption. The limited available evidence does not suggest differences in invest-
ment, so I focus on the labor force and market participation. 36 Agriculture is an
important economic activity, providing primary employment for around 70% of the
population in the region examined. Thus, Table 9 begins by looking at the percent-
age of the district labor force whose primary occupation is agriculture, taken from
34 The elasticity of equivalent consumption in 2001 with respect to haciendas per capita in 1689,
in non-mita districts, is 0.036 (s.e. = 0.022).
31The first modern road building campaigns occurred in the 1920's and many of the region's
roads were constructed in the 1950's (Stein, 1980, Capufnay, 1951, p. 197-199).
3 6Data from the 1994 Agricultural Census on utilization of fifteen types of capital goods and
twelve types of infrastructure for agricultural production do not show differences across the mita
boundary, nor is the length of fallowing different. I am not aware of data on private investment
outside of agriculture.
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the 1993 Population Census. The median point estimate on mitad is equal to 0.10
and marginally significant only in Panel C, providing some weak evidence for a mita
effect on employment in agriculture. Further results (not shown) do not find an effect
on male and female labor force participation and hours worked.
The dependent variable in column (2), from the 1994 Agricultural Census, is a
dummy equal to one if the agricultural household sells at least part of its produce
in market. The corpus of evidence suggests we can be confident that the mita's
effects persist in part through an economically meaningful impact on agricultural
market participation, though the precise magnitude of this effect is difficult to con-
vincingly establish given the properties of the data and the mechanics of RD. The
cubic longitude-latitude regression estimates a long-run mita effect of -0.074 (s.e. =
0.036), which is significant at the 5% level and compares to a mean market par-
ticipation rate in the study region of 0.17. The magnitude of this estimate differs
substantially from estimates that use a cubic polynomial in distance to Potosi (Panel
B, -0.208, s.e. = 0.030) and a cubic polynomial in distance to the mita boundary
(Panel C, -0.225, s.e. = 0.032). It also contrasts to the estimate from ordinary least
squares limiting the sample to districts bordering the boundary (-0.178, s.e.= 0.050).
The surface plots in Figure 3 shed some light on why the cubic longitude-latitude
point estimate is smaller. They show predicted values in "longitude-latitude-market
participation rate" space from regressing the market participation dummy on the
mita dummy (upper left), the mita dummy and a linear polynomial in longitude-
latitude (upper right), the mita dummy and a quadratic polynomial in longitude-
latitude (lower left), or the mita dummy and a cubic polynomial in longitude-latitude
(lower right)." The mita region is seen from the side, appearing as a "canyon" with
37I show three-dimensional surface plots, instead of shaded plots as in Figure 2, because the
predicted values can be seen more clearly, and it is not necessary to plot the data points.
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lower market participation values. In the surface plot with the cubic polynomial,
which is analogous to the regression in Panel A, the function increases smoothly and
steeply, by orders of magnitude, near the mita boundary. In contrast, the other plots
model less of the steep variation near the boundary as smooth and thus estimate
a larger discontinuity. The single-dimensional RDs likewise have fewer degrees of
freedom to model the variation near the boundary as smooth. It is not obvious which
specification produces the most accurate results, as a more flexible specification will
not necessarily yield a more reliable estimate. For example, consider the stylized case
of an equation that includes the mita dummy and a polynomial with as many terms
as observations. This has a solution that perfectly fits the data with a discontinuity
term of zero, regardless of how large the true mita effect is. On the other hand,
flexibility is important if parsimonious specifications do not have enough degrees of
freedom to accurately model smoothly changing unobservables. While there is not,
for example, a large urban area at the peak of the cubic polynomial causing market
participation to increase steeply in this region, it is difficult to conclusively argue
that the variation is attributable to the discontinuity and not to unobservables, or
vice versa.38 The estimates in Tables 9 and A3 are most useful for determining a
range of possible mita effects consistent with the data, and this range supports an
economically meaningful mita effect on market participation. 39
A mita effect on market participation is consistent with the findings on road
networks, particularly given that recent studies on Andean Peru empirically connect
poor road infrastructure to higher transaction costs, lower market participation,
38 Note, however, that the relatively large (mita) urban area of Ayacucho, while outside the study
region, is near the cluster of mita districts with high market participation in the upper left corner
of the mita area.
39The specifications interacting the mita dummy with a linear or quadratic polynomial in distance
to the mita boundary, reported in Table A3, do not estimate a significant mita effect. Graphical
evidence suggests that these specifications are sensitive to outliers near the boundary.
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and reduced household income (Escobal and Ponce, 2002; Escobal, 2001; Agreda
and Escobal, 1998).' An alternative hypothesis is that agricultural producers in
mita districts supplement their income by working as wage laborers rather than
by producing for markets. In column (3), the dependent variable is an indicator
equal to one if a member of the agricultural household participates in secondary
employment outside the agricultural unit, also taken from the 1994 Agricultural
Census. Estimates suggest that, if anything, the mita effect on participation in
secondary employment is negative.
Could residents in mita districts have less desire to participate in the market
economy, rather than being constrained by poor road infrastructure? While Shining
Path, a Maoist guerilla movement, gained a strong foothold in the region during the
1980's, this hypothesis seems unlikely.4 1 Shining Path's rise to power occurred against
a backdrop of limited support for Maoist ideology, and the movement's attempts to
reduce participation in markets were unpopular and unsuccessful where attempted
4 0In my sample, 33% of agricultural households in districts with paved road density above the
median participate in markets, as compared to 13% in districts with paved road density below the
median. Of course, there may also exist other channels through which a mita effect lowers market
participation. Data from the 1994 Agricultural Census reveal that the median size of household
landholdings is somewhat lower inside the mita catchment (at 1.2 hectares) than outside (at 1.4
hectares). If marketing agricultural produce involves fixed costs, a broader group of small farmers
in non-mita districts may find it profitable.
41Many of the factors linked to the mita (poor infrastructure, limited access to markets, poorly
defined property rights, and poverty) are heavily emphasized as the leading factors promoting
Shining Path (CVR, 2003, vol. 1, p. 94, McClintock, 1998; Palmer, 1994). Thus, I tested whether
there was a mita effect on Shining Path (results available upon request). To measure the intensity
of Shining Path, I exploit a loophole in the Peruvian constitution that stipulates that when more
than two thirds of votes cast are blank or null, authorities cannot be renewed (Pareja and Gatti,
1990). In an attempt to sabotage the 1989 municipal elections, Shining Path operatives encouraged
citizens to cast blank or null (secret) ballots (McClintock, 1993, p. 79). I find that a mita effect
increased blank/null votes by 10.7 percentage points (standard error = 0.031), suggesting greater
support for and intimidation by Shining Path in mita districts. Moreover, estimates show that a
mita effect increased the probability that authorities were not renewed by a highly significant 43.5
percentage points. I also look at blank/null votes in 2002, ten years after Shining Path's defeat,
and there is no longer an effect.
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(McClintock, 1998; Palmer 1994).
Recent qualitative evidence also underscores roads and market access. The cit-
izens I spoke with, while visiting eight primarily mita and six primarily non-mita
provinces, were acutely aware that some areas are more prosperous than others.
When discussing the factors leading to the observed income differences, a common
theme was that it is difficult to transport crops to markets. Thus, most residents in
mita districts are engaged in subsistence farming. Agrarian scientist Edgar Gonzales
Castro argues: "Some provinces have been favored, with the government - partic-
ularly during the large road building campaign in the early 1950's - choosing to
construct roads in some provinces and completely ignore others" (Dec. 14th, 2006).
At the forefront of the local government's mission in the (primarily mita) province of
Espinar is "to advocate effectively for a system of modern roads to regional markets"
(2008). Popular demands have also centered on roads and markets. In 2004, (the
mita district) Ilave made international headlines when demonstrations involving over
10,000 protestors culminated with the lynching of Ilave's mayor, whom protestors
accused of failing to deliver on promises to pave the town's access road and build a
local market (Shifter, 2004).
1.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper documents and exploits plausible exogenous variation in the assignment
of the mita to identify channels through which it influences contemporary economic
development. I estimate that its long-run effects lower household consumption by
around 25% and increase stunting in children by around six percentage points. I then
document land tenure, public goods, and market participation as channels through
which its impacts persist.
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In existing theories about land inequality and long-run growth, the implicit coun-
terfactual to large landowners in Latin America is secure, enfranchised smallholders
(Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997). This is not an appropriate counterfactual for Peru,
or many other places in Latin America, because institutional structures largely in
place before the formation of the landed elite did not provide secure property rights,
protection from exploitation, or a host of other guarantees to potential smallholders.
Large landowners - while they did not aim to promote economic prosperity for the
masses - did shield individuals from exploitation by a highly extractive state and
ensure public goods. This evidence suggests that exploring constraints on how the
state can be used to shape economic interactions - for example, the extent to which
elites can employ state machinery to coerce labor or citizens can use state guarantees
to protect their property - is a more useful starting point than land inequality for
modeling Latin America's long-run growth trajectory. The development of general
models of institutional evolution and empirical investigation of how these constraints
are influenced by forces promoting change are particularly central areas for future
research.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
<100 km of mita boundary
Inside Outside SE
<75 km of mita boundary
Inside Outside SE
Sample falls within:
<50 km of mita boundary
Inside Outside SE
<25 km of mita boundary
Inside Outside SE
GIS Measures
Elevation
Slope
Observations
% Indigenous
Observations
Log 1572 tribute
rate
% 1572 tribute to:
Spanish Nobility 59.80
Spanish Priests 21.05
Spanish Justices 13.36
Indigenous Mayors 5.67
Observations 63
4042 4018
5.54 7.21
177 95
63.59 58.84
1112 366
[188.77
(85.54)
[0.88]*
(0.49)***
[11.19]
(9.76)
1.57 1.60 [0.04]
(0.03)
63.82
19.10
12.58
4.40
41
[1.39]***
(1.36)***
[0.90]**
(0.94)**
[0.53]
(0.48)*
[0.78]
(0.85)
4085 4103
5.75 7.02
144 86
71.00 64.55
831 330
[166.92]
(82.75)
[0.86]
(0.52)**
[8.04]
(8.14)
1.57 1.60 [0.04]
(0.03)
59.98
21.90
13.31
4.55
47
63.69
19.45
12.46
4.29
37
[1.56] **
(1.53)**
{1.02)**
(1.02)**
[0.65]
(0.60)
[0.26]
(0.29)
4117
5.87
104
4096
6.95
73
71.01 64.54
683 330
[169.45]
(89.61)
[0.95]
(0.58)*
[8.42]
(8.43)
1.58 1.61 [0.05]
(0.04)
62.01
20.59
12.81
4.42
35
63.07
19.93
12.48
4.47
30
[1.12]
(1.34)
[0.76]
(0.92)
[0.43]
(0.55)
[0.34]
(0.33)
4135 4060
5.77 7.21
48 52
74.47 63.35
329 251
[146.16]
(115.15)
[0.90]
(0.79)*
[10.87]
(10.52)
1.65 1.61 [0.02]*
(0.03)
61.01 63.17 [1.58]
(2.21)
21.45 19.98 [1.01]
(1.33)
13.06 12.37 [0.56]
(0.79)
4.48 4.42 [0.29]
(0.39)
18 24
The unit of observation is twenty kilometer by twenty kilometer grid cells for the geospatial measures, the household for % indigenous, and the
district for the 1572 tribute data. Conley standard errors for the difference in means between mita and non-mita observations are in brackets.
Robust standard errors for the difference in means are in parentheses. For % indigenous, the robust standard errors are corrected for clustering at the
district level. The geospatial measures are calculated using elevation data at 30 arc second (one kilometer) resolution (SRTM, 2000). The unit of
measure for elevation is 1000 meters and for slope is degrees. A household is indigenous if its members primarily speak an indigenous language in the
home (ENAHO, 2001). The tribute data are taken from Miranda, 1975 [1583]. In the first three columns, the sample includes only observations
located less than 100 kilometers from the mita boundary, and this threshold is reduced to 75, 50, and finally 25 kilometers in the succeeding columns.
Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
Table 2: Living Standards
Dependent variable is:
Log equiv. hh. consumption (2001) Stunted growth, children 6-9 (2005)
<100 km <75 km
Sample Within: of bound.
(1)
of bound.
(2)
<50 km
of bound.
(3)
A: Cubic Polynomial in Latitude and Longitude
Mita -0.284 -0.216 -0.331
(0.198) (0.207) (0.219)
R2 0.060 0.060 0.069
B: Cubic Polynomial in Distance to Potosi
Mita -0.337*** -0.307*** -0.329***
(0.087) (0.101) (0.096)
R2  0.046 0.036 0.047
C: Cubic Polynomial in Distance to Mita Boundary
Mita -0.277*** -0.230** -0.224**
(0.078) (0.089) (0.092)
R 2 0.044 0.042 0.040
<100 km <75 km <50 km border
of bound. of bound. of bound. district
(4) (5) (6) (7)
0.070 0.084* 0.087* 0.114**
(0.043) (0.046) (0.048) (0.049)
0.051 0.020 0.017 0.050
0.080*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.063*
(0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.032)
0.049 0.017 0.013 0.047
0.073*** 0.061*** 0.064*** 0.055*
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.030)
0.040 0.015 0.013 0.043
Geo. Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Boundary F.E.s yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 71 60 52 289 239 185 63
Observations 1,478 1,161 1,013 158,848 115,761 100,446 37,421
The unit of observation is the household in columns (1) through (3) and the individual in columns (4) through (7). Robust standard errors, adjusted
for clustering by district, are in parentheses. The dependent variable is log equivalent household consumption (ENAHO, 2001) in columns (1)
through (3), and a dummy equal to 1 if the child has stunted growth and equal to 0 otherwise in columns (4) through (7) (Ministry of Education,
2005). Mita is an indicator equal to one if the household's district contributed to the mita and equal to zero otherwise (Saignes, 1984; Amat y Juniet,
1947, p. 249, 284). Panel A includes a cubic polynomial in the latitude and longitude of the observation's district capital, Panel B includes a cubic
polynomial in Euclidean distance from the observation's district capital to Potosf, and Panel C includes a cubic polynomial in Euclidean distance to
the nearest point on the mita boundary. All regressions include controls for elevation and slope, as well as boundary segment fixed effects. Columns
(1) through (3) include demographic controls for the number of infants, children, and adults in the household. In the first and fourth columns, the
sample includes observations whose district capitals are located within 100 kilometers of the mita boundary, and this threshold is reduced to 75 and
50 kilometers in the succeeding columns. Column (7) includes only observations whose districts border the mita boundary. 78% of the observations
are in mita districts in column (1), 71% in column (2), 68% in column (3), 78% in column (4), 71% in column (5), 68% in column (6), and 58% in
column (7). Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
Table 3: Specification Tests
Dependent variable is:
Log equiv. household consump. (2001) Stunted growth, children 6-9 (2005)
<100 km
Sample Within: of bound.
(1)
<75 km
of bound.
(2)
<50 km
of bound.
(3)
Alternative functional forms for RD polynomial: Baseline
Linear polynomial in latitude and longitude
Mita -0.294*** -0.199 -0.143
(0.092) (0.126) (0.128)
Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude
Mita -0.151 -0.247 -0.361
(0.189) (0.209) (0.216)
Quartic polynomial in latitude and longitude
Mita -0.392* -0.324 -0.342
(0.225) (0.231) (0.260)
Alternative functional forms for RD polynomial: Baseline
Linear polynomial in distance to Potosi
Mita -0.297*** -0.273***
(0.079) (0.093)
Quadratic polynomial in distance to Potosi
Mita -0.345*** -
(0.086)
Quartic polynomial in distancei
Mita -0.331*** -
(0.086)
Interacted linear polynomial in
Mita -0.307*** -
(0.092)
Interacted quadratic polynomial
Mita -0.264***
(0.087)
0.262***
(0.095)
to Potosi
0.310***
(0.100)
distance to Potosi
0.280***
(0.094)
in distance to Pot
-0.177*
(0.096)
-0.220**
(0.092)
0.309***
(0.100)
0.330***
(0.097)
-0.227**
(0.095)
tosi
-0.285**
(0.111)
Alternative functional forms for RD polynomial: Baseline
Linear polynomial in distance to mita boundary
Mita -0.299*** -0.227** -0.223**
(0.082) (0.089) (0.091)
Quadratic polynomial in distance to mita boundary
Mita -0.277*** -0.227** -0.224**
(0.078) (0.089) (0.092)
Quartic polynomial in distance to mita boundary
Mita -0.251*** -0.229** -0.246***
(0.078) (0.089) (0.088)
Interacted linear polynomial in distance to mita boundary
Mita -0.301* -0.277 -0.385*
(0.174) (0.190) (0.210)
Interacted quadratic polynomial in distance to mita boundary
Mita -0.351 -0.505 -0.295
(0.260) (0.319) (0.366)
Ordinary Least Squares
Mita -0.294*** -0.288*** -0.227**
(0.083) (0.089) (0.090)
Geo. Controls
Boundary F.E.s
Clusters
Observations
yes
yes
71
1,478
yes
yes
60
1,161
yes
yes
52
1,013
<100 km <75 km <50 km border
of bound. of bound. of bound. district
(4) (5) (6) (7)
I
0.064*** 0.054** 0.062** 0.068**
(0.021) (0.022) (0.026) (0.031)
0.073* 0.091** 0.106** 0.087**
(0.040) (0.043) (0.047) (0.041)
0.073 0.072 0.057 0.104**
(0.056) (0.050) (0.048) (0.042)
II
0.050** 0.048** 0.049** 0.071**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.031)
0.072*** 0.064*** 0.072*** 0.060*
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.032)
0.078*** 0.075*** 0.071*** 0.053*
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.031)
0.051** 0.048** 0.043* 0.076***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.029)
0.033 0.027 0.039* 0.036
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
III
0.072*** 0.060*** 0.058** 0.056*
(0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.032)
0.072*** 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.056*
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.030)
0.073*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.055*
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.030)
0.082 0.087 0.095 0.132**
(0.054) (0.055) (0.065) (0.053)
0.140* 0.132 0.136 0.121*
(0.082) (0.084) (0.086) (0.064)
0.057** 0.048* 0.049* 0.055*
(0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.031)
yes
yes
289
158,848
yes
yes
239
115,761
yes
yes
185
100,446
yes
yes
63
37,421
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by district, are in parentheses. All regressions include geographic
controls and boundary segment fixed effects. Columns (1) through (3) include demographic controls for the number
of infants, children, and adults in the household. Coefficients significantly different from zero are denoted by: *10%,
**5%, and ***1%.
Table 4: Additional Specification Tests
Log equivalent household consumption (2001)
Excludes
districts
Control for Includes with Inca
Baseline ethnicity Cusco estates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Excludes
portions of
boundary
formed by
rivers
(5)
Flexible
estimation
of consump.
equivalence
(6)
Migration
(7)
A: Cubic Polynomial in Latitude and Longitude
Mita -0.331 -0.202 -0.465** -0.281 -0.322 -0.326 -0.223
(0.219) (0.157) (0.207) (0.265) (0.215) (0.230) (0.198)
R
2  0.069 0.154 0.104 0.065 0.070 0.292 0.067
B: Cubic Polynomial in Distance to Potosi
Mita -0.329*** -0.282*** -0.450*** -0.354*** -0.376*** -0.328*** -0.263***
(0.096) (0.073) (0.096) (0.101) (0.114) (0.099) (0.095)
R2 0.047 0.140 0.087 0.036 0.049 0.275 0.042
C: Cubic Polynomial in Distance to Mita Boundary
Mita -0.224** -0.195*** -0.333*** -0.255** -0.217** -0.224** -0.161*
(0.092) (0.070) (0.087) (0.110) (0.098) (0.095) (0.088)
R2 0.040 0.135 0.088 0.047 0.039 0.270 0.037
Geo. Controls
Bound. F.E.s
Clusters
Obs.
yes
yes
52
1013
yes
yes
52
1013
yes
yes
57
1173
yes
yes
47
930
yes
yes
51
992
yes
yes
52
1013
yes
yes
52
997
Stunted growth, children 6-9 (2005)Stunted growth, children 6-9 (2005)
Excludes
Excludes portions of
districts boundary
Includes with Inca formed by
Baseline Cusco estates rivers Migration
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
0.087* 0.147*** 0.093* 0.090* 0.069
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049)
0.017 0.046 0.019 0.018 0.016
0.078*** 0.146*** 0.077*** 0.081*** 0.060**
(0.024) (0.030) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025)
0.013 0.039 0.014 0.013 0.012
0.064*** 0.132*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.046*
(0.023) (0.027) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024)
0.013 0.042 0.014 0.013 0.012
yes
yes
185
100,446
yes
yes
195
127,259
yes
yes
180
96,440
yes
yes
183
99,940
yes
yes
185
98,922
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by district, are in parentheses. All regressions include soil type indicators and boundary segment fixed
effects. Columns (1) through (5) and (7) include demographic controls for the number of infants, children, and adults in the household. Column (6)
includes controls for the log of household size and the ratio of children to household members, using the log of household consumption as the
dependent variable. The samples include observations whose district capitals are less than 50 kilometers from the mita boundary. Coefficients that
are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
Table 5: 1572 Tribute and Population
Dependent variable is:
Log Share of Tribute Revenues to
Mean Spanish Spanish Spanish Indig. Percent
Tribute Nobility Priests Justices Mayors Men Boys Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A: Cubic Polynomial in Latitude and Longitude
Mita 0.020 -0.010 0.004 0.004 0.003 -0.006 0.011 -0.009
(0.031) (0.030) (0.019) (0.010) (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) (0.016)
R2 0.762 0.109 0.090 0.228 0.266 0.596 0.377 0.599
B: Cubic Polynomial in Distance to Potos'
Mita 0.019 -0.013 0.008 0.006 -0.001 -0.012 0.005 -0.011
(0.029) (0.025) (0.015) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
R2 0.597 0.058 0.073 0.151 0.132 0.315 0.139 0.401
C: Cubic Polynomial in Distance to Mita Boundary
Mita 0.040 -0.009 0.005 0.003 -0.001 -0.011 0.001 -0.008
(0.030) (0.018) (0.012) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
R2 0.406 0.062 0.096 0.118 0.162 0.267 0.190 0.361
Geo. Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Boundary F.E.s yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Mean Dep. Var. 1.591 0.625 0.203 0.127 0.044 0.193 0.204 0.544
Observations 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
The dependent variable in column (1) is the log of the district's mean 1572 tribute rate (Miranda, 1975 [1583]). In
columns (2) through (5), it is the share of tribute revenue allocated to Spanish nobility (encomenderos), Spanish
priests, Spanish justices, and indigenous mayors (caciques), respectively. In Columns (6) through (8), it is the share
of 1572 district population composed of males (aged 18 to 50), boys, and females (of all ages), respectively. Panel A
includes a cubic polynomial in longitude and latitude, Panel B includes a cubic polynomial in Euclidean distance
from the observation's district capital to Potosi, and Panel C includes a cubic polynomial in Euclidean distance to
the nearest point on the mita boundary. All regressions geographic controls and boundary segment fixed effects.
The samples include districts whose capitals are less than 50 kilometers from the mita boundary. Column (1)
weights by the square root of the district's tributary population and columns (6) through (8) weight by the square
root of the district's total population. 66% of the observations are from mita districts. Coefficients that are
significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
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Table 6: Land Tenure and Labor Systems
Dependent variable is:
Percent of rural
Haciendos per tributary Percent of rural
1000 district population in population in
Haciendas per residents in haciendas in haciendas in Land gini in
district in 1689 1689 c. 1845 1940 1994
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A: Cubic Polynomial in Latitude and Longitude
Mita -12.683*** -6.453** -0.127* -0.066 0.078
(3.221) (2.490) (0.067) (0.086) (0.053)
R2 0.538 0.582 0.410 0.421 0.245
B: Cubic Polynomial in Distance to Potosi
Mita -10.316*** -7.570*** -0.204** -0.143*** 0.107***
(2.057) (1.478) (0.082) (0.051) (0.036)
R 2  0.494 0.514 0.308 0.346 0.194
C: Cubic Polynomial in Distance to Mita Boundary
Mita -11.336*** -8.516*** -0.212*** -0.120*** 0.124***
(2.074) (1.665) (0.060) (0.045) (0.033)
R 0.494 0.497 0.316 0.336 0.226
Geo. Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Boundary F.E.s yes yes yes yes yes
Mean Dep. Var. 6.500 5.336 0.135 0.263 0.783
Observations 74 74 81 119 181
The unit of observation is the district. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable in
column (1) is haciendas per district in 1689 and in column (2) is haciendas per 1000 district residents in 1689
(Villanueva Urteaga, 1982). In column (3) it is the percentage of the district's tributary population residing in
haciendas c. 1845 (Peralta Ruiz, 1991), in column (4) it is the percentage of the district's rural population residing
in haciendas in 1940 (Censo Nacional de Poblacion y Ocupaci6n, 1944), and in column (5) it is the district land
gini (Tercer Censo Nacional Agropecuario, 1994). Panel A includes a cubic polynomial in the latitude and
longitude of the observation's district capital, Panel B includes a cubic polynomial in Euclidean distance from the
observation's district capital to Potosi, and Panel C includes a cubic polynomial in Euclidean distance to the
nearest point on the mita boundary. All regressions include geographic controls and boundary segment fixed
effects. The samples include districts whose capitals are less than 50 kilometers from the mita boundary. Column
(3) is weighted by the square root of the district's rural tributary population and column (4) is weighted by the
square root of the district's rural population. 58% of the observations are in mita districts in columns (1) and (2),
59% in column (3), 62% in column (4), and 66% in column (5). Coefficients that are significantly different from
zero are denoted by the following system: *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
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Table 7: Education
Dependent variable is:
Mean years Mean years
Literacy of schooling of schooling
1876 1940 2001
(1) (2) (3)
A: Cubic Polynomial in Latitude and Longitude
Mita -0.015 -0.265 -1.479*
(0.012) (0.177) (0.872)
R2 0.401 0.280 0.020
B: Cubic Polynomial in Distance to Potosi
Mita -0.020*** -0.181** -0.341
(0.007) (0.078) (0.451)
R2 0.345 0.187 0.007
C. Cubic Polynomial in Dist. to Mita Bound.
Mita -0.022*** -0.209*** -0.111
(0.006) (0.076) (0.429)
R2 0.301 0.234 0.004
Geo. Controls yes yes yes
Boundary F.E.s yes yes yes
Mean Dep. Var. 0.036 0.470 4.457
Clusters 95 118 52
Observations 95 118 4,038
The unit of observation is the district in columns (1) and (2) and the individual in column (3). Robust standard
errors, adjusted for clustering by district, are in parentheses. The dependent variable is mean literacy in 1876 in
column (1) (Censo general de la republica del Perd, 1878), mean years of schooling in 1940 in column (2) (Censo
Nacional de Poblaci6n y Ocupaci6n, 1944), and individual years of schooling in 2001 in column (3) (ENAHO,
2001).Panel A includes a cubic polynomial in the latitude and longitude of the observation's district capital, Panel
B includes a cubic polynomial in Euclidean distance from the observation's district capital to Potosi, and Panel C
includes a cubic polynomial in Euclidean distance to the nearest point on the mita boundary. All regressions include
geographic controls and boundary segment fixed effects. The samples include districts whose capitals are less than
50 kilometers from the mita boundary. Columns (1) and (2) are weighted by the square root of the district's
population. 64% of the observations are in mita districts in column (1), 63% in column (2), and 67% in column (3).
Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
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Table 8: Roads
Dependent variable is:
Density of
Density of Density of paved/gravel
local road regional road regional
networks networks roads
(1) (2) (3)
A: Cubic Polynomial in Latitude and Longitude
Mita 0.464 -29.276* -22.426*
(18.575) (16.038) (12.178)
R2 0.232 0.293 0.271
B: Cubic Polynomial in Distance to Potosi
Mita -1.522 -32.644*** -30.698***
(12.101) (8.988) (8.155)
R 0.217 0.271 0.256
C. Cubic Polynomial in Dist. to Mita Bound.
Mita 0.535 -35.831*** -32.458***
(12.227) (9.386) (8.638)
R2 0.213 0.226 0.208
Geo. Controls yes yes yes
Boundary F.E.s yes yes yes
Mean Dep. Var. 85.34 33.55 22.51
Observations 185 185 185
The unit of observation is the district. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The road densities are defined as
total length in meters of the respective road type in each district divided by the district's surface area, in km 2 .
They are calculated using a GIS map of Peru's road networks (Ministro de Transporte, 2006). Panel A includes a
cubic polynomial in the latitude and longitude of the observation's district capital, Panel B includes a cubic
polynomial in Euclidean distance from the observation's district capital to Potosi, and Panel C includes a cubic
polynomial in Euclidean distance to the nearest point on the mita boundary. All regressions include geographic
controls and boundary segment fixed effects. The samples include districts whose capitals are less than 50
kilometers from the mita boundary. 66% of the observations are in mita districts. Coefficients that are significantly
different from zero are denoted by the following system: *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
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Table 9: Consumption Channels
Dependent variable is:
Household
Percent of district Agricultural member
labor force in household sells employed outside
agriculture - part of produce in the agricultural
1993 markets - 1994 unit - 1994
(1) (2) (3)
A: Cubic Polynomial in Latitude and Longitude
Mita 0.211 -0.074** -0.013
(0.140) (0.036) (0.032)
R2 0.177 0.176 0.010
B: Cubic Polynomial in Distance to Potosi
Mita 0.101 -0.208*** -0.033
(0.061) (0.030) (0.020)
R2 0.112 0.144 0.008
C: Cubic Polynomial in Distance to Mita Boundary
Mita 0.092* -0.225*** -0.038**
(0.054) (0.032) (0.018)
R2 0.213 0.136 0.006
Geo. Controls yes yes yes
Boundary F.E.s yes yes yes
Mean Dep. Var. 0.697 0.173 0.245
Clusters 179 178 182
Observations 179 160,990 183,596
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering by district in columns (2) and (3), are in parentheses. The
dependent variable in column (1) is the percentage of the district's labor force engaged in agriculture as a primary
occupation (IX Censo de Poblacion, 1993), in column (2) it is an indicator equal to one if the agricultural unit sells
at least part of its produce in markets, and in column (3) it is an indicator equal to one if at least one member of
the household pursues secondary employment outside the agricultural unit (Tercer Censo Nacional Agropecuario,
1994). Panel A includes a cubic polynomial in the latitude and longitude of the observation's district capital, Panel
B includes a cubic polynomial in Euclidean distance from the observation's district capital to Potosf, and Panel C
includes a cubic polynomial in Euclidean distance to the nearest point on the mita boundary. All regressions include
geographic controls and boundary segment fixed effects. Column (1) is weighted by the square root of the district's
population. 66% of the observations in column (1) are in mita districts, 68% in column (2), and 69% in column (3).
Coefficients that are significantly different from zero are denoted by the following system: *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
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Figure 1
The mita boundary is in black and the study boundary in light gray. Districts falling inside the
contiguous area formed by the mita boundary contributed to the mita. Elevation is shown in the
background.
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Chapter 2
Trafficking Networks and the
Mexican Drug War
2.1 Introduction
Drug trade-related violence has escalated dramatically in Mexico during the past
five years, claiming over 40,000 lives and raising concerns about the capacity of the
Mexican state to monopolize violence. Recent years have also witnessed large scale
efforts to combat drug trafficking, spearheaded by Mexico's conservative National
Action Party (PAN). While drug traffickers are economic actors with clear profit
maximization motives, there is little empirical evidence on how traffickers' economic
objectives have influenced the effects of Mexican policy towards the drug trade. More
generally, it remains controversial whether state policies have caused the marked
increase in violence, or whether violence would have risen substantially in any case
(Guerrero, 2011; Rios, 2011a; Shirk, 2011). This study uses variation from close
mayoral elections and a network model of drug trafficking to examine the direct and
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spillover effects of crackdowns on drug trafficking.
Mexico is the largest supplier to the U.S. illicit drug market (U.N. World Drug
Report, 2011). While Mexican drug traffickers engage in a wide variety of illicit
activities - including domestic drug sales, protection rackets, kidnapping, human
smuggling, prostitution, oil and fuel theft, money laundering, weapons trafficking,
and auto theft - the largest share of their revenues derives from trafficking drugs
from Mexico to the U.S. (Guerrero, 2011, p. 10). Official data described later in this
paper document that in 2008, drug trafficking organizations maintained operations
in two thirds of Mexico's municipalities and illicit drugs were cultivated in 14% of
municipalities.
This study begins by specifying a network model of drug trafficking in which traf-
fickers' objective is to minimize the costs incurred in trafficking drugs from producing
municipalities in Mexico across the Mexican road network to the United States. This
model is used as an empirical tool for analyzing the direct and spillover effects of
local policy towards the drug trade. In the simplest version of the model, the cost of
traversing each edge in the road network is proportional to the physical length of the
edge, and hence traffickers take the shortest route to the nearest U.S. point of entry.
After examining the relationships in the data using this shortest paths model, the
study specifies and estimates a richer version of the model that imposes congestion
costs when trafficking routes coincide.
A challenge of identifying the effects of crackdowns on violence is that the state
does not randomly decide to combat drug trafficking in some places but not others,
and they may choose to crack down in municipalities where violence is expected to
increase. In order to isolate plausibly exogenous variation in policy towards the drug
trade, I exploit the outcomes of close mayoral elections involving the PAN party.1
'See Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004) for a pioneering example of a regression discontinuity design
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The PAN's role in spearheading the war on drug trafficking, as well as qualitative
evidence that PAN mayors have contributed to these efforts, motivate this empirical
strategy. While municipalities where PAN candidates win by a wide margin are likely
to be different from municipalities where they lose, when we focus on close elections
it becomes plausible that the outcomes are driven by idiosyncratic factors that do
not themselves affect violence. In fact, the outcomes of close elections involving the
PAN are uncorrelated with a large number of municipal characteristics measured
prior to the elections.
The network model, variation from close mayoral elections, and data on drug
trade-related outcomes between 2007 and 2009 are used to examine three sets of
questions. First, the study asks whether the outcomes of close mayoral elections in-
volving the PAN affect drug trade-related violence and explores the economic mech-
anisms that mediate this relationship. Second, the study examines whether drug
trafficking routes are diverted to other municipalities following close PAN victories
and tests whether the diversion of drug traffic is accompanied by violence and eco-
nomic spillover effects. Finally, the study uses the trafficking model to examine the
allocation of law enforcement resources.
Regression discontinuity (RD) estimates exploiting the outcomes of close elections
show that the probability that a drug trade-related homicide occurs in a municipality
in a given month is 8.4 percentage points higher after a PAN mayor takes office than
after a non-PAN mayor takes office. This is a large effect, given that six percent of
municipality-months in the sample experienced a drug trade-related homicide. The
exploiting close elections. A number of studies have used discontinuous changes in policies, in the
cross-section or over time, to examine illicit behavior. These studies examine topics ranging from
earnings manipulation (Bollen and Pool, 2009; Bhojraj et al., 2009) to the production of defective
products (Krueger and Mas, 2004) to fixing the outcomes of sporting events (Wolfers, 2006; Duggan
and Levitt, 2002) to sex-selective abortions in Taiwan (Lin et al., 2008). See Zitzewitz (2011) for a
detailed review.
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violence response to close PAN victories consists primarily of individuals involved
in the drug trade killing each other. Analysis using information on the industrial
organization of trafficking suggests that it reflects rival traffickers' attempts to wrest
control of territories after crackdowns initiated by PAN mayors have challenged the
incumbent criminals.
These results support qualitative and descriptive studies, such as the well-known
work by Eduardo Guerrero (2011), which argue that Mexican government policy
has been the primary cause of the large increase in violence in recent years. In
municipalities with a close PAN loss, violence declines slightly in the six months
following the inauguration of new authorities as compared to the six months prior
to the election. In municipalities with a narrowly elected PAN mayor, violence -
previously at the same average level as in municipalities where the PAN barely lost
- increases sharply. The results also relate to work by Josh Angrist and Adriana
Kugler (2008) documenting that exogenous increases in coca prices increase violence
in rural districts in Colombia because combatant groups fight over the additional
rents. In Mexico, crackdowns likely reduce rents from criminal activities while in
effect, but by weakening the incumbent criminal group they also reduce the costs
of taking control of a municipality. Controlling the municipality is likely to offer
substantial rents from trafficking and a variety of other criminal activities once the
crackdown subsides.
The paper's second set of results examines whether close PAN victories exert
spillover effects. When policy leads one location to become less conducive to illicit
activities, organized crime may relocate elsewhere. For example, coca eradication
policies in Bolivia and Peru during the late-1990s led cultivation to shift to Colom-
bia, and large-scale coca eradication in Colombia in the early 2000s has since led
cultivation to re-expand in Peru and Bolivia, with South American coca cultiva-
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tion remaining unchanged between 1999 and 2009 (Isacson, 2010; Leech, 2000; UN
Office on Drugs and Crime 1999-2009). On a local level, work by Rafael Di Tella
and Ernesto Schargrodsky (2004) documents that the allocation of police officers to
Jewish institutions in Buenos Aires substantially reduced auto theft in the immedi-
ate vicinity of these institutions but may also have diverted some auto theft to as
close as two blocks away. While a number of studies have examined the economics
of the drug trade and organized crime more generally, to the best of my knowledge
this study is the first to empirically estimate spillover patterns in drug trafficking
activity.2
I begin by showing that the simple model in which traffickers take the shortest
route to the nearest U.S. point of entry robustly predicts the diversion of drug traffic
following close PAN victories. Specifically, I assume that it becomes more costly
to traffic drugs through a municipality after a close PAN victory. Because munici-
pal elections happen at different times throughout the sample period, they generate
month-to-month within-municipality variation in predicted trafficking routes. This
variation is driven by plausibly exogenous changes in politics elsewhere in Mexico
and can be compared to variation in monthly panel data on actual illicit drug con-
fiscations and other outcomes. This approach is illustrated in Figure 2-1. When the
shortest paths trafficking model is used, the presence of a predicted drug trafficking
route increases the value of illicit drug confiscations in a given municipality-month by
around 18.5 percent. Because traffickers may care about the routes that other traf-
fickers take, I also estimate a richer model that imposes congestion costs when routes
coincide. Routes predicted by this model for the beginning of the sample period are
2Prominent examples of studies of the economics of organized crime include Steve Levitt and
Sudhir Venkatesh's analysis of the finances of a U.S. drug gang (2000), sociologist Diego Gambetta's
economic analysis of the Sicilian mafia (1996), and Frederico Varese's analysis of the rise of the
Russian mafia (2005).
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shown in Figure 2-2. The richer model is similarly predictive of within-municipality
changes in confiscations, with the presence of a predicted trafficking route increasing
the value of illicit drug confiscations by around 19.5 percent. Robustness and placebo
checks support the validity of the approach.
When a municipality acquires a predicted trafficking route, the probability that
a drug trade-related homicide occurs in a given month increases by around 1.4 per-
centage points, relative to a baseline probability of 4.4 percent. This relationship
is similar regardless of whether the shortest paths model or model with congestion
is used. When routes are predicted using the model with congestion, the violence
spillovers are concentrated in municipalities where two or more routes coincide.
Moreover, when a municipality acquires a predicted route, wages earned by adult
men in the informal sector fall by around 2.5 percent and female labor force partici-
pation declines by around one percentage point, relative to a baseline participation
rate of 51 percent. Formal sector wages and male labor force participation are not af-
fected. The economic spillovers are noisily estimated and thus should be interpreted
with caution. Nevertheless, they are consistent with qualitative evidence discussed
in Section 2 that drug trafficking organizations extort informal sector producers via
protection rackets.
While high rates of violence and the flexibility of trafficking operations pose ma-
jor challenges to state efforts to combat the drug trade, this study's results indicate
that crackdowns do increase trafficking costs. Decreasing the profits of traffickers is
a central goal of Mexican drug policy because it reduces the resources that these or-
ganizations have to corrupt Mexican institutions and threaten public security (Shirk,
2011). Thus, the study's third set of results uses the trafficking model to examine
how scarce law enforcement resources can be allocated so as to increase trafficking
costs by as much as possible. I also discuss how the violent response to this policy
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may be reduced. While we would not expect there to be any easy or ideal solutions
to the challenges facing Mexico, the network approach to trafficking provides unique
information with the potential to contribute to a more nuanced and economically
informed law enforcement policy.
The next section provides an overview of Mexican drug trafficking and state
policies towards the drug trade, and Section 3 develops the network model of drug
trafficking. Section 4 tests whether the outcomes of close elections involving the PAN
influence drug trade-related violence and examines economic mechanisms underlying
this relationship. Section 5 documents that close PAN mayoral victories divert drug
traffic elsewhere. It also estimates the version of the trafficking model with congestion
and tests whether PAN crackdowns exert violence and economic spillover effects.
Section 6 utilizes the trafficking model to examine the allocation of law enforcement
resources. Finally, Section 7 offers concluding remarks.
2.2 Background
Mexican drug traffickers dominate the wholesale illicit drug market in the United
States. According to the U.N. World Drug Report, Mexico is the largest supplier of
heroin to U.S. markets and the largest foreign supplier of marijuana and metham-
phetamine. Official Mexican government data on drug producing regions, obtained
from confidential sources, document that fourteen percent of Mexico's municipalities
regularly produce opium poppy seed (used to make heroin) or cannabis. Moreover,
Mexico serves as a major transhipment hub for cocaine, with 60 to 90 percent of the
cocaine consumed in the U.S. transiting through Mexico (U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency, 2011).
The U.S. State Department estimates that wholesale revenues of Mexican drug
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traffickers in U.S. markets range from $13.6 billion to $48.4 billion annually.3 While
the margin of error on this estimate is large, there is consensus that the U.S. mar-
ket provides substantially more revenue than Mexico's domestic illicit drug market,
which is worth an estimated $560 million annually (Secretaria de Seguridad Plblica,
2010). Data on drug addiction also emphasize the importance of the U.S. illicit drug
market. According to the U.S. National Survey on Drug Use and Health, 14.2 percent
of Americans (35.5 million people) have used illicit drugs during the past year, as
contrasted to 1.4 percent of the Mexican population (1.1 million people) (Guerrero,
2011, p. 82; National Addiction Survey, 2008).
At the beginning of this study's sample period, there were six major drug traffick-
ing organizations operating in Mexico, as well as many local gangs. Official Mexican
data obtained from confidential sources document that 68 percent of Mexico's 2,456
municipalities were known to have a major drug trafficking organization or local
drug gang operating within their limits in early 2008. These data also estimate
that 49 percent of Mexico's 320 drug producing municipalities were controlled by a
major drug trafficking organization in 2008, whereas the remaining 51 percent were
controlled by local gangs.
While the term 'cartel' is used colloquially to refer to Mexican drug trafficking
organizations, these competing groups do not collude to reduce illicit drug produc-
tion or to set the price of illicit drugs. As documented in detail by Eduardo Guerrero
(2011, p. 106-108), alliances between drug trafficking organizations have been highly
unstable during the past five years. Moreover, the number of major trafficking orga-
nizations in Mexico expanded from 6 in 2007 to 16 by mid-2011, with cells breaking
3 Estimates by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency,
and the Mexican Secretaria de Seguridad Pdlblica are broadly similar and also contain a large margin
of error.
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away from the larger organizations over disputes about leadership and operational
issues (Guerrero, 2011, p. 10). Within drug trafficking organizations, most decisions
about day-to-day operations are decentralized. Decisionmaking by semi-independent
local cells ensures that no single player will be able to reveal extensive information
if he or she is captured by authorities.
While the U.S. illicit drug market provides the main source of revenues for Mex-
ican drug trafficking organizations, they are diversified into a host of other illicit ac-
tivities, including domestic drug sales, protection rackets, kidnapping, human smug-
gling, prostitution, oil and fuel theft, money laundering, weapons trafficking, and
auto theft (Guerrero, 2011, p. 10). Drug trafficking organizations have substan-
tially expanded their operations in some of these activities in recent years (Rios,
2011a). Most notably, protection rackets involving the general population have in-
creased substantially, with complaints to authorities tripling between 2004 and 2009
(Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pdiblica, 2011). In a re-
cent nationwide survey, Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2011) found that drug traffickers are
most likely to extort the poor, with 24% to 40% of surveyed households who par-
ticipate in the poverty alleviation program Oportunidades reporting that they had
been extorted by traffickers. Such activities affect the lives of many citizens who
are unaffiliated with the drug trade, and as of 2011, public opinion surveys found
that public security was more likely to be chosen as the largest problem facing the
country than concerns about the economy.
For most of the 20th century, Mexican politics were dominated by a single party,
the PRI (Institutionalized Revolutionary Party). Both local and federal authorities
took a passive stance towards drug trafficking, and there were a number of well-
documented instances in which officials engaged in drug trade-related corruption
(see for example Shannon, 1988). While the Mexican federal government periodically
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cracked down on drug trafficking, these operations were limited in size and scope.4
The PRI's dominance began to erode in the 1990s, and the first opposition president
was elected from the National Action Party (PAN) in 2000. Today Mexico is a
competitive multi-party democracy.
Government efforts to combat the drug trade have increased substantially in re-
cent years. Soon after taking office in December 2006, PAN president Felipe Calder6n
deployed 6,500 federal troops to the state of Michoacan to combat drug trade-related
violence. The government's operations against drug trafficking have continued to in-
crease since this time, with approximately 45,000 troops involved by 2011. Military
and federal police operations have been a centerpiece of Calder6n's administration,
and major judicial reforms were also legislated in 2008. However, the criminal justice
system remains weak, and it is estimated that only 2% of felony crimes are prosecuted
(Shirk, 2011).
Since the start of Calder6n's presidency in December 2006, violence has increased
dramatically in Mexico. Over 40,000 people were killed by drug trade-related violence
between 2007 and mid-2011, and drug trade-related violence has increased by at least
30 percent every year during this period (Rios, 2011b). More than 85 percent of the
violence consists of people involved in the drug trade killing each other. Whether or
not the increase in violence has been caused by state policy has been controversial,
with political scientists taking both sides of the debate (see Shirk, 2011, p. 8 for a
discussion of this controversy). Some have used qualitative and descriptive evidence
to argue that the state's policies have ignited conflicts between traffickers, leading to
the large increase in violence in recent years (see Guerrero, 2011 for a detailed dis-
4Notable examples include Operation Condor in the 1970s to eradicate illicit drug crops in
northern Mexico and the deployment of federal troops to Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas by PAN
president Vicente Fox in the early 2000s.
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cussion), while others argue that violence would have risen substantially in any case
as a result of the diversification of drug trafficking organizations into new criminal
activities (see Rios, 2011a). This study presents causal evidence linking crackdowns
to large increases in drug trade-related violence.
Local authorities command the majority of Mexico's law enforcement officers. In
total, there are 2,139 independent state, local, and federal police agencies in Mexico,
2038 of which are municipal police agencies, and 90% of Mexico's approximately
500,000 police officers are under the command of state and municipal authorities
(Guerrero, 2011, p. 20). Mayors, who are elected every three years at different times
in each of Mexico's 31 states and Federal District, name the municipal police chief
and set policies regarding police conduct. Municipal police have a limited mandate,
focusing on automobile traffic violations and minor disruptions to public order. It
is rare for them to confiscate illicit drugs, and they do not have the training or
weaponry typically required to make high level drug arrests. Because their main
activities involve patrolling the local environment, municipal police do however serve
as critical sources of information for military and federal police attacks on drug traf-
ficking operations. For the same reasons, municipal police are also valuable allies for
organized criminals, who need information on who is passing through the municipal-
ities they control so that they can protect local criminal operations and anticipate
attacks by their rivals and by federal authorities.5 The importance of municipal po-
lice is reflected by the fact that they form the largest group of public servants killed
by drug trade-related violence (Guerrero, 2011).
5 For example, in a recent meeting on national security, Mexican president Felipe Calder6n
argued: "The military report that when they enter a city, they tune into the frequency of the
municipal police radio and hear them reporting to the criminals every step they [the military] take.
'And right now they are on this avenue arriving at the traffic light on that corner, and they have
six trucks and bring this many weapons.' And these municipal police patrols attempt to block their
[the military's] access" (El Pais, August 26, 2010, translation mine.
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Qualitative evidence indicates that PAN mayors are more likely to request law
enforcement assistance from the federal government and also suggests that operations
involving the federal police and military have tended to be most effective when
the relevant local authorities are aligned with the PAN, which controls the federal
government (Guerrero, 2011, p. 70).' For example, while drug trade-related violence
initially increased in Baja California in response to a large federal intervention, the
violence has since declined, and the state is frequently showcased as a success story
of federal intervention. The governor of Baja California belongs to the PAN, which is
the party controlling Mexico's executive branch, and the federal intervention began
under the auspices of a PAN mayor in Tijuana who was enthusiastic to cooperate
with federal authorities. On the other hand, in Ciudad Juarez both the mayor
and governor belong to the opposing PRI party, and conflicts and mistrust between
municipal and federal police have been rampant.
There are several potential explanations for these patterns. Authorities from the
same party may coordinate law enforcement operations more effectively, PAN author-
ities could be less corrupted by the drug trade, or the preferences of PAN authorities
or their constituents could lead them to take a tougher stance on organized crime. 7
While disentangling these explanations is infeasible given data constraints and the
inherent empirical challenges in separately identifying politicians' motivations, these
plausible channels motivate this study's focus on close elections involving the PAN.
'Disaggregated data on federal police assignments and requests by mayors for federal police
assistance are not made available to researchers.
7I have analyzed official government data on corruption, made available by confidential sources.
This data records drug trade-related corruption of mayors in 2008, as measured primarily by in-
tercepted calls from traffickers to political officials. While the data are likely quite noisy, to my
knowledge they are the best source of information on drug trade-related corruption available. Cor-
ruption was no more common in municipalities where a PAN candidate had been elected mayor by
a narrow margin than in municipalities where the PAN candidate had lost by a narrow margin.
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2.3 A Network Model of Drug Trafficking
This section develops a simple model of the network structure of drug trafficking,
that will serve as an empirical tool for analyzing the direct and spillover effects of
local policy towards the drug trade. In this model, traffickers minimize the costs
of transporting drugs from origin municipalities in Mexico across the Mexican road
network to U.S. points of entry. In the version of the model developed in this section,
they incur costs only from the physical distance traversed, and thus take the shortest
route to the nearest U.S. point of entry. This simple shortest paths model provides
an intuitive starting point for examining the patterns in the data without having to
first develop extensive theoretical or empirical machinery.
The trafficking routes predicted by this model are used in Section 4 to explore the
mechanisms linking close PAN victories to increases in drug trade-related violence.
Section 5 then shows that the model robustly predicts the diversion of drug traffic
following close PAN victories and uses the predicted routes to locate violence and
economic spillover effects of PAN crackdowns. Specifically, I assume that close PAN
victories increase the costs of trafficking drugs through the municipalities that expe-
rience them by a pre-specified amount. Close elections occur throughout the sam-
ple period, generating plausibly exogenous month-to-month variation in predicted
trafficking routes throughout Mexico. I identify spillover effects by comparing this
variation in predicted routes to panel variation in illicit drug confiscations, violence,
and economic outcomes.
Assuming that trafficking costs depend only on physical distance is a considerable
simplification, and in particular it does not allow for interactions between traffickers.
After examining the relationships in the data using the intuitive shortest paths model,
in Section 5.2 I specify and estimate a richer version of the model that includes
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congestion costs. I use the simulated method of moments to estimate the parameters
of the congestion cost function. The model developed in this section, which assumes
that congestion costs are zero, is a special case of the richer model. In practice, both
versions of the model robustly predict the diversion of drug traffic following close
PAN victories.
I now describe the setup of the model. Let N = (V, 8) be an undirected graph
representing the Mexican road network, which consists of sets V of vertices and 8 of
edges. This network, which contains 17,453 edges, is shown in Figure 2-2. Traffickers
transport drugs across the network from a set of origin municipalities to a set of
destination municipalities. Destinations consist of U.S. points of entry via terrestrial
border crossings and major Mexican ports. While drugs may also enter the United
States between terrestrial border crossings, the large amount of legitimate commerce
between Mexico and the United States offers ample opportunities for drug traffickers
to smuggle large quantities of drugs through border crossings and ports (U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency, 2011).8 All destinations pay the same international price for
a unit of smuggled drugs. Each origin i produces a given supply of drugs and has a
trafficker whose objective is to minimize the cost of trafficking these drugs to U.S.
points of entry. I model trafficking decisions as made by local traffickers because,
as discussed in Section 2, trafficking operations are typically decentralized. While it
does not matter who makes decisions when traffickers only incur costs from distance,
this will become relevant when congestion is introduced into the model later in the
paper.
8There are 370 million entries into the U.S. through terrestrial border crossings each year, and 116
million vehicles cross the land borders with Canada and Mexico (U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency,
2011). More than 90,000 merchant and passenger ships dock at U.S. ports each year, and these ships
carry more than 9 million shipping containers. Commerce between the U.S. and Mexico exceeds a
billion dollars a day.
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The model focuses on domestically produced drugs, and origins are identified from
confidential Mexican government data on drug cultivation (heroin and marijuana)
and major drug labs (methamphetamine). Opium poppy seed and marijuana have a
long history of production in given regions with particularly suitable conditions, and
thus we can be confident that the origins for domestically produced drugs are stable
and accurate throughout the sample period. In contrast, cocaine - which can only be
produced in the Andean region - typically enters Mexico along the Pacific coast via
fishing vessels and go-fast boats (U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, 2011). Thus, the
origins for cocaine routes are more flexible, less well-known, and may have changed
substantially during the sample period. Moreover, government policies may divert
cocaine traffic away from Mexico altogether.9 For these reasons, the model focuses
on domestically produced drugs. In practice, we know little about the quantity of
drugs cultivated in each producing municipality, and hence I make the simplifying
assumption that each produces a single unit of drugs.
Trafficking paths connect producing municipalities to U.S. points of entry. For-
mally, a trafficking path is an ordered set of nodes such that an edge exists between
two successive nodes. Each edge e C E has a cost function ce(le), where 1e is the length
of the edge in kilometers. The total cost to traverse path p is w(p) = EE ce(1e),
which equals the length of the path. Let 'Pi denote the set of all possible paths
between producing municipality i and the United States. Each trafficker solves:
min w(p) (2.1)
PEPi
This problem, which amounts to choosing the shortest path between each producing
9 There is some evidence that shipments of cocaine through Haiti have increased in recent years
(U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, 2011).
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municipality and the nearest U.S. point of entry, can be solved using Dijkstra's algo-
rithm (Dijkstra, 1959), which is an application of Bellman's principal of optimality.
2.4 Direct Effects of Close PAN Victories on Vi-
olence
This section uses a regression discontinuity approach to test whether the outcomes of
close mayoral elections involving the National Action Party (PAN) - which has spear-
headed the war on drug trafficking - affect violence in the municipalities experiencing
these close elections. While disaggregated data on mayoral requests for federal police
as well as the allocation of the military and federal police are not made available to
researchers, the qualitative evidence discussed in Section 2 suggests that PAN may-
ors are more likely to crack down on the drug trade by enlisting the assistance of
federal law enforcement and coordinating operations with them. This section first
describes the data on violence and local politics and then provides a graphical anal-
ysis of the relationship between violence and the outcomes of close elections. It then
explores the robustness of this relationship and finally uses measures of the industrial
organization of drug trafficking to explore mechanisms linking the outcomes of close
elections to violence. To the extent that local crackdowns incentivize traffickers to
relocate some of their operations, PAN victories could also exert spillover effects.
These will be examined in Section 5.
2.4.1 Data
The analysis uses official government data on drug trade-related outcomes, obtained
from confidential sources unless otherwise noted. Drug trade related homicides and
80
armed confrontations between authorities and organized criminals occurring between
December of 2006 and 2009 were compiled by a committee with representatives from
all ministries who are members of the National Council of Public Security (Consejo
Nacional de Seguridad Piblica). This committee meets each week to classify which
homicides from the past week are drug trade-related.10 Drug trade-related homicides
are defined as any instance in which a civilian kills another civilian, with at least
one of the parties involved in the drug trade. The classification is made using infor-
mation in the police reports and validated whenever possible using newspapers. The
committee also maintains a database of how many people have been killed in armed
clashes between police and organized criminals. Confidential daily data on homi-
cides occurring between 1990 and 2008 were obtained from the National Institute
of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). Confidential data on high level drug arrests
occurring between December of 2006 and 2009 are employed as well. High level
traffickers include the kingpins of the major trafficking organizations, the regional
lieutenants of these organizations, hired assassins, and the financiers who conduct
money laundering operations.
This section also uses official government data on drug trade-related organizations
(DTOs), which include major trafficking organizations as well as local gangs. The
data list which of Mexico's 2456 municipalities had at least one DTO operating
within their limits in early 2008 and also provide the identity of the group if it is
a major trafficking organization. They offer the closest possible approximation to
pre-period DTO presence available, given that systematic data about DTOs were
not collected before this time.
Finally, electoral data for elections occurring during 2007-2008 were obtained
'
0 Previously reported homicides are also considered for reclassification if new information has
become available.
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from the electoral authorities in each of Mexico's states. The sources for a number
of other variables, used to examine whether the RD sample is balanced, are listed in
the notes to Table 2.1.
2.4.2 Econometric framework and graphical analysis
I now outline the study's empirical approach for estimating the direct effects of close
PAN victories on violence and also provide a graphical analysis of the relationship
between local politics and violence. I first analyze cross-sectional violence measures
using standard non-parametric regression discontinuity methods (as described in
Imbens and Lemieux, 2008), and then exploit the panel variation in the violence data
by examining a specification that combines regression discontinuity and differences-
in-differences. These approaches yield similar estimates.
In order to perform the regression discontinuity analysis, I restrict the data to a
small window around the PAN win-loss threshold, so that only municipalities with
a narrow vote spread between the winner and runner-up contribute to the estimate
of the discontinuity. I choose this bandwidth using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman band-
width selection rule (2009)." I then estimate a local linear regression using a tri-
angular kernel, which ensures that the weight on each observation decays with the
distance from the threshold. Specifically, I estimate the following regression model
within the bandwidth:
Yms = ao + a1PANwinms + a 2PANwinms x spreadmas
+ a3 (1 - PANwinms,) x spreadms + JX' + 3X'nsPANwinms + a, + Ems (2.2).
"Results (available upon request) are robust to using a variety of different bandwidths.
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where yms is the outcome of interest in municipality m in state s. PANWinms is
an indicator equal to 1 if the PAN candidate won the election, and spreadms is
the margin of PAN victory. Some specifications also include os, a state-specific
intercept and X',,, demeaned baseline controls. While baseline controls and fixed
effects are not necessary for identification, their inclusion improves the precision of
the estimates. The sample is restricted to elections where the PAN won or came in
second.
Identification requires that all relevant factors besides treatment vary smoothly
at the threshold between a PAN victory and a PAN loss. That is, letting yi and
yo denote potential outcomes under a PAN victory and PAN loss, respectively, and
spread denote the PAN margin of victory, identification requires that E[y1|spread]
and E[yolspread] are continuous at the PAN win-loss threshold. This assumption is
needed for municipalities where the PAN barely won to be an appropriate counter-
factual for municipalities where the PAN barely lost.
To assess the plausibility of this assumption, Table 2.1 compares municipal crime,
political, economic, demographic, road network, and geographic characteristics in
municipalities where the PAN barely lost to those in municipalities where they barely
won. Crime characteristics include the average monthly drug-trade related homicide
rate between December of 2006 (when these data were first collected) through June of
2007 (when the first authorities elected during the sample period were inaugurated),
as well as the average probability that a drug trade-related homicide occurred in
a given month during this period. They also include police-criminal confrontation
deaths per 100,000 inhabitants (Dec. 2006 - Jun. 2007), the average probability that
police criminal-confrontation deaths occurred, and the long-run average municipal
homicide rate (1990-2006). Political characteristics explored are municipal tax col-
lection per capita (2005), municipal taxes per dollar of income (2005), dummies for
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the party of the mayoral incumbent, the percentage of electoral cycles between 1976
and 2006 in which the party of the mayor alternated, and a dummy equal to 1 if the
PRI always controlled the mayorship between 1976 and 2006. Demographic charac-
teristics are population (2005), population density (2005), and migrants per capita
(2005). Economic characteristics include income per capita (2005), the municipal
Gini index (2005), migrants per capita (2005), malnutrition (2005), mean years of
schooling (2005), infant mortality (2005), percent of households without access to
sewage (2005), percent of households without access to water (2005), and the munic-
ipal marginality index (2005).12 Road network characteristics are the total detour
length in kilometers required for the shortest path drug routes to circumvent the mu-
nicipality, total length of roads in the municipality (2005), road density, and distance
of the municipality to the U.S. border. Finally, the geographic characteristics are
average municipal elevation, slope, surface area, low temperature (1950-2000), high
temperature (1950-2000), and precipitation (1950-2000). Sources for these variables
are listed in the notes to Table 2.1.
Column (1) of Table 2.1 reports the mean value for each variable in municipalities
where the PAN barely lost, column (2) does the same for municipalities where the
PAN barley won, and column (3) reports the t-statistics on the difference in means.
The sample is limited to elections with a vote spread between the winner and the
runner-up of five percentage points or less. In no case are there statistically significant
differences between municipalities where the PAN lost and municipalities where they
won.13 Moreover, I run the local linear regression specification given in equation (2.2)
12 The marginality index incorporates information on literacy; primary school completion rates;
access to electricity, sewage, and running water; household overcrowding; construction materials
used in households; municipal population in rural areas; and household income.
'
3 Results are similar if the vote spread is limited to three or seven percentage points instead.
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using each of the baseline characteristics as the dependent variable." The coefficient
on PAN win is reported in column (4) and the t-statistic on PAN win is reported in
column (5). The coefficients on PAN win estimated by local linear regression tend
to be small and in no case are they statistically different from zero. Overall, this
evidence strongly suggests that municipalities where the PAN barely lost are a valid
control group for municipalities where they barely won.
Identification also requires the absence of selective sorting around the PAN win-
loss threshold. This assumption would be violated, for example, if PAN candidates
could rig elections in their favor in municipalities that would later experience an
increase in violence. While there are many historical examples of electoral fraud in
Mexico, the political system has become dramatically more open since the early 1990s
and elections are coordinated by a multi-partisan state commission. The balancing
of the sample on the crime pre-characteristics, the electoral variables, and the many
other characteristics in Table 2.1 indicates that rigged elections are unlikely to drive
the results.
Due to space constraints, I focus on the probability that drug trade-related homi-
cides occur in a given month in the graphical analysis, and later Table 2.2 documents
that the results are robust to instead using the drug trade-related homicide rate per
10,000 municipal inhabitants.' 5 Recall that drug trade-related homicides are those
in which at least one party is involved in the drug trade. In over 85 percent of these
homicides, both the aggressor and victim are involved in the drug trade. While a few
municipalities always experience drug trade-related homicides, there is considerable
14State fixed effects are omitted to make the specification analogous to the difference in means
reported in column (3). Results are similar when state fixed effects are included, and in no case is
there a statistically significant discontinuity.
1 5It is not obvious that drug trade-related homicides should be normalized by municipal popula-
tion, as drug trafficking activity is not necessarily proportional to population.
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variation in the extensive margin of violence.
The six panels in Figure 2-3 plot violence measures against the PAN margin
of victory, with a negative margin indicating a PAN loss. Each point represents
the average value of the outcome in vote spread bins of width 0.0025. The solid
line plots predicted values from a local linear regression, with separate vote spread
trends estimated on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. The dashed lines show
95% confidence intervals. The bandwidth is chosen using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman
bandwidth selection rule (2009).
The dependent variable in Panel A is the average probability that a drug trade-
related homicide occurs in a given municipality-month during the five months follow-
ing the inauguration of new authorities. Panel A shows that in the post-inauguration
period, there is a marked discontinuity in drug trade-related homicides at the thresh-
old between a PAN loss and a PAN victory. The probability that a drug trade-related
homicide occurs in a given month is around nine percentage points higher after a PAN
mayor takes office than after a non-PAN mayor takes office. This can be compared
to the sample average probability of six percent that a drug trade-related homicide
occurs in a given month.
Next, Panel B examines drug trade-related homicides during the one to five month
period between the election and inauguration of new authorities (the lame duck
period), whose length varies by state. The figure documents that drug trade-related
violence is similar in municipalities where the PAN barely won as compared to those
where they barely lost. Panel C performs a placebo check, examining the average
probability of a drug trade-related homicide during the six months prior to the
election. There is no discontinuity at the PAN win-loss threshold, supporting the
plausible exogeneity of close elections.
While homicides are classified as drug trade-related by a national committee, it
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is possible that the information in the police reports used to make this classification
could systematically differ across municipalities. To explore whether the discontinu-
ity in Panel A could simply reflect the reclassification of homicides by PAN authori-
ties, Panels D through F examine the non-drug trade-related monthly homicide rate
per 10,000 municipal inhabitants, for the post-inauguration, lame duck, and pre-
election periods, respectively. There are no statistically significant discontinuities,
and this is also the case when a dummy measure of non-drug trade-related homicides
is used (as documented in Table Al in the online appendix). These results alleviate
concerns that close elections simply affect the classification of violence.
To shed further light on the relationship between violence and close PAN victories,
I estimate equation (2.2) separately for each month prior to the election and following
the inauguration of new authorities. Figure 2-4 reports the coefficients on PAN win.
State fixed effects and controls for the characteristics listed in Table 2.1 are included
in order to increase the precision of the estimates. 6 Figure 2-4 plots the coefficients
for the period lasting from six months prior to the election to six months following
the inauguration of new authorities. The lame duck period is excluded due to its
varying length by state, which makes it difficult to examine transparently in a month-
by-month analysis. The dashed lines plot 95% confidence intervals.
In Panel A, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a drug trade-
related homicide occurred in a given municipality-month. The PAN win coefficients
document that before elections, drug trade-related homicides occurred with similar
frequency in municipalities where the PAN would later barely lose versus in munic-
ipalities where they would barely win. These estimates support the validity of the
identification strategy. Following the inauguration of new authorities, the PAN win
coefficients become large, positive, and are statistically significant at the five or ten
'
6The coefficient magnitudes are similar when the controls are excluded.
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percent level in all periods except for six months following the inauguration.' 7
As an additional check on these results, I explore the relationship from an al-
ternative perspective that exploits the full panel variation available in the monthly
homicide series. Specifically, Panel B of Figure 2-4 plots the Y, coefficients from the
following differences-in-differences specification against time:
Ti.s Ts
Ymst = B8 + E B7r Cmr + E 'YrrmPANwinms,
r=-Ts 7=-Tm.
+ f (spreadms)Postmst + Pst + Jom + Emst (2.3)
where ymst is the outcome in municipality m in state s in month t and {(} is a set
of months-to-election and months-since-inauguration dummies. Postmst is a dummy
equal to 1 for all periods t in which the new municipal authorities have assumed
power. f(.) is the RD polynomial, which is assumed to take a quadratic form in the
graphical analysis. spreadm is the margin of PAN victory, 4 ),t are state x month
fixed effects, and om are municipality fixed effects. 6mst is clustered by municipality.
The sample is a balanced panel, limited to municipalities with a vote spread of five
percentage points or less between the winner and runner-up. 18 Panel B of Figure 2-4
shows that the magnitudes of the -y, coefficients are similar to the month-by-month
cross-sectional RD estimates plotted in Panel A.
Panels C and D repeat the exercise for non-drug trade-related homicides. The
'
7 When the post-period is extended to a year following the inauguration of new authorities,
the coefficients are more volatile between seven and twelve months after the inauguration of new
authorities (see Appendix Figure 1). Whether this is due to PAN authorities successfully deterring
drug trafficking activity or results from these authorities becoming less tough on crime is not possible
to establish definitively, but spillover results presented in the next section suggest that drug traffic
continues to be diverted to other municipalities beyond the first six months that a PAN mayor has
been in office.
18Results (available upon request) are similar when alternative windows around the PAN win-loss
threshold are used.
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month-by-month RD and the panel specification both show the absence of a dis-
continuity at the PAN win-loss threshold, before and after the inauguration of new
authorities. Overall, the evidence in Figures 2-3 and 2-4 strongly support the hy-
pothesis that government policy has exerted important effects on drug trade-related
violence in Mexico.
2.4.3 Further results and robustness
The graphical analysis shows that drug trade-related violence in a municipality in-
creases substantially after the close election of a PAN mayor. Before moving on to
explore mechanisms, I examine this result in more detail.
Columns (1) through (3) of Table 2.2 report estimates from the local linear RD
specification given by equation (2.2). Panel A examines the probability of a drug
trade-related homicide in a given month, and Panel B examines the drug trade-
related homicide rate.19 The specification includes state fixed effects and controls
for the baseline characteristics listed in Table 2.1. The post-inauguration period
extends to five months following the inauguration of new authorities (after which
point the month-by-month analysis suggests that the violence effects start to decline
somewhat), and the pre-election period extends to six months prior to the election.
Column 1 estimates that the average probability that at least one drug trade-
related homicide occurs in a municipality in a given month is 8.4 percentage points
higher after a PAN mayor takes office than after a non-PAN mayor takes office,
and this effect is statistically significant at the one percent level. The drug trade-
related homicide rate per 10,000 municipal inhabitants is around 0.05 (s.e. = 0.02)
higher following a close PAN victory, which can be compared to the average monthly
'
9 Analysis of the non drug trade-related homicide rate robustly shows no discontinuity at the
PAN win-loss threshold and due to space constraints is presented Table Al in the online appendix.
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homicide rate of 0.06. In contrast, the estimated coefficients for the lame duck and
pre-inauguration periods reported in columns (2) and (3) are small and statistically
insignificant in both panels. Columns (4) and (5) document that the PAN win effect
is robust to excluding the state fixed effects as well as to excluding both the baseline
controls and state fixed effects, as we would expect if close PAN victories are as if
randomly assigned.2 o
Next, column (6) reports results from the following panel specification, which
is analogous to the differences-in-differences specification examined in the graphical
analysis:
ymst = 00 + BELameDuckmst + /3jPostlInnaugst + 7E LameDuck,'t PANwin,
+ -1PostInnaugust P ANwinms + f (spreads) LameDuckmst
+ f (spreads)PostInnaugmst + 4 st + 6m + Emst (2.4)
LameDuckmst is a dummy equal to one for all periods t between the election and
inauguration of new authorities, Postnnaugmst is a dummy equal to one for all
periods t in which the new municipal authorities have assumed power. All other
variables are defined as in equation (2.3). Pre-election is the omitted category, and
Emst is clustered by municipality. The sample is limited to municipalities with a five
percentage point vote spread or less. 21
Column (6) reports estimates from equation (2.4) when a linear functional form is
used for the RD polynomial. This specification estimates that the probability that at
least one drug trade-related homicide occurs in a municipality in a given month is 14.7
21The estimated effects for the lame duck and pre-election periods are also similar when state
fixed effects and baseline controls are excluded.
21Results are very similar when a seven or three percentage point vote spread is used instead.
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percentage points higher after a PAN mayor takes office than after a non-PAN mayor
takes office, and the monthly drug trade-related homicide rate is estimated to be 0.09
higher. The coefficients on lame duck x PAN win are substantially smaller than the
post-inauguration x PAN win coefficients and are statistically insignificant. These
results provide additional support for the robustness of the relationship between the
outcomes of close elections and violence.
Local linear regression will not necessarily provide an unbiased estimate of the
magnitude of the discontinuity if the true underlying functional form is not linear
(Lee and Lemieux, 2009). While the RD figures suggest that the data are reason-
ably approximated by a linear functional form, columns (7) through (12) explore
robustness to specifying the RD using a variety of functional forms. Columns (7),
(9), and (11) estimate equation (2.2) using quadratic, cubic, and quartic vote spread
terms, respectively (along with state fixed effects and baseline controls).2 Columns
(8), (10), and (12) estimate the panel specification using quadratic, cubic, and quar-
tic RD polynomials, respectively. The estimated effects of close PAN victories on
the probability of drug trade-related violence are large, positive, and statistically
significant across specifications. The coefficients tend to increase somewhat in mag-
nitude when higher order polynomials are used. The estimated impacts on the drug
trade-related homicide rate are also large, positive, and statistically significant in all
specifications except for the cross-sectional RD with a quartic polynomial.
Deaths in police-drug trafficker confrontations and drug trade-related arrests are
additional outcomes that we would expect to be affected by the outcomes of close
elections. Both of these phenomena are more common in municipalities that have
22These specifications use the same bandwidth as the linear specification.
23Results (available upon request) are very similar when I use a semi-parametric, cross-sectional
RD approach with various orders of RD polynomials, limiting the sample to municipalities with a
five percentage point vote spread or less.
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experienced a close PAN victory. Deadly conflicts between police and drug traffickers
are relatively rare, occurring in only 20 municipality-months and 12 municipalities
with a vote spread of five percentage points or less. Following close elections, these
confrontations are fifty percent more likely to occur in municipalities where the PAN
barely won than in municipalities where they barely lost. As regards arrests, the
confidential federal government database of drug-related arrests includes only high
level arrests, since most other drug-related arrests are never prosecuted. High level
arrests occurred in only 4 municipalities and 15 municipality months during the
sample period. During the post-inauguration period, 49 high level arrests occurred
in municipalities where the PAN barely won, as compared to only 26 in municipalities
where they barely lost. Given the rarity of these events, there is not much power for
conducting a rigorous econometric analysis. When I do analyze these outcomes using
the RD approach, the coefficients on PAN win are positive and marginally significant
in some specifications (results available upon request).
Table 2.2 provides robust evidence that close PAN victories increase drug trade-
related violence. Next, I briefly explore whether there are heterogeneous effects
based on local political characteristics. The dependent variable in all columns of
Table 2.3 is the average probability that a drug trade-related homicide occurs in a
given month during the post-inauguration period, and the coefficients are estimated
using local linear regression.24 For comparison purposes, column (1) of Table 2.3
reports the baseline result from column (1) of Table 2.2. Next, column (2) exam-
ines a specification that distinguishes between municipalities where the PAN was
the incumbent and municipalities where another party held the incumbency. 5 This
24As documented Table A2 in the online appendix, the results are very similar when I instead
use a panel data specification.
2 5 1n Mexico, mayors cannot run for re-election, so regardless of the party of the incumbent a new
politician always takes office with each electoral cycle.
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specification includes the same terms as the baseline RD specification in equation
(2.2) and also interacts PAN win, spread, and PAN win x spread with the PAN
incumbency dummy. The estimated effect on violence of a PAN mayor taking office,
relative to a non-PAN mayor taking office, is large and statistically significant re-
gardless of whether the PAN held the incumbency. Prior to the close elections, the
average probability of a drug trade-related homicide in a given municipality-month is
modestly higher in municipalities with a PAN incumbent than it is in municipalities
with a mayor from a different party (0.067 as compared to 0.048). Following the
inauguration of closely elected PAN authorities, violence increases sharply regardless
of the party of the incumbent. In contrast, following the inauguration of closely
elected non-PAN authorities, violence decreases slightly and by a similar amount
regardless of the party of the incumbent. These findings are consistent with de-
scriptive evidence on Mexican violence outbreaks since 2006. This evidence shows
that once violence increases, it may increase further but typically does not decline
to pre-outbreak levels (Guerrero, 2011). The findings also suggest that PAN mayors
narrowly elected in 2007 and 2008 may have been tougher on drug trafficking than
their PAN predecessors, who were elected before drug trafficking became a major
policy issue.
Column (3) reports a specification that distinguishes between whether the PAN
candidate faced an opponent from the historically dominant PRI party, which op-
posed the PAN in around three quarters of elections. There are not statistically
significant differences in drug trade-related violence in municipalities where the PAN
mayor faced a PRI opponent as compared to municipalities where the PAN mayor
faced an opponent from another party.
Next, columns (4) and(5) present further evidence that the effects documented
in Table 2.2 result specifically from the PAN taking office. Recall that the sample
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for the results presented thus far includes municipalities with close elections where a
PAN candidate was the winner or runner-up. In contrast, column (4) examines close
elections where the PRI and PRD - Mexico's two other major parties - received the
two highest vote shares. The PAN win dummy in the RD specification is replaced
by a PRI win dummy. While the coefficient on PRI win is positive, it is about
half the magnitude of the coefficient on PAN win in the baseline specification and
is not statistically significant. Column (5) includes all close elections in the sample,
regardless of which parties received the two highest vote shares. The PAN win
dummy is replaced by a dummy equal to one if there was an alternation in the
political party of the mayor. As expected given the results in columns (2) and (4),
the coefficient on the alternation indicator is small and statistically insignificant.
Finally, column (6) examines all municipalities where a PAN candidate was the
winner or runner-up, reporting results from an ordinary least squares regression of
the probability that a drug trade-related homicide occurs in a given month during
the post-inauguration period on the PAN win dummy, controls, and state fixed ef-
fects. While the coefficient on PAN win is positive, it is small in comparison to the
estimate from the RD, with a magnitude of 0.01, and it is not statistically significant.
Politics are likely to be meaningfully different in municipalities with very competitive
elections as compared to municipalities with uncompetitive elections, and omitted
variables bias in the ordinary least squares regression could also explain the difference
between the estimates in column (1) versus column (6). Section 5 will use only the
plausibly exogenous variation generated by close PAN elections to identify spillover
effects. It will use all of these close elections, since the direct effects on violence are
similar regardless of the party of the incumbent or the opponent.
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2.4.4 Trafficking Industrial Organization and Violence
Regression discontinuity estimates show that drug trade-related homicides in a mu-
nicipality increase substantially after the close election of a PAN mayor. I now
examine potential mechanisms linking close PAN victories to violence. Over eighty-
five percent of the drug trade-related violence consists of people involved in the drug
trade killing each other. The evidence presented in this section suggests that the vio-
lence reflects rival traffickers' attempts to wrest control of territories after crackdowns
initiated by PAN mayors have challenged the incumbent criminals.
I begin by categorizing municipalities into four groups using confidential gov-
ernment data on drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). The categories are: 1)
municipalities controlled by a major DTO that border territory controlled by a rival
DTO (9.5% of the sample), 2) municipalities controlled by a major DTO that do not
border territory controlled by a rival DTO (20% of the sample), 3) municipalities
controlled by a local drug gang (33% of the sample), and 4) no known drug trade
presence (37.5% of the sample).26 Municipalities with no known drug trade presence
had not experienced any drug trade-related homicides or illicit drug confiscations at
the time the DTO data were compiled, and local authorities had not reported the
presence of a drug trade-related group to federal authorities.
For comparison purposes, column (1) of Table 2.4 reports the baseline local linear
regression result from column (1) of Table 2.2 and column (2) reports the baseline
differences-in-differences estimate from column (6) of Table 2.2. Next, column (3)
uses a local linear regression specification to explore the relationship between the
violence response to a close PAN victory and the structure of the drug trade. The
dependent variable is the average probability that a drug trade-related homicide
21The major DTOs during the sample period are Beltran, Familia Michoacana, Golfo, Juarez,
Sinaloa, Tijuana, and Zetas.
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occurs in a given month during the post-inauguration period. The specification
includes the same terms as the baseline RD specification in equation (2.2), as well
as interacting PAN win, spread, and PAN win x spread with the dummies for the
three categories of drug trade presence. No known drug trade presence is the omitted
category.
The estimates show that the effect of close PAN victories on violence is extremely
large in municipalities controlled by a major DTO that border a rival DTO's territory.
A close PAN victory increases the probability that a drug trade-related homicide
occurs in a given month by a highly significant 53 percentage points. The estimated
effect of 14.6 percentage points for municipalities controlled by a major DTO that do
not border territory controlled by a rival is considerably smaller but still statistically
significant at the 5% level. The estimated effects of close PAN victories on violence
in municipalities with a local drug gang or with no known drug trade presence are
small and statistically insignificant.
To examine the robustness of this result, column 4 of Table 2.4 reports a panel
specification analogous to equation (2.4), in which dummies for the three categories
of drug trade presence are interacted with post-inauguration and post-inauguration
x PAN win. The coefficient on post-inauguration x PAN win x borders rival, equal
to 0.524, is nearly identical to the analogous coefficient on PAN win x borders rival
in column (3) and is statistically significant at the one percent level. The violence
effect for municipalities with a major DTO that do not border territory controlled
by rival DTOs is also similar to the effect estimated by local linear regression. In
municipalities with only a local drug gang or with no known drug trafficking presence,
a close PAN win is estimated to increase the probability of a drug trade-related
homicide by a statistically significant 12.7 and 10.7 percentage points, respectively. 27
27 The fact that the estimates are similar for these groups of municipalities suggests that local
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While these effects are larger than those estimated by local linear regression, both
specifications estimate that the violence effects for these municipalities are smaller
than the effects for municipalities with a major DTO. Columns (5) and (6) show
that when a quadratic instead of a linear functional form is used for the vote spread
terms, the results are qualitatively similar (although the still very large effect for
municipalities bordering a rival is no longer statistically significant in column 5).28
Next, I use the shortest paths trafficking model to calculate the total detour
costs that would be imposed if trafficking routes could no longer pass through a
municipality. Total detour costs equal the sum of the lengths (in kilometers) of
shortest paths from all producing municipalities to the U.S. when paths are not
allowed to pass through the municipality under consideration minus the sum of the
lengths of all shortest paths when they can pass through any municipality in Mexico.
Columns (7) through (12) interact PAN win or PAN win x post with standardized
total detour costs. 29 A one standard deviation increase in detour costs increases
the probability of a drug trade-related homicide following a close PAN victory by
around seven percentage points in the local linear regression specification. This can
be compared to the 8.7 percentage point effect of close PAN victories at the sample
mean of detour costs. Similar patterns arise when the panel specification is used
(column 8) and when higher order vote spread terms are used (columns 9 through
12). In summary, violence increases the most in municipalities that impose the
greatest detour costs to circumvent, and hence are likely to be valuable to control.
drug gang presence may be under-reported.
28 There is not enough variation in the data to precisely estimate a local regression with four
separate cubic vote spread trends on either side of the discontinuity. When I estimate a specifica-
tion with separate PAN win x territorial ownership dummies and a single cubic vote spread term
estimated separately on either side of the discontinuity, the results are similar to those presented
in Table 2.4.
29Results are similar, but more difficult to interpret, when I do not standardize the detour costs
measure.
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The characteristics examined in Table 2.4 are highly correlated, and moreover
the presence of drug trafficking groups is likely an outcome of the network structure
of drug trafficking. Thus, I cannot separately identify the impacts of territorial own-
ership from the impacts of the routes structure. Nevertheless, together the results
strongly suggest that the industrial organization of drug trafficking exerts impor-
tant effects on the violent response to close PAN victories. While crackdowns likely
reduce rents from illicit activities in the short-to-medium run, by weakening the in-
cumbent criminal group they also reduce the costs of taking control of a municipality.
Controlling the municipality is likely to offer substantial rents from trafficking and
the variety of other criminal activities that DTOs control once the crackdown has
subsided. Because crackdowns may divert drug traffic while in effect, I now turn to
an investigation of spillover effects.
2.5 A Network Analysis of Spillover Effects
This section uses the network model of the drug trade and plausibly exogenous varia-
tion provided by the outcomes of close elections to identify the spillover effects of local
crackdowns. Correlations between policy in one municipality and drug trade-related
outcomes elsewhere could occur for several reasons, as highlighted more generally
by Manski's formal treatment of spillover effects (1993). First, correlations could
result from environmental factors unrelated to the local policies under consideration.
Second, they could occur because traffickers choose to operate in given geographic
arrangements for reasons unrelated to policy. Finally, local drug trafficking poli-
cies in one municipality could exert spillover effects, influencing outcomes elsewhere.
The plausibly exogenous variation provided by close elections allows spillovers to be
isolated from other correlations in outcomes across municipalities.
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This section begins by examining whether the simple shortest paths network
model is predictive of the diversion of drug traffic following close PAN victories.
Then, I specify and estimate a richer version of the model that incorporates conges-
tion costs. Finally, I test whether PAN crackdowns exert spillover effects on violence
and economic outcomes. The section concludes by discussing possible extensions to
the analysis.
2.5.1 Do close PAN victories divert drug traffic?
I begin by examining whether close PAN victories divert drug traffic to alternative
routes predicted by the shortest paths trafficking model. The costs of trafficking
drugs through a municipality are assumed to increase to infinity (or, in the robustness
checks, by some other positive proportion) for the remainder of the sample period
following the inauguration of PAN mayors elected by a vote spread of five percentage
points or less. 30 Because municipal elections happen at different times throughout
the sample period, this generates month-to-month plausibly exogenous variation in
the shortest routes from producing municipalities to U.S. points of entry. I examine
the relationship between model predicted variation in routes and variation in actual
illicit drug confiscations, the best available proxy for actual illicit drug traffic, using
the following regression specification:
con fmst = Bo + O1Routesmst + 7pst + om + Emst (2.5)
where confmst is actual illicit drug confiscations of domestically produced drugs in
municipality m in month t. Both an indicator measure and a continuous measure are
3 Results (available upon request) are similar when I instead use municipalities with a vote spread
of three percentage points or less or with a vote spread of seven percentage points or less.
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explored. Routes mst is a measure of predicted drug trafficking routes, 4 st is a month
x state fixed effect, and Jm is a municipality fixed effect. Because variation in routes
may be correlated across space, the error term is clustered simultaneously by munic-
ipality and state-month (following the two-way clustering of Cameron, Gelbach, and
Miller, 2011). The sample excludes municipalities with close elections, since the aim
of the model is to predict spillovers from these elections.3 ' This empirical approach
is summarized in Figure 2-1.
The confiscations data provide the value of all illicit drug confiscations made by
Mexican authorities between December of 2006 and December of 2009 and were made
available by confidential sources. The value of confiscations (evaluated at Mexican
illicit drug prices) in a municipality-month must be equal to at least $1,000 USD
to be included in the sample. Occasionally the total value of confiscations in a
municipality-month is both less than $1,000 and positive, and such confiscations are
very likely to be from individual consumers and not from drug traffickers.3 2 The
confiscations rate per unit of drug traffic likely differs depending on the political en-
vironment. However, because municipal elections only occur once every three years,
local authorities typically do not change and the municipality fixed effects will absorb
time invariant differences in the probability of confiscations across municipalities.
Panel A of Table 2.5 reports estimates from equation (2.5), using an indica-
tor variable equal to one if a municipality has a predicted trafficking route in a
given month as the routes measure. In column (1), the dependent variable is a
dummy equal to one if domestically produced illicit drugs are confiscated in a given
"It also excludes producing municipalities, since the analysis focuses on the extensive margin
of predicted trafficking routes, and the producing municipalities mechanically contain a trafficking
route. Results (available upon request) are robust to including these municipalities.
"Estimates are robust to using a variety of different cut-offs for the minimum value of drugs
confiscated to construct the confiscations dummy variable (results available upon request).
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municipality-month. When a municipality acquires a predicted trafficking route,
drug confiscations increase by around 1.6 percentage points, relative to a sample av-
erage probability of confiscations in a given municipality-month of 5.3 percent. This
correlation is statistically significant at the 1% level. In column (2), the dependent
variable is equal to the log of the value (in US dollars) of domestic illicit drug con-
fiscations in the municipality-month if confiscations are positive and equal to zero
otherwise. Because all positive confiscation values are at least equal to 1,000 USD,
this measure is always positive.' The correlation between the log value of confisca-
tions and predicted trafficking routes is large, positive, and statistically significant
at the one percent level. Acquiring a predicted trafficking route is associated with
an increase in the value of confiscated drugs of around 18.5 percent. In Table A3 of
the online appendix, I repeat the analysis in Table 2.5 using the number of predicted
routes instead of the indicator routes measure and find similar results. The value of
confiscations increases by 2.3 percent for each additional trafficking route acquired,
and this effect is statistically significant at the one percent level.
One concern in interpreting these results is that the relationship between pre-
dicted trafficking routes and actual confiscations could result from the direct effects
of PAN crackdowns. For example, if alternative shortest paths traverse nearby mu-
nicipalities and if PAN authorities coordinate with the military and federal police,
who become active in an entire region, this could lead to a correlation between
changes in shortest routes and changes in confiscations in nearby municipalities. It
is much more difficult to tell a story in which close PAN victories directly affect drug
trade outcomes in municipalities located further away. Thus, columns (3) and (4)
33Working in logs is attractive because drug confiscations are highly right-skewed, with several
major drug busts resulting in tens of millions of dollars worth of confiscated drugs. Using log values
makes the data more normally distributed and aids in the interpretation of the results.
101
examine whether the model remains predictive when municipalities bordering those
that have experienced a close PAN victory are dropped from the sample. The esti-
mated coefficients are similar in magnitude to those reported in columns (1) and (2)
and are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
To shed further light on the plausibility of the model, columns (5) through (8)
report placebo checks. First I assume, contrary to the regression discontinuity evi-
dence, that the costs of passing through municipalities that have experienced a close
PAN loss are infinity, whereas there is no additional cost beyond traversing the physi-
cal distance to traffic drugs through a municipality that has experienced a close PAN
win. This provides a basic test of whether the model loses its predictive power when
it uses the wrong shocks. Columns (5) and (6) show that the model does lose its
predictive power when this implausible assumption is made.
Next, columns (7) and (8) test whether variation in routes induced by close
PAN victories is correlated with variation in cocaine confiscations. Because cocaine
origins are different from the origins for domestically produced drugs, the predicted
domestic drug routes should be uncorrelated with cocaine confiscations. Columns (7)
and (8) document that the coefficients on the predicted routes dummy are small and
statistically insignificant, whether a dummy or value measure of cocaine confiscations
is used as the dependent variable. These results lend further support to the validity
of the model.
Thus far, I have assumed that the cost of passing through a municipality that
has experienced a close PAN victory is infinity. Figure 2-5 explores whether the
relationship between predicted trafficking routes and the value of domestic drug
confiscations is robust to assuming that a close PAN victory proportionally increases
the effective length of the edges in a municipality by a given factor .34 The x-axis
34 For example, if the length of a road through a municipality equals 10 kilometers and a = 2,
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plots values of a ranging from 0.25 to 10 and the y-axis plots the coefficient on the
routes dummy when a close PAN victory is assumed to proportionately increase the
effective length of edges in a municipality by a. 95% confidence bands are shown
with a thin black line and 90% confidence bands with a slightly thicker black line.
Moving from left to right across the x-axis, the first two cost factors, 0.25 and 0.5,
serve as placebo checks. The RD evidence indicates that a close PAN victory makes
trafficking drugs more costly, whereas a = 0.25 and a = 0.5 imply that PAN victories
reduce trafficking costs. These placebo estimates are small, and none are statistically
significant at the 10% level. In contrast, the estimates for cost values greater than
one are similar to the baseline estimate in Table 2.5 and all are statistically significant
at the 5% level.3
2.5.2 A richer trafficking model
While the shortest paths model robustly predicts the diversion of drug traffic follow-
ing PAN victories, assuming that traffickers take shortest distance routes is clearly a
simplification. In particular, we might expect that traffickers care about what routes
other traffickers are taking. There are (at least) several reasons why the costs of
traversing an edge may change as traffic on the edge increases. The probability of
violent conflict with other traffickers may change, the quality of hiding places may
decline (particularly at U.S. points of entry), and law enforcement authorities may
direct more or less attention per unit of traffic. Thus, before examining whether the
diversion of drug traffic is accompanied by violence and economic spillover effects, I
develop a richer version of the trafficking model that incorporates congestion costs
before a close PAN victory it would cost 10 to traffic drugs through the municipality and afterwards
it would cost 20.
35Cost values between 0.5 and 1.5 are not informative, as values close to 1 do not generate enough
variation in the edge costs over time to create within-municipality variation in trafficking routes.
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when routes coincide. These costs introduce interactions between traffickers, pro-
ducing a potentially more nuanced framework for locating spillovers and conducting
policy analysis. Because congestion costs are unknown, I specify a congestion cost
function and estimate its parameters using the simulated method of moments and
cross-sectional data on confiscations from the beginning of the sample period.
Recall from Section 3 that each origin i produces a unit of drugs and has a
trafficker who decides how to transport the municipality's supply of drugs to U.S.
points of entry. Each of the destinations has a given size, approximated by the
number of commercial lanes for terrestrial border crossings and the container capacity
for ports. All destinations pay the same international price for a unit of smuggled
drugs.
Let Pi denote the set of all possible paths between producing municipality i and
the United States, let P = UiP denote the set of all paths between all producing
municipalities and the United States, and let x, denote the flow on path p E P.
Each edge e E E has a cost function Ce(le, Xe), where le is the length of the edge
in kilometers and xe = ZPEPIeEP X is the total flow on edge e, which equals the
sum of flows across the paths that traverse it. I do not impose costs for trafficking
drugs through territory controlled by traffickers in a rival trafficking organization
because 51% of producing municipalities are controlled by local gangs, and there is
not information on which larger organizations, if any, these groups coordinate with
to transport drugs to the United States. This simplification is discussed in more
detail at the end of this section.
Each trafficker's objective is to minimize the costs of transporting drugs to U.S.
points of entry, taking aggregate flows as given. Since the amount of drugs trans-
ported by a single agent is small relative to the total supply of drugs, this assumption
appears reasonable and simplifies the analysis considerably. In equilibrium, the costs
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of all routes actually used to transport drugs from a given producing municipality
to the U.S. are equal and less than those that would be experienced by reallocat-
ing traffic to an unused route. Formally, an equilibrium must satisfy the following
conditions, first published by transportation analyst John Wardrop in 1952:
1. For all p, p' E Pi with x,, xog > 0, eep, ce(Xe,le) = EeE, Ce(Xe, le).
2. For all p, p' C Pi with x, > 0 zy = 0, EeEp ce(Xe, 1,) EeCp Ce(Xe, le).
The equilibrium routing pattern satisfying these conditions is the Nash equi-
librium of the game. Beckmann, McGuire, and Winsten (1956) proved that the
equilibrium can be characterized by a straightforward optimization problem.36 An
equilibrium always exists, and if each ce is strictly increasing, then the equilibrium is
unique. Traffickers ignore the externalities that their use of a route imposes via con-
gestion costs, and thus the equilibrium routing pattern will typically not be socially
optimal.
While this game does not have a closed-form solution, for a given network, set of
supplies, and specification of the congestion costs ce(-) it can be solved using numer-
ical methods. I use the Frank-Wolfe algorithm (1956), which generalizes Dantzig's
36Specifically, the routing pattern xWE is an equilibrium if and only if it is a solution to:
min E je Ce(z)dz (2.6)
eEE
s.t. E x = Xe Ve E E (2.7)
pEPleEp
>x,=1 Vi =1,2,... (2.8)
pE P
xp> 0 Vp E P (2.9)
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well-known simplex algorithm to non-linear programming problems. Details are pro-
vided in the online estimation appendix, which describes the paper's estimation
procedures.
Because the congestion costs are unknown, solving the problem requires spec-
ifying a functional form for the edge costs ce(le, Xe) and estimating the unknown
parameters. I assume that the congestion costs on each edge take a Cobb-Douglas
form, and explore the robustness of the model's predictions to several different spec-
ifications of these costs. In the most parsimonious version, border crossings im-
pose a congestion cost equal to #t(f lowe/lanes)6 for terrestrial border crossings and
# (flowe/containers)3 for ports, where {#t, #,, 5} are congestion parameters, lanes
is the number of commercial lanes of a terrestrial crossing, and containers is the
container capacity of a port. J captures the shape of congestion costs, and conges-
tion costs are scaled to the same units as physical distance costs by the parameters
{#t, #,}. One might be concerned that this functional form is overly restrictive.
While there is not enough variation in the data to estimate a separate congestion
parameter for each of the 26 points of entry into the U.S., I do estimate a version of
the model with six # parameters: one for terrestrial points of entry in the bottom
quartile of the size distribution (i.e. crossings with a single lane), three more for
terrestrial points of entry in the other three quartiles (2 lanes, 3 to 9 lanes, and 10
to 17 lanes, respectively), one for ports with below median container capacity, and
one for ports with above median container capacity.3 7 This allows the model to more
flexibly capture the relationship between congestion costs and the size of the U.S.
points of entry. In the final version of the model, I estimate the seven congestion cost
parameters for U.S. points of entry, as well as parameters for congestion costs on the
37 Median container capacity is 160,000 TEUs, which is divided by 10,000 to be in units comparable
to the size of the terrestrial crossings. TEU stands for "twenty-foot equivalent units."
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interior edges. The congestion costs on the interior edges take the form: leOitfloWe,
where 1e is the length of the edge, and #4 ,t and -y are congestion parameters whose
interpretation is analogous to the # and J parameters on U.S. points of entry.38
The congestion parameters are estimated using the simulated method of moments
(SMM) and cross-sectional data on the value of domestically produced illicit drugs
confiscated during the beginning of the sample period, which lasts from December of
2006, when the confiscations data become available, until the first authorities elected
during the sample period took office in July of 2007. Every choice of the model's pa-
rameters generates a set of moments that summarize the patterns of model-predicted
confiscations, and I estimate the congestion parameters by matching these moments
to their counterparts generated from data on the value of actual illicit drug confisca-
tions. Specifically, let {Xm} denote the flows predicted by the trafficking equilibrium
problem, aggregated to the municipal level, and let 00 E RP denote the vector of con-
gestion parameters plus one scaling parameter K that maps model-predicted flows
to model-predicted confiscations: conffm = Kxm, r E (0, o0).39 Let g(xm, 0) E R
denote a vector of moment functions that specifies the difference between observed
confiscations and those predicted by the model, given the congestion costs described
by 0. The number of moment conditions must be greater than or equal to the num-
ber of parameters for the model to be identified. The SMM estimator d minimizes a
3 8When I instead specify the congestion costs on interior edges as <iq$tflowe' (i.e. congestion
costs to traverse an edge are the same regardless of the length of the edge), the estimated routes
and spillover patterns are broadly similar (results available upon request).
39n likely varies with the local environment, but it is not possible to estimate this dependence.
To the extent that the model is robustly predictive of the evolution of drug trade-related outcomes
within municipalities over time, this suggests that the estimated parameters are reasonable despite
the fact that confiscations are an imperfect proxy of actual illicit drug flows.
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weighted quadratic form:
1 M -I M
0 = argmin [ xzm,o) 1 [ (Xm,0) (2.10)
where y(-) is an estimate of the true moment function, M is the number of munici-
palities in the sample, and E is an L x L positive semi-definite weighting matrix. If
A is a consistent estimator of Var[g(xm, Oo)] and E = A-, then the SMM estimator
will be asymptotically efficient. The optimal SMM estimator can be obtained by
first minimizing (2.10) using E = IL, the identity matrix. From this first step, A
can be calculated, and (2.10) can be re-optimized in a second step using E = A-1.
Further details about the asymptotic properties of the SMM estimator can be found
in Pakes and Pollard (1989) and McFadden (1989).
Predicted confiscations on a given edge are not independent of predicted confis-
cations elsewhere in the network, introducing spatial dependence. Following Conley
(1999), I replace the asymptotic covariance matrix A with a weighted average of spa-
tial autocovariance terms with zero weights for observations further than a certain
distance. I allow for correlation between municipalities located within 250 km of
each other. More details are provided in the online estimation appendix.
Depending on the specification, there are four to ten parameters in 0. The mo-
ments match the mean model predicted and observed confiscations at ports, at ter-
restrial bordering crossings, and on interior edges. They also match the interactions
between port confiscations and the port's container capacity, between terrestrial
crossing confiscations and the crossing's number of commercial lanes, between inte-
rior confiscations and the length of the interior edge, and between interior confisca-
tions and the length of the detour required to circumvent the edge. For models that
estimate six separate crossing congestion parameters, the moment conditions match
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predicted confiscations within a 100 kilometer radius of each U.S. point of entry to
actual confiscations within a 100 kilometer radius. The estimates for the model with
three congestion parameters are similar when these moments are included in the es-
timation, but I omit them in the baseline estimation because they are not necessary
for identification and adding more moment conditions raises the risk of finite sam-
ple bias and related problems similar to those that arise with weak instruments in
linear models (see Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 2002). Finally, the moment conditions
match the model predicted and observed variance of confiscations across U.S. points
of entry and across interior edges.
As is often the case with choice problems, the SMM objective function is not
globally convex and hence minimizing it is non-trivial. Standard gradient methods
may perform poorly, and thus I instead use simulated annealing, which is more suited
to problems that lack a globally convex objective (Kirkpatrick, Gelatt, and Vecchi,
1983). Details about the estimation are provided in the online appendix.
Table 2.6 reports the simulated method of moments estimates of the cost function
parameters. Conley standard errors are in brackets and robust standard errors are
in parentheses. Column 1 reports estimates for the specification with parsimonious
congestion costs on U.S. points of entry, column 2 reports estimates for the speci-
fication with more flexible congestion costs on U.S. points of entry, and column 3
reports estimates for the specification with congestion costs on both U.S. points of
entry and interior edges of the road network.
All parameters are precisely estimated. 6, which captures the shape of the conges-
tion costs on U.S. points of entry, ranges from 1.57 to 1.88, depending on the model
specification. This implies that the costs of congestion increase as illicit drug traffic
through a point of entry into the U.S. increases. This is an intuitive finding given
that hiding places may become worse and authorities may direct more attention per
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unit of traffic towards a given point of entry as illicit flows through that point of
entry increase. When the congestion costs on points of entry are allowed to take a
more flexible form in column 2, the O% 's tend to increase somewhat with the size
of the border crossing. In other words, the model estimates higher congestion costs
on a ten lane border crossing edge with ten units of traffic than on a one lane edge
with one unit of traffic. The model in column 3, which includes congestion costs
on interior edges, estimates -y = 0.11. This implies that congestion costs on interior
edges are concave. In equilibrium, the total costs imposed by congestion on U.S.
points of entry in this specification are about 39 times larger than the total costs
imposed by congestion on interior edges, suggesting that congestion at U.S. points
of entry is more important than congestion within Mexico. This is not surprising,
given the greater law enforcement presence at U.S. points of entry and the bottle-
necks that they impose. All three models estimate that total congestion costs are
nearly as large as total distance costs. Predicted routes for the pre-period, estimated
using the parameters in column 1 of Table 2.6, are show in Figure 2-2. The routing
patterns predicted by the other congestion cost specifications are similar.
The model parameters are estimated to match the cross-section of pre-period con-
fiscation values, and the model is highly predictive of these confiscations. In a linear
regression of actual municipal-level confiscations on model predicted confiscations,
all three specifications have a t-statistic of between 7 and 8. The squared correlation
coefficient is between 0.02 and 0.03. As would be expected, as more parameters are
added to the model, the correlation coefficient increases somewhat. The model is
also highly predictive of the extensive margin of confiscations. When comparing the
actual confiscations indicator variable to the predicted confiscations indicator vari-
able, the Pearson chi-squared statistic has a value of 100 for the 4 parameter model,
116 for the 8 parameter model, and 76 for the 10 parameter model, all of which have
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p-values near zero.
I now turn to an examination of whether the trafficking model, fitted on data
from the beginning of the sample period, predicts the diversion of trafficking routes
in response to close PAN victories occurring later in the sample period. The em-
pirical approach is the same as that used for the shortest paths trafficking model.
Due to space constraints, in the main text I report results for the routes measure
calculated using the parameters in Column 1 of Table 2.6, as variation in these routes
is the most highly correlated with variation in actual illicit drug confiscations. Ta-
bles A4, A5, and A6 in the online appendix repeat all analyses from the main text
using the parameters in columns (2) and (3) of Table 2.6, documenting that the esti-
mated spillovers in drug traffic, violence, and economic outcomes are broadly similar
regardless of the congestion parameters used to predict trafficking routes.
Panel B of Table 2.5 examines the relationship between actual illicit drug con-
fiscations and routes predicted using the model with congestion. As in the analysis
with the shortest distance routes, I focus on the extensive margin of trafficking. In
column (1), the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if domestically pro-
duced illicit drugs are confiscated in a given municipality-month and equal to zero
otherwise. When a municipality acquires a predicted trafficking route, drug confis-
cations increase by around 1.5 percentage points, and this correlation is statistically
significant at the 1% level. In column (2), the dependent variable is equal to the log
of the value (in US dollars) of domestic illicit drug confiscations in the municipality-
month if confiscations are positive and equal to zero otherwise. Acquiring a predicted
trafficking route is associated with an increase in the value of confiscated drugs of
around 19.5 percent. Columns (3) and (4) document that these results are robust to
excluding municipalities that border a municipality that has experienced a close PAN
victory. Columns (5) and (6) show that the model loses its predictive power when
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the wrong shocks are used (that is, when I assume that PAN losses instead of PAN
victories increase trafficking costs). Next, columns (7) and (8) document that the
correlations between predicted domestic trafficking routes and the presence or value
of cocaine confiscations are small and statistically insignificant. Finally, Figure 2-5
shows that the results are robust to varying the costs imposed by a close PAN victory.
When close PAN victories are implausibly assumed to reduce the costs of trafficking
drugs through a municipality, the model loses its predictive power. As shown in
Table A4 in the online appendix, the above results are robust to using the other
specifications of the congestion costs reported in Table 2.6. In the online appendix,
I also repeat the analysis in Table 2.5 using the number of predicted routes instead
of the indicator routes measure. While the value of confiscations increases for each
additional trafficking route acquired, the relationship is not statistically significant
at conventional levels.
Overall, while congestion does change the predicted routes somewhat, the model
with congestion costs offers at best modest improvements in predictive power over the
shortest paths model. The partial correlation coefficient between the routes dummy
calculated using the model with congestion and the value of confiscations is 0.018,
as compared to 0.014 for the shortest paths model. I now turn to an examination of
whether PAN crackdowns exert violence and economic spillovers.
2.5.3 Violence and economic spillovers
The results in Table 2.5 indicate that the trafficking model predicts the diversion of
drug traffic following close PAN victories. Now, I use the model's predictions about
the diversion of drug traffic to locate violence and economic spillover effects. Ideally,
I would use predicted trafficking routes as an instrument for actual trafficking routes,
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but actual trafficking routes are unobserved. Thus, I focus on testing whether there is
a reduced form relationship between predicted drug trafficking presence and violence
or economic outcomes.
First I explore violence spillovers. Table 2.7 reports estimates from equation (2.5),
with violence measures used as the dependent variable. Panel A uses the shortest
paths routes, and Panel B uses the routes measure from the model with congestion.
Column (1) of Panel A shows that the presence of a predicted trafficking route in-
creases the probability that a drug trade-related homicide occurs in a given month by
1.3 percentage points (s.e.=0.5). This can be compared to the average sample proba-
bility of a drug trade-related homicide, which is equal to 4.4 percent. The estimated
effect of 1.5 percentage points in Panel B is similar. When municipalities bordering a
municipality that has experienced a close PAN victory are excluded from the sample,
the effect estimated in Panel B increases slightly, to 1.8 percentage points, and re-
mains statistically significant. In contrast, the effect in Panel A becomes smaller and
statistically insignificant. This suggests that the model with congestion costs may
be better at predicting violence spillovers that are not in adjacent municipalities.
Congestion costs may partially reflect a higher probability of violent clashes when
traffickers' routes coincide. I examine whether there is evidence for this in column (2),
by regressing the drug trade-related homicide dummy on an indicator equal to one
if a municipality contains one predicted trafficking route in the relevant month and
a separate indicator equal to one if it contains more than one predicted trafficking
route. No trafficking routes is the omitted category. The coefficients reported in
Panel B, which uses the model with congestion, provide suggestive evidence that
traffickers are more likely to engage in violent conflicts when their routes coincide.
The coefficient on the more than one route dummy is equal to 0.019 (s.e.= 0.007),
whereas the coefficient on the single route dummy is equal to 0.008 (s.e.= 0.006).
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However, when the shortest path routes are used, the spillover effects on violence
are estimated to be similar regardless of whether there is one or multiple routes
in a municipality, indicating that the evidence in Panel B should be interpreted
cautiously.
In columns (3) and (4), I report analogous specifications using monthly drug
trade-related homicides per 10,000 municipal inhabitants as the dependent variable.
The pattern of results is qualitatively similar to that in columns (1) and (2). However,
the correlation between the routes dummy predicted using the model with congestion
and the homicide rate, while positive and large relative to the sample mean, is not
statistically significant.
Column (7) documents that the presence of a predicted trafficking route has
no effect on the non-drug trade-related homicide rate. Finally, columns (8) and
(9) report results from the placebo check in which close PAN losses rather than
close PAN victories increase the costs of trafficking drugs. As expected, there is no
longer a relationship between predicted routes and the drug trade-related homicide
probability or rate.
Next, I turn to economic spillovers. I use quarterly data from the National
Survey of Occupation and Employment (Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacidrn y Empleo),
collected by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), to construct
measures of labor market outcomes for 2007 through 2009. These data are available
for a sample of municipalities. 40 Table 2.8 reports the results from regressing male
and female labor force participation and formal and informal sector wages of prime
age males on the predicted trafficking routes dummy, state x quarter fixed effects,
41 have also examined the direct effects of close PAN victories on economic outcomes. Because
the economic data are from a sample, municipalities near the PAN win-loss threshold with economic
data are limited in number, and the direct economic effects (available upon request) are imprecisely
estimated.
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and municipality fixed effects.41 Panel A predicts routes using the shortest paths
model, and Panel B uses the model with congestion costs.
Overall, the economic spillover effects tend to be imprecisely estimated and thus
should be interpreted cautiously. Nevertheless, they provide suggestive evidence -
consistent with the qualitative evidence discussed in Section 2 - that drug trafficking
organizations engage in widespread extortion, particularly of poorer citizens. The
correlations between the routes dummy and male labor force participation (column
1) and formal sector wages (column 3) are statistically insignificant and tend to be
relatively small. In contrast, columns (2) and (4) of Panel B document that the
presence of a predicted trafficking route lowers informal sector wages by around 2.3
percent (s.e.= 1.3) and lowers female labor force participation by 1.26 percentage
points (s.e.= 0.57), relative to an average female participation rate of 51 percent.
The coefficients on the routes dummy in Panel A, which uses the shortest paths
model, are also large but are noisily estimated. Columns (5) and (6) show that the
estimates in both panels are similar when municipalities bordering a municipality
that has experienced a close PAN victory are excluded from the sample. Finally,
columns (7) and (8) use the placebo model in which close PAN losses increase the
costs of trafficking drugs through a municipality. The correlations between the routes
dummy and both female labor force participation and informal sector wages, while
imprecisely estimated, are smaller than the correlations shown in columns (2) and
(4) and are statistically insignificant. While the economic data do not provide as
much power as the confiscations and violence data, overall the evidence suggests that
drug trafficking presence exerts economic effects on the general population.
4 1The analysis of wages is limited to prime age males because they tend to participate inelastically
in the labor force, reducing concerns about selection bias in the wage regressions.
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2.5.4 Possible Extensions
Both versions of the trafficking model predict the diversion of drug traffic following
close PAN victories. With access to additional data, it would be straightforward
to further enrich the analysis. For example, I do not examine cocaine trafficking
because of the absence of reliable data on cocaine points of entry into Mexico. Once
cocaine enters Mexico, however, terrestrial trafficking is similar to that of other
domestically produced drugs. Thus, with reliable data on cocaine points of entry, a
similar approach could be applied to this drug.
With better data, the trafficking model could also explicitly incorporate territorial
ownership by drug trafficking organizations. 51 percent of producing municipalities
were controlled by a local drug gang in the period examined in this study, and we do
not know which trafficking organizations, if any, these gangs allied with to transport
their drugs to the United States. Thus, I am unable to incorporate territorial own-
ership into the model. I do, however, explore the importance of territorial ownership
by conducting the following exercise. I begin by limiting the sample to edges ema-
nating from nodes that meet the following criteria: 1) the node is traversed in the
equilibrium with congestion costs by a trafficking route whose origin is controlled by
a major DTO, 2) the node forks into at least one edge which is controlled by a DTO
that controls the origin of a route traversing that node, and 3) the node also forks
into at least one edge that is not controlled by the above-mentioned DTO. This sam-
ple includes 633 edges (217 nodes), as compared to 17,453 edges (13,969 nodes) in
the full network. I find that the trafficking model on average under-predicts flows on
edges described by the second criterion and over-predicts flows on edges described by
the third criterion. This suggests that territorial ownership is relevant. The network
model likely predicts drug traffic without incorporating territorial ownership because
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territorial ownership has responded endogenously to network characteristics. If ad-
ditional information were to become available, this result suggests that the model's
predictions could be further improved by incorporating territorial ownership.
The network approach developed in this study could also be extended to other
contexts in which combating drug trafficking is a policy priority. This includes areas
such as Afghanistan, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, certain provinces in China,
Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, which are major centers of heroin and cocaine produc-
tion and trafficking. Given that these regions have a much sparser road network than
Mexico, presumably a network analysis of terrestrial drug trafficking would be more
straightforward.
2.6 Policy Implications
As we have seen, Mexico is currently facing an important and difficult challenge.
Mexican traffickers earn tens of billions of dollars each year in profits and have often
used these proceeds to corrupt Mexican institutions and threaten public security,
with potentially quite detrimental consequences for Mexican citizens. At the same
time, attempts to combat drug trafficking have had unintended consequences, leading
to large increases in violence.
Reducing the profits of organized criminal groups is a central objective of Mexican
drug policy, as it reduces the resources that traffickers have to corrupt government
officials and to threaten public security (Shirk, 2011). It may (or may not) be that
policies in consumer countries, such as the legalization of marijuana or more con-
certed efforts to reduce illicit drug consumption by individuals already under the
supervision of the criminal justice system, would reduce profits of drug traffickers
more than well-coordinated interdiction efforts in Mexico. Alternatively, some have
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called on Mexico to abandon interdiction altogether. However, legalization in the
U.S. is unlikely to be politically feasible in the immediate future, and ending inter-
diction is also improbable given the threats that traffickers pose through their varied
criminal activities and influences on public institutions. Thus, there is likely to be a
continued emphasis on how interdiction policies in Mexico can be improved.
This section uses the trafficking model and spillover patterns to examine how
scarce law enforcement resources can be allocated to increase trafficking costs by as
much as possible. Of course policies that increase trafficking costs may have the
unintended consequence of increasing violence, and thus this section also discusses
how the violent response to this policy may be reduced.
There are several reasons why explicitly considering the network structure of traf-
ficking is relevant to the allocation of law enforcement resources. Most obviously,
allocating a police checkpoint or other resources to a road with extensive drug traf-
fic will not necessarily increase trafficking costs substantially, since there could be
a cheap detour. Moreover, increasing the cost of traversing an edge could actually
decrease total trafficking costs because of the externalities from congestion. This
result, known as Braess's paradox after mathematician Dietrich Braess, has been
documented in a number of real world traffic congestion examples.42 It occurs for
around fifteen percent of edges in the trafficking equilibrium predicted by this study's
analysis. Finally, the effects of law enforcement in different locations will be intercon-
nected through the network structure of trafficking. The network model, combined
with a simple algorithm for the allocation of law enforcement resources, incorporates
all three of these phenomena.
42 For examples of Braess's paradox in traffic congestion in Seoul, New York, Berlin, Boston, and
London, see Youn, Gastner, and Jeong (2008); Easley and Kleinberg (2008, p. 71); and Knodel
(1969, p. 57-59).
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I specify the government's resource allocation problem as follows: the govern-
ment's objective is to maximize the total costs that traffickers incur by allocating
resources, such as police checkpoints, to edges in the road network. This policy in-
creases the cost of trafficking drugs on each of the selected edges, which are referred
to as vital edges, by a pre-specified amount pe. Traffickers respond by selecting the
cheapest routes given the new set of edge costs, accounting for changes in congestion.
The government faces a resource constraint and must pay a cost re to send a unit of
law enforcement to each edge e.
With data about the types of law enforcement resources employed in PAN crack-
downs, one could use the network model to estimate pe, and re could be calculated
from administrative data. However, these data cannot be released to researchers,
and conducting a comprehensive analysis of the deployment of Mexican military and
law enforcement resources is beyond the scope of this study in any case.4 3 Instead,
I provide the following illustrative example of how the network approach can con-
tribute to the design of law enforcement policies. Suppose that the government's
budget allows it to allocate a pre-specified number of police checkpoints. I estimate
a reasonable value for pe, the amount that checkpoints increase the effective length
of an edge, by using the impacts of close PAN victories as a benchmark. The net-
work model best predicts the diversion of drug traffic following PAN victories when I
assume that they increase trafficking costs by a factor of three. Thus, I assume that
each police checkpoint increases the effective length of selected edges by 3 x 9 = 27
kilometers, where 9 kilometers is the average edge length in the network."
43With the appropriate data, it would be straightforward to extend the analysis to multiple types
of law enforcement resources (Israeli and Wood, 2002).
44An alternative assumption is that police checkpoints multiply the effective length of edges by
a given factor. However, this would imply that checkpoints increase the costs of longer edges by
more than they increase the costs of shorter edges. The multiplicative costs assumption appears
reasonable for PAN crackdowns, as larger municipalities have more police and are likely to receive
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The government's resource allocation problem is a Stackelberg network game with
a large number of Nash followers (Ba§ and Srikant, 2002; Stackelberg, 1952). In the
first stage, the government allocates police checkpoints to k vital edges. In the second
stage, traffickers respond by simultaneously selecting trafficking routes. The scenario
in which traffickers respond to the government's action by choosing the shortest path
to the U.S. is a special case in which congestion costs are zero. Ball, Golden, and
Vohra (1989) showed that this special case is NP hard, and thus it follows that the
more general problem is also NP-hard. That is, the time required to solve for the
optimum increases quickly as the size of the problem grows. Even if we focused
on the simpler model with no congestion costs, solving for the optimum using an
exhaustive search would have an order of complexity of O(V!), where V (the number
of vertices) equals 13,969, and thus would take trillions of years to run. Intuitively,
the problem is challenging because allocating police resources to two edges at the
same time might increase the objective function more than the summation of changes
in the objective function when resources are allocated to each edge separately, and
hence the order in which a solution algorithm proceeds may matter.
Developing algorithms for problems similar to the one described here is an active
area of operations research and computer science. For example, researchers have
examined the problem of identifying vital edges in critical infrastructure networks,
such as oil pipelines and electricity grids, so that these edges can be better defended
against terrorist attacks and the systems made more robust (see, for example, Brown,
Carlyle, Salmer6n and Wood, 2005). To the best of my knowledge there are currently
no known algorithms for solving the government's resource allocation problem that
are both exact (guaranteed to converge to optimality) and feasible given the size of
larger federal police and military contingents, but the assumption appears less appropriate for police
checkpoints.
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the network, either for the network with congestion or for the simpler problem in
which congestion costs are zero." Developing a fast, exact algorithm for this problem
is a challenging endeavor that is significantly beyond the scope of the current study.
Thus, I instead use the following approximate heuristic to solve for the k vital edges:
1. For each of k iterations, calculate how total trafficking costs respond to indi-
vidually increasing the edge lengths of each of the N most trafficked edges in
the network.
2. Assign each element of this set of N edges a rank, m = 1 ... N, such that the
removal of edge m = 1 would increase trafficking costs the most, the removal
of edge m = 2 would increase trafficking costs the second most ... and the
removal of edge m = N would increase trafficking costs the least.
3. Increase the effective length of the edge with m = 1 by a pre-specified amount.
4. Terminate if k iterations have been completed and return to step 1 otherwise.
While this algorithm does not guarantee convergence to the optimum, encourag-
ingly it offers a solution that is robust to varying the details of the algorithm. Figure
2-6 plots the results of this exercise with k = 25 and N = 250, highlighting munic-
ipalities that contain a vital edge in red. The average monthly drug trade-related
homicide rate between 2007 and 2009 is plotted in the background. Allocating police
checkpoints to these 25 edges increases the total length of the network by 0.0043
4 5Malik, Mittal, and Gupta (1989) suggest an algorithm for finding k vital edges in the shortest
path problem, but unfortunately it is theoretically flawed (see Israeli and Wood (2002) for a dis-
cussion). The most closely related work is by Israeli and Wood (2002), who develop an efficient
algorithm for solving for k vital edges in the context of a shortest path problem on a directed graph
with a single origin and destination. Even if the algorithm, which involves considerable mathe-
matical machinery, could be extended to this paper's undirected graph with multiple origins, it is
unlikely to be feasible on a network of the size examined here and does not accommodate conges-
tion costs. Existing vital edge algorithms focus on shortest path or max flow problems (i.e. Lim
and Smith, 2007) , and to the best of my knowledge researchers have not examined the vital edge
problem in a congested network.
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percent and increases total trafficking costs by 17 percent. Results are similar when
I instead: a) choose values of N ranging from 100 to 500, b) alternate in step 3
between selecting the edges with m = 1 and m = 2, c) alternate in step 3 between
selecting the edges with m = 1, m = 2, and m = 3, and d) remove the edge with
m = 2, m = 3, m = 4, or m = 5 when k = 1 and remove the edge with m = 1 when
k =2... 25.
One concern with targeting law enforcement resources towards vital edges is that
this may increase violence substantially. To the extent that the government aims
to both increase trafficking costs and minimize the probability of a large violence
response, vital edges can be distinguished based on a crackdown's predicted direct
and spillover effects on violence. Moreover, if the government credibly signals a
permanent law enforcement presence on vital edges, this could plausibly reduce the
violent response since the returns to controlling those edges would be permanently
reduced. Hence the expected returns to traffickers of fighting over the edge would be
lower.
A potential alternative strategy that does not require a network analysis would
be for the government to place checkpoints in municipalities with the most violence.
These municipalities may contain a disproportionate number of vital edges if the
control of vital edges is contested. Figure 2-6 shows that while some vital edges are
in high violence municipalities, others are not. By incorporating spillovers and well-
defined predictions about traffickers' behavior, the network model provides unique
information. A frequent critique of the Mexican government's policy towards drug
trafficking is that it has tended to indiscriminately target drug traffickers, rather
than focusing resources on a more systematic and theoretically informed approach
(Guerrero, 2011; Kleiman, 2011). While we would not expect there to be any easy or
ideal solutions to the challenges facing Mexico, the network approach to trafficking
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provides unique information with the potential to contribute to a more nuanced and
economically informed law enforcement policy.
2.7 Conclusion
This study examines the direct and spillover effects of Mexican policy towards the
drug trade, developing three sets of results. First, regression discontinuity estimates
show that drug trade-related violence in a municipality increases substantially after
the close election of a PAN mayor. The empirical evidence suggests that the violence
largely reflects rival traffickers' attempts to wrest control of territories after crack-
downs initiated by PAN mayors have challenged the incumbent criminals. Second,
an economic model of equilibrium trafficking routes predicts the diversion of drug
traffic following close PAN victories. When drug traffic is diverted to other munici-
palities, violence in these municipalities increases. Moreover, there is some evidence
that female labor force participation declines and informal sector wages fall. These
results corroborate qualitative evidence that traffickers extort informal sector pro-
ducers. Finally, I show that the network approach can serve as a tool for the efficient
allocation of law enforcement resources.
These results demonstrate how traffickers' economic objectives and constraints
imposed by the routes network affect the policy outcomes of the Mexican Drug War.
While there are unlikely to be any ideal solutions to the challenges posed by the drug
trade, the results nevertheless suggest that developing a more detailed understanding
of how governments and organized criminals interact in networks could improve the
allocation of scarce public resources, in Mexico and a number of other contexts. In
addition to helping governments address the immediate challenges of reducing the
profits and other operational objectives of organized criminals, a network-informed
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approach may aid in pursuing longer-term policy goals. In making the case for why
combating drug trafficking is important for Mexico's long-term interests, President
Felipe Calder6n argued that organized criminals had infiltrated public institutions
to such an extent that challenging these groups was necessary for protecting national
security and preventing institutional deterioration. This study has focused on the
shorter-term consequences of the Mexican Drug War because at the time of writing,
any longer term impacts on institutional quality and security had yet to be realized.
Examining the conditions under which crackdowns on organized crime lead to long-
term changes in these outcomes is a particularly central question for future research.
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Table 2.1: Pre-characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
5% vote spread t-stat on
PAN PAN means
lost won difference
t-stat on
RD RD
estimate estimate
Crime characteristics
Monthly drug-trade related homicides (Dec. '06 - Jun. '07)
Monthly drug-trade related homicide dummy (Dec. '06 - Jun. '07)
Monthly police-criminal confrontation deaths (Dec. '06 - Jun. '07)
Monthly confrontation deaths dummy (Dec. '06 - Jun. '07)
Annual homicide rate per 100,000 inhab. (1990-2006)
Municipal political characteristics
Mun. taxes per capita (2005)
Mun. taxes per $ income (2005)
PAN incumbent
PRD incumbent
% alternations (1976-2006)
PRI never lost (1976-2006)
Demographic characteristics
Population (2005)
Population density (2005)
Migrants per capita (2005)
Economic characteristics
Income per capita (2005)
Mun. Gini (2005)
Malnutrition (2005)
Mean years schooling (2005)
Infant mortality (2005)
HH w/o access to sewage (2005)
HH w/o access to water (2005)
Marginality index (2005)
Road network characteristics
Average detour length (km)
Total roads (km)
Road density (km/km 2 )
Distance U.S. (km)
Geographic characteristics
Elevation (m)
Slope (degrees)
Surface area (km 2 )
Average min. temperature, C (1950-2000)
Average max. temperature, C (1950-2000)
Average precipitation, cm (1950-2000)
Observations
0.113 0.176 (0.41)
0.042 0.031 (-0.51
0.146 0.086 (-0.57)
0.043 0.043 (-0.01)
15.01 13.68 (-0.46)
56.75
0.001
0.366
0.037
0.418
0.073
59.84
0.001
0.371
0.057
0.400
0.071
(0.22)
(0.05)
(0.07)
(0.59)
(-0.34)
(-0.97)
0.07 (0.36)
-0.01 (-0.46)
-0.20 (-0.75)
-0.02 (-0.66)
-0.19 (-0.63)
13.9
0.0001
-0.02
0.01
0.006
-0.03
(0.73)
(0.95)
(-0.37)
(0.16)
(0.30)
(-0.39)
5099 6026 (0.35) 336 (0.84)
191.1 220.2 (0.41) -118 (-0.80)
0.018 0.016 (-0.69) -0.0007 (-0.35)
4483
0.421
31.20
6.18
22.26
8.436
18.22
-0.119
4285
0.410
32.76
6.26
22.54
8.505
16.14
-0.154
(-0.53)
(-1.47)
(0.52)
(0.32)
(0.22)
(0.05)
(-0.62)
(-0.23)
157 220 (0.46)
66.4 111.5 (1.28)
0.129 0.156 (1.23)
732.3 700.8 (-0.62)
1380
3.25
739
12.2
26.6
105
82
1406
3.62
1834
11.8
26.4
115
70
(0.19)
(0.89)
(1.34)
(-0.57)
(-0.45)
(0.82)
0.02
-0.005
-0.37
0.06
0.28
2.01
-0.81
-0.05
(0.03)
(-0.57)
(-0.01)
(0.21)
(0.18)
(0.71)
(-0.20)
(-0.26)
23.6 (0.47)
54.1 (1.34)
0.003 (0.11)
-9.91 (-0.10)
-45.3
0.07
1249
-0.04
-0.10
5.9
(-0.31)
(0.12)
(1.44)
(-0.04)
(-0.14)
(0.46)
Notes: Data on population, population density, mean years of schooling, and migrants per capita are from I Conteo de Poblacion Y
Vitienda, INEGI (National Institute of Statistics and Geography, 2005). Data on municipal tax collection are from Sistema de
Cuentas Municipales, INEGI. Data on household access to sewage and water are from CONAPO (National Population Council)
(2005). Data on malnutrition are from CONEVAL (National Council for Evaluating Social Development Policy), Indice de Reazgo
Social (2005). Data on infant mortality are from PNUD Mexico (UN Development Program, 2005). The marginality index is from
CONAPO (2005). Data on distance to the U.S. and other road network characteristics are from the author's own calculations, using
GIS software. Electoral data are from Mexico Electoral -Banamex and electoral results published by the Electoral Tribunals of each
state. The geographic characteristics are from Acemoglu and Dell (2009). Data on homicides (1990-2006) are from INEGI and data
on drug trade-related violence are from confidential sources. Column (3) reports the t-statistic on the difference in means between
municipalities where the PAN barely won and where they barely lost. Column (4) reports the coefficient on PAN win from equation
(2.2) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable, and column (5) reports the t-statistic on PAN win. *
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table 2.2: Close PAN Elections and Violence
Post Lame Pre No No FE or
inaug. duck election FE controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Probability of drug trade-related homicides
PAN win
x lame duck
PAN win
x post-inaug.
PAN win
R-squared
Clusters
Observations
0.084*** 0.005 0.014 0.093*** 0.093**
(0.027) (0.030) (0.013) (0.026) (0.043)
0.648 0.686 0.868 0.576 0.024
430 430 430 430 430
Linear Quadratic Cubic Quartic
RD polynomial
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
0.019
(0.058)
0.147***
(0.051)
0.127***
(0.036)
0.007
(0.059)
0.132***
(0.047)
0.149***
(0.046)
0.050
(0.088)
0.204***
(0.064)
0.179***
(0.060)
0.046
(0.090)
0.204***
(0.062)
0.237 0.652 0.240 0.653 0.244 0.655 0.244
152 152 152 152
1,960 430 1,960 430 1,960 430 1,960
Panel B: Drug trade-related homicide rate
PAN win
x lame duck
PAN win
X post-inaug.
PAN win 0.046** 0.007 0.005 0.044** 0.047**
(0.020) (0.023) (0.005) (0.020) (0.023)
R-squared
Clusters
Observations
0.026
(0.025)
0.089**
(0.038)
0.066**
(0.029)
0.018
(0.025)
0.088**
(0.038)
0.096***
(0.037)
0.068*
(0.038)
0.107**
(0.041)
0.090**
(0.040)
0.068*
(0.038)
0.103**
(0.040)
0.370 0.250 0.643 0.246 0.021 0.219 0.374 0.220 0.380 0.222 0.386 0.223
152 152 152 152
430 430 430 430 430 1,960 430 1,960 430 1,960 430 1,960
Notes: In columns (1), (4), (5), (7), (9), and (11) the dependent variable is the average monthly homicide probability (Panel A) or rate (Panel B) in the post-inauguration
period; in column (2) it is average homicides in the lame duck period, and in column (3) it is average homicides in the pre-election period. In columns (6), (8), (10), and
(12), it is the homicide dummy (rate) in a given municipality-month. PAN win is a dummy equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, lame duck is a dummy equal
to one if the observation occurred between the election and inauguration of a new mayor, and post-inaug. is a dummy equal to one if the observation occurred after the
inauguration of a new mayor. Columns (6), (8), (10), and (12) include a lame duck main effect, a post-inauguration main effect, month x state and municipality fixed
effects, and interactions between the RD polynomial listed in the column headings and the lame duck and post-inauguration dummies. These columns limit the sample to
municipalities with a vote spread of five percentage points or less. Columns (1) through (3), (7), (9), and (11) include state fixed effects and controls for baseline
characteristics, estimated separately on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. The coefficients in columns (1) through (5), (7), (9), and (11) are estimated using local
regression, with separated trends in vote spread estimated on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality in columns (6),(8), (10), and (12), are in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table 2.3: Local Politics in More Detail
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Elections involving PAN
PAN PRI
Baseline Incumbent Opponent
Alternative samples
PRI v. Any All
PRD alternation muns.
PAN win 0.084*** 0.067** 0.070** 0.012
(0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.010)
PAN win 0.055
x PAN Incumbent (0.040)
PAN win 0.021
x PHI opponent (0.032)
PHI win 0.049
*(00005)
Alternate 0.013
(0*018)
R-squared 0.648 0.648 0.648 0.571 0.554 0.670
Observations 430 430 430 259 780 614
PAN incumbent effect 0.122***
(0.040)
PRI opponent effect 0.090***
(0.030)
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the average probability that a drug trade-related
homicide occurred in a given municipality-month during the post-inauguration period. PAN win
is a dummy equal to one if a PAN candidate won the election, PRI win is a dummy equal to one if
a PrI candidate won the election, Alternate is a dummy equal to one for any alternation of the
political party controlling the mayorship, Pan Incumbent is a dummy equal to 1 if the
municipality had a PAN incumbent, and PRI opponent is a dummy equal to one if the PAN
candidate faced a PRI opponent. Columns (1) through (5) are estimated using local regression,
with separate trends in vote spread estimated on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. Ali
columns included state fixed effects, as well as baseline controls estimated separately on either
side of the PAN win-loss threshold. Column (2) also includes interactions between the vote spread
terms and the PAN incumbent dummy, and Column (3) includes interactions between the vote
spread terms and the PRI opponent dummy Columns (1) through (3) limit the sample to
municipalities where a PAN candidate was the winner or runner-up, Column (4) limits the sample
to municipalities with a close election between PRI and PRD candidates, and Column (5) includes
all municipalities with a close election, regardless of the political parties involved. Column (6)
includes all elections where a PAN candidate was the winner or runner-up. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.4: Trafficking Industrial Organization and Violence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent variable is drug trade-related homicides (probability or indicator)
PAN win
PAN win x
borders rival
PAN win x
borders allies
PAN win x
local gang
PAN win x
detour
PAN win x post
PAN win x post
x borders rival
PAN win x post
x borders allies
PAN win x post
x local gang
PAN win x post
x detour
Vote spread terms
R-squared
Clusters
Observations
Borders rival
effect
Borders allies
effect
Local gang
effect
0.084***
(0.027)
0.020
(0.026)
0.513***
(0.180)
0. 126*
(0.071)
0.012
(0.032)
0.147***
(0.051)
linear linear linear
0.648 0.247 0.633
152
430 1,672 430
0.533***
(0.174)
0.146**
(0.069)
0.032
(0.028)
0.123**
(0.051)
0.401***
(0.116)
0.047
(0.102)
0.009
(0.024)
linear
0.271
152
1,672
0.524***
(0.131)
0. 169*
(0.092)
0.132**
(0.052)
0.037
(0.031)
0.268
(0.233)
0.172*
(0.095)
0.010
(0.045)
quad.
0.646
430
0.306
(0.226)
0.209**
(0.090)
0.047
(0.040)
0.107**
(0.047)
0.411***
(0.111)
0.049
(0.098)
0.019
(0.026)
quad.
0.274
152
1,672
0.518***
(0.122)
0. 157*
(0.091)
0.127**
(0.051)
0.087***
(0.025)
0.070***
(0.022)
0.134***
(0.041)
0.132***
(0.035)
0.070***
(0.021)
0.150***
(0.024)
0.151***
(0.045)
0.122***
(0.038)
0.148***
(0.022)
0.070***
(0.022)
0.169***
(0.051)
0.144***
(0.021)
linear linear quad. quad. cubic cubic
0.671 0.279 0.675 0.282 0.676 0.283
152 152 152
430 1,672 430 1,672 430 1,672
Notes: In columns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9), and (11), the dependent variable is the average probability that a drug trade-related homicide occurred in a given
municipality-month during the post-inauguration period. In columns (2), (4), (6), (8), (10), and (12), the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if a drug
trade-related homicide occurred in a given municipality-month. Borders rival is a dummy equal to one if the municipality is controlled by a major DTO and borders
territory controlled by a rival DTO, borders allies is a dummy equal to one if the municipality is controlled by a major DTO and does not border territory controlled by a
rival, and local gang is a dummy equal to one if the municipality is controlled by a local drug gang. No known drug trade presence is the omitted category. Detour is the
standardized increase in total trafficking costs when the municipality's roads are removed from the trafficking network. Post is a dummy equal to one if the observation
occurs during the post-inauguration period. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table 2.5: The Diversion of Drug Traffic
(2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Limited Sample
Domestic illicit drug confiscat
Dummy Value Dummy Value
(5) (6)
Placebo Paths
ions
Dummy Value
(7) (8)
Full Sample
Cocaine
Dummy
confiscations
Value
Panel A: Shortest
Predicted
routes dummy
Panel B: Model wi
Predicted
routes dummy
State x month FE
Municipality FE
R 2
Municipalities
Observations
Mean dep. var.
Paths
0.016*** 0.170*** 0.015**
(0.005) (0.050) (0.006)
ith Congestion Costs
0.015*** 0.178***
(0.005) (0.059)
yes
yes
0.42
1869
69,153
0.053
yes
yes
0.47
1869
69,153
0.589
0.013**
(0.006)
yes
yes
0.42
1574
58,238
0.055
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1), (3), and (5) is a dummy equal to 1 if domestic illicit drug confiscations are
made in a given municipality-month; the dependent variable in columns (2), (4), and (6) is the log value of domestic illicit drug
confiscations (or 0 if no confiscations are made); the dependent variable in column (7) is a dummy equal to 1 if cocaine
confiscations are made in a given municipality-month; and the dependent variable in column (8) is the log value of confiscated
cocaine (or 0 if no confiscations are made). Columns (5) and (6) use the placebo network, as described in the text. Columns
(3) and (4) limit the sample to municipalities that do not border a municipality that has experienced a close PAN victory.
Panel A predicts trafficking routes using the shortest paths model, and Panel B uses the model with congestion costs. All
columns include month x state and municipality fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by municipality and month x state are
reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
(1)
0.162**
(0.063)
0.159**
(0.064)
yes
yes
0.47
1574
58,238
0.613
0.004
(0.004)
0.006
(0.006)
yes
yes
0.42
1869
69,153
0.053
0.038
(0.038)
0.036
(0.069)
yes
yes
0.47
1869
69,153
0.589
0.004
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.004)
yes
yes
0.37
1869
69,153
0.046
0.027
(0.020)
0.014
(0.023)
yes
yes
0.37
1869
69,153
0.163
Table 2.6: Trafficking Model Parameter Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Crossing Costs Full
parsimonious flexible congestion
model model costs
#t 62.34***
[2.72]
(1.41)
#p 36.48***
[2.07]
(1.40)
OQ2
#sm all
lap"rge
'kin.t
6
-y
n
1.88***
[0.05]
(0.04)
0.763***
[0.07]
(0.06)
3.24***
[0.30]
(0.25)
13.19***
[2.14]
(1.89)
13.86***
[4.37]
(4.08)
18.81***
[0.86]
(0.83)
64.47***
[9.76]
(9.16)
55.34***
[8.43]
(7.46)
1.57***
[0.15]
(0.12)
0.91***
[0.08]
(0.07)
13.00***
[1.27]
(1.19)
9.29***
[0.34]
(0.33)
21.26***
[0.54]
(0.52)
20.22***
[0.62]
(0.57)
70.990***
[1.29]
(1.28)
43.50**
[21.73]
(17.03)
0.015***
[0.004]
(0.003)
1.86***
[0.17]
(0.16)
0.11**
[0.06]
(0.05)
0.79***
[0.07]
(0.06)
Notes: Column 1 reports the simulated method of moments parameter estimates for the model with parsimonious
congestion costs on U.S. points of entry, Column 2 reports the parameter estimates for the model with flexible
congestion costs on U.S. points of entry, and Column 3 reports the parameter estimates for the model with
congestion costs on both U.S. points of entry and interior edges. Conley (1999) standard errors are in brackets, and
robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 2.7: Violence Spillovers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Sample
dummy dummy
Panel A: Shortest Paths
Predicted 0.01
routes dummy
One route
More than
one route
3***
(0.005)
0.014*
(0.007)
0.012
(0.008)
Full Sample Limited Sample
)rug-related homicide
rate rate dummy rate
0.021*
(0.011)
(7)
Full Sample
Non-drug
homicide
rate
0.006 0.010 0.017
(0.006) (0.011) (0.014)
(8) (9)
Placebo Paths
Drug-related
homicide
dummy rate
0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.011)
0.020*
(0.011)
0.021
(0.017)
Panel B: Model wi
Predicted
routes dummy
One route
More than
one route
State x month FE
Municipality FE
R 2
Municipalities
Observations
Mean dep.var.
th Congestion Costs
0.015***
(0.005)
0.008
(0.006)
0.019***
(0.007)
0.022
(0.019)
0.018***
(0.006)
0.029
(0.025)
0.003
(0.013)
0.035
(0.025)
yes yes yes yes yes yes
yes yes
0.36 0.36
1869 1869
69,153 69,153
0.044 0.028
yes
0.10
1869
69,153
0.044
yes
0.10
1869
69,153
0.028
yes
0.35
1574
58,238
0.045
yes
0.09
1574
58,238
0.026
-0.000
(0.007)
yes
yes
0.07
1869
69,153
0.117
0.003 -0.011
(0.006) (0.013)
yes yes
yes
0.36
1869
69,153
0.044
yes
0.10
1869
69,153
0.028
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1), (2), (5) and (8) is a dummy equal to 1 if a drug trade-related homicide occurred in a given
municipality-month; the dependent variable in columns (3), (4), (6), and (9) is the drug trade-related homicide rate per 10,000 municipal inhabitants,
and the dependent variable in column (7) is the non-drug trade-related homicide rate per 10,000 municipal inhabitants. Columns (8) and (9) use the
placebo network, as described in the text. Columns (5) and (6) limit the sample to municipalities that do not border a municipality that has
experienced a close PAN victory. All columns include month x state and municipality fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by municipality and
month x state are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
Table 2.8: Economic Spillovers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full sample
Male Female Formal Informal
participation sector log wages
Limited sample
Female Informal
participation wages
Placebo Paths
Female Informal
participation wages
Panel A: Shortest Paths
Predicted
routes dummy
Panel B: Model wit
Predicted
routes dummy
State x quarter FE
Municipality FE
R 2
Municipalities
Observations
Mean Dep. Var.
-0.124
(0.513)
-0.756
(1.038)
h Congestion Costs
-0.242 -1.261**
(0.302) (0.570)
yes yes
yes
0.52
880
9,821
89.58
yes
0.79
880
9,821
51.46
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1) is average municipal male labor force participation; the
columns (2), (5), and (7) is average municipal female labor force participation, the dependent variable
wages of formal sector workers; and the dependent variable in columns (4), (6), and (8) is log wages of
Columns (7) and (8) use the placebo network, as described in the text. All columns include quarter x
dependent variable in
in column (3) is log
informal sector workers.
state and municipality
fixed effects. Column (1) weights by the square root of the municipality's male population and columns (2), (5), and (7) weight
by the square root of the municipality's female population. The sample in columns (5) and (6) excludes municipalities that
border a municipality that has experienced a close PAN victory. Standard errors clustered by municipality and quarter x state
are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
(6) (7) (8)
0.020
(0.022)
0.013
(0.012)
yes
yes
0.18
879
407,204
3.34
-0.023
(0.020)
-0.022*
(0.013)
yes
yes
0.09
871
148,302
3.24
-0.784
(1.622)
-1.558**
(0.673)
yes
yes
0.79
709
7,887
44.81
-0.030
(0.027)
-0.028*
(0.017)
yes
yes
0.09
703
114,633
3.03
-0.691
(1.040)
-0.520
(0.636)
yes
yes
0.79
880
9,821
51.46
0.022
(0.023)
-0.014
(0.020)
yes
yes
0.13
871
148,302
3.24
Figure 2-1: Illustration of Spillovers Methodology
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Figure 2-2: Road Network and Predicted Trafficking Routes
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Notes: The least cost routes plotted in this figure are predicted using the network model with congestion costs.
Figure 2-3: RD Results: Close PAN Victories and Violence
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Notes: This figure plots violence measures against the PAN margin of victory, with a negative
margin indicating a PAN loss. Each point represents the average value of the outcome in vote
spread bins of width 0.0025. The solid line plots predicted values from a local linear regression,
with separate vote spread trends estimated on either side of the PAN win-loss threshold. The
dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals. The bandwidth is chosen using the
Imbens-Kalyanaraman bandwidth selection rule (2009).
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Figure 2-4: Estimates by Month
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Notes: Panels A and C plot the RD coefficients on PAN win from equation (2.2), estimated
separately for each month prior to the election and following the inauguration of new authorities.
Panels B and D plot the -y, coefficients from equation (2.3). The dashed lines plot 95% confidence
intervals.
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Figure 2-5: Varying the Costs Imposed by PAN Victories
Panel A: No congestion costs
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Notes: The y-axis plots the coefficient on the routes dummy in equation (2.5) when a close PAN
victory is assumed to proportionately increase the effective length of edges in the municipality by
a factor of a. The x-axis plots values of a ranging from 0.25 to 10. 95% confidence bands are
shown with a thin black line and 90% confidence bands with a slightly thicker black line.
Figure 2-6: Vital Edges
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Notes: Municipalities that contain a vital edge are highlighted in red. The average monthly drug trade-related homicide rate
between 2007 and 2009 is plotted in the background.
Chapter 3
Insurgency and Long-Run
Development: Lessons from the
Mexican Revolution
3.1 Introduction
Bringing conflicted regions under the control of the central state has been a paramount
motivation of state policy in the modern world. The extension of the state's author-
ity often involves fundamental economic and political changes designed to weaken
local elites and resolve longstanding disputes. While these reforms plausibly exert
large persistent economic effects, few attempts have been made to quantify the long-
run impacts of specific policies. This study examines how the central state brought
conflicted regions in Mexico under control historically and relates this to long-run
economic outcomes.
Specifically, I examine the Mexican Revolution, a multi-sided civil war that began
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in 1910 with the overthrow of long-time autocrat Porfirio Diaz. "Land and liberty"
served as the battle cry of the Revolution, and at its heart were disputes about land
distribution and the degree to which political power should be centralized. When
fighting abated in 1918, rampant conflicts over land remained unresolved and the
central state had limited authority outside the national capital. In the decades fol-
lowing the Revolution, major state priorities included a massive expansion of the
federal bureaucracy and large scale agrarian reform. Mexico redistributed over half
of its surface area in the form of ejidos: farms comprised of individual and com-
munal plots that were granted to a group of petitioners. While individuals had
inalienable usage rights to ejido plots as long as they remained in the community,
ejidal land could not be sold, rented, or legally converted to non-agricultural use. In
the decades following the Revolution, Mexico's single party bureaucracy controlled
access to credit for essential inputs, as ejidal farmers could not use their land as col-
lateral to access private credit markets, and state credit served patronage purposes
(Deininger and Bresciani, 2001; Benjamin, 1989; de Janvry et. al, 1997; Ronfeldt,
1973). Ejidos still account for 54% of Mexico's land area and about half of its rural
population today.
This study identifies how insurgency affected subsequent policies and economic
development by using drought severity to instrument for insurgent activity, condi-
tional on state fixed effects.1 Miguel used There is a strong correlation between
drought severity and insurgency, which is defined as the sustained use of violent
force by local residents to subvert representatives of the government. Moving from
half of long-run average precipitation - a severe drought - to average precipitation
'Ted Miguel, Satyanath Shanker, and Ernest Sergenti (2004) pioneered the use of rainfall shocks
to empirically examine conflict. They utilize rainfall as an instrument for growth in order to identify
the causal effect of growth on conflict in Africa.
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decreased the probability of insurgent activity by around 38 percentage points, and
the first stage F-statistic on this relationship is equal to 19. In contrast, drought
severity is uncorrelated with a host of characteristics measured in 1900.
Instrumental variables estimates document that municipalities with sustained
revolutionary insurgency had substantially more land reform in the years following
the Revolution and are today poorer and more agricultural. Around 22 percentage
points more of municipal surface area was redistributed through land reform in mu-
nicipalities that experienced historical insurgency. Today incomes in municipalities
with insurgency historically are around 30 percent lower, the fraction of the munici-
pal labor force working in agricultural is 20 percentage points higher, and the fraction
of the labor force working in industry is six percentage points lower. Moreover, alter-
nations between political parties for the mayorship have been 33 percentage points
less common over the past forty years. In contrast, I find little evidence for a per-
sistent impact of insurgency on violence or public goods provision, which is largely
determined at the state level.
There are many potential mechanisms through which insurgency could impact
long-run development. This study focuses on agrarian structure, which historical and
quantitative evidence emphasize as a particularly plausible mechanism. I hypothesize
that the Mexican state promoted stability in insurgent regions by implementing large-
scale agrarian reform, and this in turn lowered industrialization, income, and political
competition in the long run.
Empirically identifying how Mexican land reform has affected long-run develop-
ment requires alternative samples and identification approaches, and hence space
constraints require that this question be examined in separate work. Here, I discuss
existing empirical and historical evidence supporting the plausibility of agrarian re-
form as a central channel through which the effects of historical insurgency persist.
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Most closely related to this paper is work by Beatriz Magaloni, Barry Weingast, and
Alberto Diaz-Cayeros (2008) that uses a standard growth regression framework ap-
plied to Mexico's 31 states between 1950 and 1995 to measure the economic impact
of land reform. They estimate that Mexican GDP per capita would have been 124
percent higher in 1995 had there been no land reform in Mexico. They also pro-
vide evidence that the distribution of ejidal lands was a key patronage instrument
for generating support for the PRI (Institutionalized Revolutionary Party), which
dominated Mexican politics from the 1920s through the end of the 20th century.
Additionally, in ongoing work I examine the empirical relationship between agrarian
structure and industrial development. I show that while high-productivity, irrigated
agricultural areas tended to industrialize, this effect has been muted in regions with
a high concentration of ejidal lands. Agribusinesses have preferred to locate in ar-
eas where they could vertically integrate by purchasing farms, which has not been
possible in ejidal areas due to the prohibitions on land market transactions (John-
ston et al., 1987). Moreover, the federal government, which for much of the 20th
century controlled nearly a quarter of the Mexican food processing industry, tended
to purchase food and locate state-owned processing industries near well-connected
private farmers (Ochoa, 2000). Descriptive and historical evidence discussed later in
this paper also points to large inefficiencies in the ejidal sector (see Deininger and
Bresciani, 2001 for a review).
This study contributes to a growing literature on the economic effects of conflict
(see Blattman and Miguel, 2010 for a review). The literature focuses primarily on
the impacts of conflict on the labor, capital, and human capital stocks, whereas em-
pirical work on the institutional effects of conflict is limited.2 Studies have found
2 For example, Blattman and Miguel (2010) argue: "The social and institutional legacies of
conflict are arguably the most important but least understood of all war impacts."
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rapid recovery of population following bombings (Davis and Weinstein, 2002; Brak-
man, Garretsen, and Schramm, 2004; Miguel and Roland, 2011). Miguel and Roland
(2011) also find that in Vietnam local living standards and human capital levels con-
verged rapidly across regions after the war, leaving few visible economic legacies of
bombings twenty-five years later. 3 In the specific context of the Mexican Revolution,
Stephen Haber, Armando Razo, and Noel Maurer (2003) document that while the
latter years of the revolution were disruptive of commerce, for the most part they
did not result in the destruction of assets, as insurgents had strong incentives to use
productive assets to finance their activities. Manufacturing and mining recovered
rapidly once the railroads resumed operations, and export agriculture boomed dur-
ing the 1920s. These findings, combined with the large literature on the persistent
impacts of institutions (see Nunn, 2009 for a review), suggest that persistent effects
of insurgency are likely to work at least in part through institutional channels. This
study shows that the Mexican Revolution exerted major long-run effects on prop-
erty rights institutions, which are in turn likely to have had persistent economic
consequences.
The Mexican government's use of agrarian reform to promote stability and extend
its control over the agricultural sector is by no means unique. For example, parallels
exist between the Mexican case and the Iraqi land reforms of the 1950s and early
1960s, in which the state did not fully distribute confiscated lands to private holders
but rather became "a very large absentee landowner" (Warriner, 1969, p. 92). "Those
who were responsible for carrying out the [land reform] law did not believe in the
principle of small ownership; they aimed at keeping the peasants in the hire of the
3 1n contrast, other researchers have found impacts of conflict on children's height and school
attendance (Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey, 2006; Bundervoet, Verwimp, and Akresh, 2009;
Shemyakina, 2006).
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government to use for narrow party gains" (Warriner, 1969, p. 99). Communist bloc
countries such as China, Cuba, and Vietnam went even further, with revolutionary
regimes collectivizing farming (King, 1977). In contexts ranging from 6th century
BCE Greece to Bolivia and Egypt in the 1950s, revolutionary regimes have used
agrarian reform to quell unrest and bring peasant support to their coalitions (Tuma,
1965; Warriner, 1969, p. 242; King, 1977, p. 377). While many land reforms
have extended state control over the agrarian sector, others have emphasized the
transfer of land to private smallholders. For example, during the occupation of
Japan the Allied Forces administered large-scale agrarian reforms that aimed to
reduce peasant unrest by transferring land to individual, private producers (King,
1977, p. 192). In South Korea, which implemented a large scale agrarian reform in
the 1950s, many landowners transacted with peasants in private land markets under
the threat of confiscation if the maximum farm size threshold was exceeded (Putzel,
2000).4 Land distribution remains central in many conflicts today, including those in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Uganda, Guatemala, Indonesia, Cambodia, and elsewhere. This
paper's empirical results highlight the potential for persistent economic inefficiencies
to arise when reforms to resolve land disputes extend the state's power by replacing
market interactions with political patronage.
In the next section, I provide historical background on the Mexican Revolution,
and Section 3 examines the relationship between drought and revolutionary insur-
gency. Section 4 tests whether insurgency impacted agrarian reform and long-run
economic development by using drought as an instrument for insurgency. Section 5
discusses the mechanisms relating historical insurgency, land reform, and long-run
4 Because the state offered minimal compensation for the confiscation of lands from Korean
landowners who violated the maximum farm size threshold and required peasants to pay a relatively
high price to purchase confiscated lands, large landowners and landless farmers had strong incentives
to engage in market transactions.
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development. Finally, Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
3.2 Historical Background
3.2.1 The Mexican Revolution
The Mexican Revolution began in 1910 with the overthrow of autocrat Porfirio Diaz,
who first ascended to the presidency of Mexico in 1876. While Mexico's constitu-
tion stipulated a democratic government with no re-election of the president, Diaz
repeatedly claimed that Mexico was not yet ready for democracy and remained in
power through rigged elections. His 35 year tenure was marked by industrialization,
a dramatic increase in land concentration, and the centralization of political power.
In a 1908 interview with the U.S. journalist James Creelman, Diaz - then ap-
proaching eighty - stated that he would retire and allow other candidates to compete
for the presidency. However, Diaz ultimately changed his mind and ran again for
re-election in 1910, allowing northern opposition politician Francisco Madero to run
against him. Despite widespread popular support for Madero, Diaz claimed to have
been re-elected almost unanimously and had Madero jailed. Madero subsequently
issued a letter from jail calling for popular revolt, and his vague promises of agrarian
reform attracted peasants throughout Mexico, leading to numerous rebellions. The
time was particularly ripe for successful rebellion, given the advanced age of Diaz
and many of his military allies, and Diaz and the federal army were defeated in May
of 1911.
Madero was elected to the presidency, but proved an unpopular leader. He an-
gered the peasant revolutionaries who had brought him to power by failing to imple-
ment agrarian reform and by increasingly allying with members of the Porfirian elite
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to quell unrest amongst those demanding radical change (Knight, 1986). While he
faced armed opposition from the left, Madero was ultimately overthrown in a 1913
coup by counter-revolutionary General Victoriano Huerta. Numerous revolutionary
movements against Huerta's military government arose in 1913, occurring largely
in the same places that had witnessed revolutionary activity in 1910-1911. These
disparate movements were able to unite in their opposition to Huerta and overthrow
his regime in July of 1914. However, their differences proved irreconcilable and soon
after Huerta's defeat the conflict deteriorated into a multi-sided civil war.
The ultimately victorious faction, referred to as Constitutionalism, emphasized
economic modernization and state centralization under a political class that was
different and somewhat broader than the Porfirian elite. Constitutionalism was cen-
tralized under a single military and political command and unambiguously sought
national power. The movement's backbone was in the northern Mexican states of
Sonora and Coahuila, which were relatively prosperous. It garnered its primary sup-
port from middle class, urban, and industrial interests and also gained the official
recognition of the U.S. government. The victorious Constitutionalists ultimately
formed the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI), which dominated Mexico
as a single party political system for most of the twentieth century.
In contrast, the most widespread type of revolutionary movement sought to de-
fend local political structures against incursions by the central government. Many
of these movements called for agrarian reform to return lands confiscated by large
estates during the Diaz regime to the peasants who had previously held them, and
they were typically local in their demands, scope, and political aspirations.5 The
5Prominent examples of movements calling for radical agrarian reform include the Zapatistas
operating in Morelos as well as parts of Puebla, Mexico state, and some other regions; the Cedillo
brothers in San Luis Potosi; and Calixto Contreras in Durango. Examples of movements that did
not pursue agrarian goals including rebellions in the Misantla and Huatusco-C6rdoba regions of
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rebellions led by Pancho Villa in northern Mexico and Emiliano Zapata in central
Mexico are the largest and most well-known of these movements.
The Revolution witnessed some traditional pitched battles, fought primarily be-
tween the Constitutionalists and Pancho Villa in northern and north-central Mexico,
but much of the fighting consisted of guerrilla warfare. By the end of 1915, Villa
had been reduced to guerrilla tactics in his home base of Chihuahua, and it took
the Constitutionalist army several more years of fighting to defeat him and the large
number of other local guerrilla movements, one of the most tenacious of which was
the Zapatistas in Morelos. Purges of local rebel leaders continued throughout the
1920s and in some cases into the 1930s.
3.2.2 Bringing insurgent regions under the control of the
state
The rallying battle cry of the Revolution was "land and liberty" (tierra y libertad),
and while not all insurgent groups were fighting for land redistribution, this was a
central demand of many insurgent movements (Knight, 1986). Towards the close
of the Revolution, Mexico ratified a new constitution that stated that centers of
population that lacked access to adequate land would be granted land in sufficient
quantities for their inhabitants' needs. According to Article 27, estates whose size
exceeded a maximum limit could be expropriated; and religious institutions could not
hold, administer, or acquire land. All properties belonging to the Catholic Church,
which held extensive property, reverted to the state.
In the decades following the Revolution, the government operationalized Article
Veracruz led by large landowners, the Manuel Peldez rebellion in the Huasteca, and the Natividad
brothers in Tepic (Knight, 1986).
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27 through the creation of state-owned properties called ejidos. Ejidos consisted
of communal and individual plots that were granted by presidential decree to a
group of petitioners. Communal plots were devoted to purposes such as grazing and
firewood, whereas crops were typically cultivated on individual ejidal plots. Ejido
members received usufruct rights to their plots, but ownership rights were held by
the community and ultimately controlled by the central state. While the rights to
the produce from one's plot were inalienable as long as one remained on the land,
they could not be transferred, and the rental of ejidal land and hiring of labor to
work ejidal plots were also prohibited.
Ejidos were central to Mexican agriculture, as nearly half of Mexico's surface area
entered the ejidal sector during the 1920s and 1930s. The state obtained the land for
the ejdial sector from estates that had been confiscated from the pre-revolutionary
elite during the Revolution, from the extensive holdings confiscated from the Church,
and from the purchase of lands from large landowners whose estates exceeded the
legal maximum size.
Ejidos met the demands of Mexico's peasant revolutionaries for access to land,
and simultaneously served as a central vehicle for the state to extend its control
into the countryside. The central state controlled access to essential inputs, such as
water resources (including wells on ejidal properties) and credit. Ejido producers
could not use their land as collateral to access private credit markets since the state
owned the land, and thus were reliant on the state for the credit necessary to buy
seeds, fertilizer, and other inputs. Pervasive corruption in the state bank serving the
ejidal sector has been well-documented (DeWalt, 1979; Wilkie, 1971). Ejidal elites
exerted disproportionate influence over decisions about the reallocation of vacated
ejidal lands, with plots became concentrated in the hands of individuals who held
political positions in the ejidos (DeWalt, 1979; Wilkie, 1971). Many decisions about
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land allocation and credit had to be countersigned by state politicians from Mexico's
single party bureaucracy (Deininger and Bresciani, 2001; Benjamin, 1989; de Janvry
et. al, 1997; Ronfeldt, 1973).
Ejidos today account for 54% of Mexico's land area, and about half of its ru-
ral population. In 1992, Mexico reformed Article 27 of the constitution so that the
state no longer has an obligation to provide ejidos. The state began an ejido ti-
tling program called PROCEDE in the same year, seeking to resolve conflicts over
plot boundaries within and between ejidos and to facilitate investment and mar-
kets. Through PROCEDE, an ejido assembly selects which parts of the ejido will
be designated for common use and which parts will be designated for private plots.
Boundaries are delineated and rental of the plots designated for private use is per-
mitted. Once the individual plots have been delineated, producers have the option of
registering their plot in the private domain - allowing it to be bought and sold in land
markets - if a super-majority of the ejido members agree. To date, approximately
90% of ejidos have had their internal and external boundaries delineated through
PROCEDE, and around 2.5% of the surface area in the ejidal sector has entered the
private domain.
There are various mechanisms through which agrarian organization could affect
long-run development. These will be discussed in more detail in Section 5, after
the relationships between insurgency and land reform and between insurgency and
long-run economic outcomes have been examined.
3.3 Drought and Insurgency
In order to examine the impact of insurgency on subsequent state policies and long-
run economic development, I use drought severity to instrument for insurgent activ-
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ity. Scholars have argued that a major drought occurring between 1907 and 1910
was central in spurring revolutionary activity (see Tutino, 1981; LaFrance, 1990),
but this hypothesis has not been tested empirically. In this section, I explore the
first stage relationship between drought severity and insurgency, conditional on state
fixed effects. I also test whether drought is correlated with a number of important
pre-characteristics and examine whether the size of the first stage relationship differs
across various sub-groups.
3.3.1 Identification Strategy
I test whether drought severity in the years leading up to the Revolution affected
insurgency by running the following regression:
insurgencym = 70 + 7y1droughtms + XMS# + as + Ems (3.1)
where insurgencym, is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the citizens of municipality
m - during the period between 1910 and 1918 - used violent force in a sustained
attempt to subvert representatives of the Mexican government (i.e. local authorities
and the military) or to confiscate others' property. droughtms measures the severity
of drought during the 1906-1910 period, Xms contains a vector of time invariant
geographic characteristics, and as is a state fixed effect. All variables are described
in more detail in the following section.
I then use drought severity as an instrument for insurgency in the following
regression:
Yms = O + 6iinsurgencym, + Xms + as + pms (3.2)
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where yms is the outcome of interest.
This instrumental variables approach requires the two following assumptions (An-
grist, 2009). First, drought must be correlated with insurgency. If this correlation
is only marginally different from zero, the resulting instrumental variables estimates
are unlikely to be informative. Second, drought must be uncorrelated with any other
determinants of the outcomes of interest: in other words, corr(droughtms, pims) = 0.
This condition is referred to as the exclusion restriction. It will obtain if drought
is as good as randomly assigned, conditional on state fixed effects, and if drought
has no effect on long-run economic and political outcomes other than through the
insurgency channel.
While the exclusion restriction relies on the instrument being uncorrelated with
unobserved determinants of the outcomes and hence is untestable, I shed light on its
plausibility by running two sets of placebo checks. First, I test whether drought is
uncorrelated with a number of important observable characteristics measured in 1900.
Second, I examine whether drought in other five year periods exerts persistent effects
on long-run development. To the extent that similar droughts in other periods do not
have persistent effects, this would increase our confidence that any long-run effects
of the 1906-1910 drought are acting primarily through its impacts on insurgency.
3.3.2 Data
Monthly five year averages of precipitation during 1906-1910 are available for 217 mu-
nicipalities, located in district seats throughout Mexico.' These data are preserved in
a government publication Atlas termopluviometrica that was sent to the World's Fair
and is now held by Tulane University. I measure drought severity as the ratio of av-
6 Districts are a political unit larger than municipalities but smaller than states that were abol-
ished in 1916.
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erage monthly precipitation in 1906-1910 to long-run average monthly precipitation,
which it taken from World Clim 4's monthly long-run average precipitation rasters.
Motivated by the historical and agronomic literature (i.e. Hollinger and Changnon,
1993), I censor the measure at one7 I focus on rainfall during non-harvest months for
corn - Mexico's main staple crop in 1910. While drought is harmful during most of
the year - lowering soil moisture content and reducing plant growth - it is beneficial
during the harvest season. Results are generally robust to using drought severity
over the year as a whole, but the first stage is weaker. Drought severity is plotted in
Figure 1.
I have also examined robustness to using the standardized precipitation index
to measure drought severity. The standardized precipitation index is calculated
as (1906-1910 mean precipitation - long run mean precipitation)/(long run stan-
dard deviation of precipitation). The long-run standard deviation is calculated from
the Mexican government's precipitation records, maintained in the government's cli-
mate database ERIC 3. The long-run precipitation record is highly incomplete, with
weather stations shifting locations over time, and it takes more data to estimate a
long-run standard deviation than it does to estimate long-run mean.8 The sample
for which there is enough information to calculate the long-run standard deviation
is smaller than the sample for which information on 1906-1910 precipitation is avail-
able, and hence my main focus is on the larger sample for which the percent normal
measure is available.
Data on insurgency were compiled from multiple regional histories and from de-
71n field experiments, agronomists have found only marginal benefits to corn yields from aug-
menting precipitation above long-run average levels. On the other hand, additional precipitation is
beneficial in dry years (see for example Holliinger and Changnon, 1993).
8 While climate models can be effective in predicting long-run average precipitation with relatively
limited data, models have not been extensively developed to predict the long-run standard deviation.
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tailed municipal timelines available in the Encyclopedia of Mexican Municipalities.
These sources are listed in the appendix. A municipality is classified as having insur-
gent activity if - during the period between 1910 and 1918 - its citizens used violent
force in a sustained attempt to subvert representatives of the Mexican government
(i.e. local authorities and the military) or to confiscate others' property. Because the
literature on the Revolution is enormous, with multiple regional histories existing for
each state as well as detailed municipal histories, I am able to explicitly document
the absence of revolutionary activity. In the appendix, I create a timeline for each
municipality in the sample, documenting what occurred during the revolutionary
period and whether this included insurgent activity. Insurgency is plotted in Figure
2.
For example, for the town of Torreon (Coahuila), I document revolutionary ac-
tivity beginning in 1911 with the overthrow of the federal military garrison and
widespread popular attacks on large property holders. I document that revolutionary
activity persisted into 1914, when Torreon fell to Pancho Villa's forces, and so forth.
In contrast, I document that the town of Coatepec (Mexico state), did not witness
insurgent activity. In listing notable events in the town's history, the Encyclopedia
of Mexican Municipalities focuses for the revolutionary period on the construction
of a three room schoolhouse in 1915. It explicitly states "In Coatepec Harinas, the
revolutionary era did not cause the disruptions that other areas suffered." Moreover,
maps in Revolucion en el estado de Mexico (Palafox, 1988) show that this munici-
pality is not near the areas of the state that experienced rebel activity or widespread
banditry. While the binary insurgency measure is a considerable simplification of a
complex event, more detailed measures would be difficult to construct in a systematic
way. Summary statistics for the drought and insurgency variables are presented in
Table 1.
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3.3.3 Results
Table 2 documents the first stage relationship between 1906-1910 drought severity
and insurgency during the Mexican Revolution and examines whether this relation-
ship is robust to different measurements of drought severity. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses and Conley standard errors that correct for spatial correlation are
in brackets. All columns include controls for time-invariant municipal geographic
characteristics: long-run average precipitation (1950-2000), long run average mini-
mum and maximum temperature (1950-2000), elevation, and slope, as well as state
fixed effects.9
Column 1 uses the percent normal measure of drought severity in non-harvest
months, the measure that concurs most closely with the biology of plant growth.
This measure divides precipitation in 1906-1910 by long-run average precipitation
and is available for the full sample of municipalities for which we have data on 1906-
1910 precipitation. Column 2 examines the percent normal measure calculated over
the entire year. In both cases, the correlation between drought severity and revo-
lution is statistically significant at the one percent level, with a somewhat stronger
relationship when the non-harvest drought measure is used (first stage F-statistic of
19.1) than when the full year drought measure is used (first stage F-statistic of 9.9).
Moving from half of long-run average precipitation - a severe drought - to average
precipitation decreases the probability of insurgent activity by around 38 percentage
points. In the sample as a whole, the probability of insurgency is 59%.
Columns 3 through 6 examine the relationship between standardized precipitation
indices and insurgency. Recall that the standardized precipitation index subtracts
the long-run monthly mean from the 1906-1910 monthly mean and the divides by the
9Results (not shown) are similar when the geographic controls are excluded or when municipal-
level characteristics measured in 1900 are included.
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long-run standardized deviation, averaging these standardized monthly deviations
across the year. Columns 3 and 4 construct the standardized precipitation index
by using weather stations within 25 kmn of a 1906-1910 weather station to calculate
the long-run standard deviation of precipitation. Columns 5 and 6 use data from
weather stations within 10 km of a 1906-1910 weather station to calculate the long-
run standard deviation. In 182 municipalities, a weather station appearing for at
least 25 years in the weather record is located within 25 kilometers of the 1906-
1910 weather station, and 120 municipalities have one of these stations within 10
kilometers of their 1906-1910 weather station. These samples compare to the full
sample of 210 municipalities for which 1906-1910 precipitation data are available.
Columns 3 and 5 calculate the standardized precipitation index averaged over non-
harvest months, and columns 4 and 6 average the monthly standardized precipitation
index over all months in the year.
There is typically a first stage relationship between the drought measure and
insurgency, but the first stage F-statistics are smaller than they are in columns 1
and 2. Moving from one standard deviation below normal precipitation to normal
precipitation decreases the probability of insurgency by around 17 percentage points.
Because the first stage is not as strong for the standardized indices and the sample
size is smaller, I use the percent normal drought measure for the remainder of the
analysis. Results using the standardized precipitation index as an instrument for
insurgency can be found in the appendix.
The instrumental variables approach will estimate the impact of insurgency on
various outcomes for those municipalities that were induced by drought to partic-
ipate in insurgent activity. While we cannot observe whether citizens in a given
municipality took up arms in response to drought, Table 3 sheds light on which sorts
of municipalities were influenced by the drought by examining the size of the first
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stage for different sub-populations.
Column 1 reports the baseline first stage relationship from the full sample, repro-
ducing column 1 of Table 2 for comparison purposes. Column 2 limits the sample
to municipalities in states that are closer than the median distance to the U.S., and
column 3 limits the sample to municipalities in states that are farther than the me-
dian distance from the U.S. The coefficient on drought severity in the full sample
is -0.770 (s.e.= 0.254). This coefficient is -0.650 for places nearer the U.S. and
-0.917 (s.e.= 0.224) for places further from the U.S. Both are statistically different
from zero, and they are not statistically distinguishable from each other.
Columns 4 and 5 divide the sample by whether the municipality had a higher
percentage of its male population working in agricultural in 1900 than the median
municipality. The correlation between drought severity and insurgency is statisti-
cally significant in both samples but is substantially larger in the more agricultural
sample, at -1.288, than in the less agricultural sample. In the more agricultural sam-
ple, moving from half of long-run average rainfall in 1906-1910 (a severe drought)
to long-run average rainfall decreases the probability of insurgency by around 64
percentage points. Next, columns 6 and 7 divide the sample by whether the munic-
ipality had more or less of its population living in an hacienda in 1900 relative to
the median municipality. The relationship between drought severity and insurgency
is large and highly statistically significant for both samples. Finally, columns 8 and
9 divide the sample by whether a higher or lower percentage of the municipality's
population spoke an indigenous language in 1900 than in the median municipality.
The relationship between drought and insurgency is large and statistically significant
in both sub-samples. Overall, these results document that drought led to insurgency
in municipalities with a wide variety of initial characteristics, and this relationship
was particularly pronounced in more agricultural municipalities.
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Identification requires drought severity between 1906 and 1910 to be as if ran-
domly assigned. In other words, in the absence of differences in rainfall during these
years, municipalities that suffered drought would not have been different on average
from municipalities that received above average rainfall. To shed light on the plau-
sibility of this assumption, Table 4 regresses a variety of outcomes from the 1900
Mexican Population Census on drought severity, measured as the percent of normal
precipitation in non-harvest months. The sample sizes are slightly different across
outcomes, as portions of the 1900 census volumes have not been preserved for the
state of Oaxaca.
For comparison purposes, column 1 reports the first stage relationship between
drought severity and insurgency from Table 2. The dependent variable in column
2 is the percentage of the municipal male population that worked in agricultural in
1900.10 The dependent variable in column 3 is the percentage of the population living
in haciendas, landed estates with an attached labor force. The dependent variable
in column 4 is the percentage of the population that primarily spoke an indigenous
language, in column 5 it is the percentage that was literate, in column 6 it is the
number of public employees per 1,000 inhabitants, and in column 7 it is the number
of police per 1,000 inhabitants.
The correlations between these outcomes and drought severity are all statistically
insignificant. The magnitudes of these relationship also tend to be smaller, relative
to the sample mean, than the magnitude of the relationship between drought and
insurgency. The next section will document that some of these outcomes diverge
in municipalities with insurgent activity as compared to municipalities that did not
experience insurgent activity, in the years following the Revolution.
10Nearly all women are counted in the 1900 census as having a domestic occupation, and hence
are excluded from this measure.
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3.4 Insurgency's impacts on policy and develop-
ment
This section uses an instrumental variables approach to test whether insurgency
affected two of the most central Mexican federal government policies in the years
following the Revolution: agrarian reform and the expansion of the federal bureau-
cracy. During the 1920s and 1930s, the federal government redistributed almost half
of Mexico's surface area through a major agrarian reform program, and the size of
the federal bureaucracy increased more than fivefold. I find that agrarian reform
was concentrated in insurgent municipalities, whereas there is little relationship be-
tween insurgency and the expansion of the federal bureaucracy. After examining
insurgency's impacts on these major policies, I test whether it has exerted persis-
tent effects on economic outcomes. Instrumental variables estimates document that
insurgency has lowered income and industrialization and increased the percentage
of the labor force in agriculture in the long-run. In the next section, I provide evi-
dence that agrarian reform is a plausible central mechanism explaining insurgency's
persistent economic impacts.
3.4.1 Data
I obtained data on agrarian reform from Mexico's online Sistema de Informacid'n del
Padrorn e historial de nticleos agrarios, which compiles information on all government
actions related to agrarian reform and titling, at the level of the ejido, from 1916
until the present. Data on over 31,000 ejidos were used to calculate information
on municipal-level agrarian reform, titling, and entry of ejidal plots into the private
domain.
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Data on income, the labor force, public employees, and education are taken from
Mexican census data for the years 1900, 1910, 1930, 1940, 1960, 2000, and 2010.
Data on household access to water are from CONAPO (National Population Council)
(2005). Electoral data are from Electoral -Banamex and electoral results published
by the Electoral Tribunals in each of Mexico's 31 states. The geographic character-
istics are from Acemoglu and Dell (2010). Data on homicides (1990-2006) are from
INEGI and data on drug trade-related violence and subversion are from confidential
government sources. Data on municipal tax collection are from Sistema de Cuentas
Municipales, INEGI.
3.4.2 Insurgency and government policies
Table 5 tests whether insurgency influenced the targeting of agrarian reform, using
the percentage of a municipality's surface area redistributed by agrarian reform as the
dependent variable. Panel A reports the IV estimates, and for comparison purposes
Panel B reports the OLS estimates. The percent normal drought measure is used as
the instrument. Robustness to alternative measures of drought and to the inclusion
of additional controls is documented in the appendix.
Overall, Table 5 provides strong evidence that insurgency led to increased land
reform. The IV estimates in column 1 document that in the sample as a whole,
insurgency increased the percentage of municipal surface area redistributed as ejidos
by 21.8 percentage points (s.e.= 0.111), relative to the sample mean of 48.9 percent.
When we focus attention on municipalities where participation in agricultural was
above the sample median in 1900, the estimated effect is 31 percentage points, and
this effect is statistically significant at the one percent level. In contrast, the impact
of insurgency is smaller and not statistically different from zero in the sample with
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below median participation in agricultural in 1900. This pattern is what we would
expect, given that the demand for agrarian reform is likely to be higher in areas where
a greater percentage of the population is employed in agriculture. While producers
now have the option of registering ejidal lands in the private domain, only 2.5% of
ejidal lands have been registered thus far, so agrarian reform numbers are largely
reflective of how much land remains in the ejidal sector today.
In columns 1 and 2, the IV estimates are somewhat larger than the OLS estimates.
There are a number of reasons why this could occur: because of measurement error
in the insurgency variable, because of omitted variables bias in the OLS specification,
because the IV measures a local average treatment effect on municipalities induced to
take up arms by drought severity (whereas the OLS measures the correlation across
the full sample), or because drought severity violates the IV exclusion restriction.
It is not possible to fully disentangle or explicitly test these possibilities since they
depend on characteristics the researcher does not observe. However, it is unlikely that
a violation of the exclusion restriction is the primary reason why the IV estimates
are larger than the OLS estimates, since the instrument is uncorrelated with a host
of pre-characteristics (Table 4). Moreover, when I examine the estimates across
the different sub-samples in Table 4, the insurgency coefficient is not substantially
different in the sub-samples with larger first stages. Thus, it appears unlikely that the
IV estimates reflect a local average treatment effect that only applies to a small sub-
population. In contrast, both omitted variables bias and measurement error appear
plausible, given the inherent difficulties in quantifying insurgent activities and the
many factors that could influence the decision to take up arms. For example, while
there are some well-known examples of indigenous revolutionary leaders, on average
municipalities with revolutionary activity were substantially less indigenous in 1900.
In turn, it is likely that more indigenous places received more land reform, since
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their land was more likely to be taken in the first place, and this would lead to a
downward bias in OLS coefficient on revolution.
A major expansion of the federal bureaucracy also occurred in the decades fol-
lowing the Revolution. In 1900, there were 3.2 government employees per 1,000
municipal residents in the sample examined in this paper. By 1940, this number had
risen to 20. On average, 16 of these were federal government employees. Table 6
explores whether insurgency differentially affected the number of public employees
present in a municipality in 1940. Given the greater amount of agrarian reform, we
might expect that the number of government employees would be higher in munic-
ipalities that had experienced insurgent activity. On the other hand, since a major
demand of many insurgents was greater autonomy from the central government, to
the extent that these demands were met we would expect lower federal bureaucracy
presence. We see from Table 5 that the IV does not estimate statistically significant
differences between municipalities that experienced insurgent activity and those that
did not. If anything the number of federal and state employees was lower in munic-
ipalities that experienced insurgency. Moreover, important measures of government
bureaucracy today do not differ. Column (5) documents that in 2005 the number of
school teachers per 1000 school aged children was statistically identical in municipal-
ities with historical insurgency and in those without historical insurgency. Column
(6) documents that local tax receipts per dollar of municipal income in 2005 also did
not differ.
3.4.3 Insurgency and long-run development
The previous section documented a large impact of insurgency on subsequent agrar-
ian reform. This section examines whether insurgency has exerted long-run impacts
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on economic prosperity.
First, Table 7 tests whether insurgency impacts economic prosperity today. Columns
1 through 4 examine income, using microdata from the 2000 Mexican Population
Census. The IV coefficient reported in column 1 estimates that historical insurgency
has lowered income by around 33%. Columns (2) through (4) divide the sample
into individuals working in agriculture, in industry, and in services. Care should be
taken in interpreting the results given that insurgency may also influence selection
into economic sectors, but the exercise is nevertheless informative about where the
income effects are concentrated. The IV coefficient is large and negative in all three
sectors, though it is not statistically significant for agriculture. This is not.surprising
given that income tends to be poorly measured for household agricultural producers.
As in Table 6, the IV coefficients are larger than the OLS coefficients, likely for the
same reasons that were discussed in the previous section.
Next, columns 5 and 6 examine the percentage of households in a municipality
that lack access to running water and to electricity. Households in municipalities
with insurgent activity historically are 14 percentage points more likely to lack access
to running water and around three percentage points more likely to lack access to
electricity. These effects are large, given that in the sample as a whole around 11
percent of households lack access to water and three percent lack access to electricity.
Next, Table 8 tests whether insurgency has influenced the sectoral allocation of
the labor force. Columns 1 and 2 examine the percentage of the municipal labor
force working in agriculture and industry in 2010, columns 3 and 4 do the same for
1960, and columns 5 and 6 examine the percentage of the male population working
in agriculture and industry in 1940. The instrumental variables estimates document
that today, the percentage of the labor force working in agricultural is around 20
percentage points higher in municipalities that experienced insurgent activity his-
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torically, and the percentage of the population working in industry is around six
percentage points lower. The insurgency coefficient in the agricultural labor force
regression is significant at the 5% level and the estimated impact on industry is
marginally significant. The point estimates are of similar magnitude in both 1960
and 1940, though they are very noisily estimated for 1960.
While there are many channels through which historical insurgency could impact
income, Tables 4 through 7 - combined with the qualitative literature - provide strong
suggestive evidence that the restrictions imposed by agrarian reform in Mexico have
discouraged people from leaving agriculture and reduced industrial development, low-
ering income in the long-run. Lower agricultural productivity in municipalities with
more land reform could also help explain the persistent impacts of historical insur-
gency on income. Section 5 provides a detailed historical and empirical examination
of the relationship between land reform and current economic outcomes.
It is also well-documented that agrarian reform created and sustained a political
patronage system linking ejidal elites to government officials at the municipal and
state levels (Varley, 1989; DeWalt, 1979; Wilkie, 1971). This patronage system may
plausibly have stifled political competition in the long-run. The evidence in Table 9
supports this hypothesis, documenting that alternations between political parties for
the mayorship have been substantially less common in municipalities with insurgent
activity historically. The IV coefficient is large and highly significant, estimating that
insurgency has lowered alternations between parties holding the mayorship by 32.7
percentage points between 1974 and 2009, relative to a sample mean of 24.4 percent.
The effect is present both before 1994, when Mexico was less politically competitive,
and after 1994, when it became more democratic. It is particularly pronounced
for the post-1994 period. However, differences in local political competition do not
appear to have lowered the provision of important public goods, which are provided
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by the state and national governments. Results, available upon request, fail to find
a large or statistically significant relationship between historical insurgency and the
public provision of education, health care, or road infrastructure in recent years.
3.5 Mechanisms
There are many potential mechanisms through which insurgency could exert per-
sistent economic effects. While it is infeasible to examine all possible channels of
persistence, the existing literature provides considerable guidance on mechanisms
that are especially likely to be important. In particular, there is a large literature
emphasizing the economic effects of Mexico's agrarian organization. I first discuss
the relationship between land reform and economic outcomes and then present em-
pirical evidence on potential alternative mechanisms relating insurgency to long-run
economic development.
3.5.1 Land reform
Empirically identifying how Mexican land reform has affected long-run development
requires alternative samples and identification approaches, and hence space con-
straints require that this question be examined in separate work. Here, I discuss
existing empirical and historical evidence supporting the plausibility of agrarian re-
form as a central channel through which the effects of historical insurgency persist.
Most closely related to this paper is work by Beatriz Magaloni, Barry Weingast,
and Alberto Diaz-Cayeros (2008) that empirically examines the impact of land reform
on economic growth and politics. Magaloni et al. use a standard growth regression
framework applied to Mexico's 31 states between 1950 and 1995 to measure the
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economic impact of land reform. They estimate that Mexican GDP per capita would
have been 124 percent higher in 1995 had there been no land reform in Mexico. They
also provide evidence that the distribution of ejidal lands was a key instrument for
generating political support for the PRI - Mexico's historically dominant party -
and show that land was distributed as a function of the presidential election cycle
and social unrest. These results are consistent with large and highly significant
municipal-level correlations between land reform and contemporary economic and
political outcomes. They are also consistent with the hypothesis that insurgency
affects current economic and political outcomes at least in part through land reform.
Overall, this evidence suggests that while Mexico's policy of creating ejidos was
highly inefficient, the government pursued it because it furthered the PRI's goals of
reducing instability and maintaining political control.
Additionally, in ongoing work I examine the empirical relationship between agrar-
ian structure and industrial development. I show that while high-productivity, irri-
gated agricultural areas tended to industrialize, this effect has been muted in regions
with a high concentration of ejidal lands. Agribusinesses have preferred to locate in
areas where they could vertically integrate by purchasing farms, which has not been
possible in ejidal areas due to the prohibitions on land market transactions (John-
ston et al., 1987). Moreover, the federal government, which for much of the 20th
century controlled nearly a quarter of the Mexican food processing industry, tended
to purchase food and locate state-owned processing industries near well-connected
private farmers (Ochoa, 2000). Given that industry is a relatively high-paying sector,
differences in industry are likely to translate into disparities in income.
Historical and descriptive evidence also point to large inefficiencies in the ejidal
sector. Evidence reviewed in Deininger and Bresciani (2001) suggests that land
reform reduced long-run agricultural productivity and opened up various possibilities
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for political manipulation in the distribution of land and credit (see also Varley, 1989;
DeWalt, 1979; Wilkie, 1971). By the 1990s, 53% of ejido households, as compared
to 26% of the total population, earned less than the minimum wage. The land-labor
ratio in the private sector was more than double that in the ejidal sector, and the
median private farm size was more than twice as high as the median farm size in
the ejidal sector. Private farmers had larger herds, owned more machinery, and were
more likely to use improved seeds. As discussed in Deininger and Bresciani, similar
results hold even when only nearby municipalities are compared. While measuring
agricultural productivity for the sample in this paper is not feasible due to data
limitations, this evidence suggests that insurgency may have significantly lowered
long-run agricultural productivity. Overall, this study's empirical results highlight
the potential for persistent economic inefficiencies to arise when reforms to resolve
land disputes extend the state's power by replacing market interactions with political
patronage.
3.5.2 Other mechanisms
While I have argued that agrarian reform is an important mechanism linking histori-
cal insurgency to modern economic and political outcomes, an alternative hypothesis
is that insurgency permanently increases the level of violence and conflict in a com-
munity, making it more difficult for the state to monopolize violence in the future.
For example, Besley and Reynal-Querol (2012) find that places in Africa that ex-
perienced more conflicts during the pre-colonial period have had more civil wars
recently. To the extent that violence and instability lower productivity, such forces
could reduce economic prosperity in the long-run.
This hypothesis is explored in Table 10. Column 1 examines the municipal homi-
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cide rate between 1992 and 2008, Column 2 the number of police deaths caused by
confrontations with drug traffickers since late 2006, Column 3 drug trade related
homicides since late 2006, and Column 4 the presence of guerrilla insurgents in 2008.
None of the IV or OLS coefficients are statistically significant, and the coefficients
in columns 1 through 3 are relatively small in magnitude. The coefficient on in-
surgency in the guerrilla activity regression, equal to 0.13 (s.e.= 0.16), is large but
very noisily estimated. Based on these results, it appears unlikely that the impacts
of revolutionary insurgency persist primarily through the state's long-run capacity
to monopolize violence. As discussed above, I also do not find a large or statisti-
cally significant relationship between historical insurgency and the public provision
of education, health care, or road infrastructure in recent years.
Another alternative interpretation of the results is that historical drought sever-
ity could exert direct impacts on modern outcomes, violating the IV exclusion re-
striction. To examine this possibility, Table 11 regresses the study's main outcome
variables on separate measures of drought severity in 1906-1910 and in all five year
periods between 1960 and 1995. The dependent variable in column 1 is the histor-
ical insurgency indicator. The dependent variable in column 2 is the percentage of
municipal surface area in the ejidal sector, the dependent variable in column 3 is the
percentage of the municipal labor force working in industry in 2010, the dependent
variable in column 4 is log income in 2000, and the dependent variable in column 5
is the percentage of elections held between 1974 and 2009 in which the party control-
ling the mayorship changed. The coefficient on 1906-1910 drought severity is large
and statistically significant in all columns. In contrast, of the 35 drought variables
from other periods (7 of which enter each regression), only one is marginally signifi-
cant. This supports the study's assumption that 1906-1910 drought interacted with
specific historical circumstances to produce long-lasting effects through insurgency.
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I have also explored droughts occurring between 1925 and 1960. Because weather
data for this period is quite limited, it would reduce the sample size substantially
to include these drought measures in the regression analysis reported in Table 11.
However, I have looked at these periods separately and do not find evidence of a
relationship between drought and current outcomes, either for the sub-sample of
municipalities that also have weather data for 1905-1910 or for Mexico as a whole
(results available upon request).
3.6 Concluding Remarks
This study identifies how insurgency during the Mexican Revolution affected subse-
quent policies and economic development by using drought severity to instrument
for revolutionary activity, conditional on state fixed effects. Instrumental variables
estimates document that insurgent municipalities received substantially more land
reform in the years following the Revolution and are today poorer, more agricultural,
less industrial, and less politically competitive.
Based on the quantitative and historical evidence, I hypothesize that the Mexican
state gained a monopoly on violence in rebellious regions through implementing large-
scale agrarian reform in the years following the Revolution. Agrarian reform imposed
considerable restrictions on redistributed lands and fostered a clientalistic political
system dominated by a single party bureaucracy. This study discusses evidence that
agrarian reform stifled industrialization and economic growth in places that received
more land reform relative to places that received less.
While agrarian reform may be important for promoting stability and reducing in-
equality in conflicted regions, this study highlights the potential costs when agrarian
reform places major restrictions on markets and fosters clientalistic politics. How
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agrarian disputes can be most effectively resolved remains an important question for
future research.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Mean S.D. p1O p90
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rainfall 0.78 0.21 0.49 1.00
Insurgency 0.59 0.49 0.0 1.0
Agrarian reform 0.49 0.26 0.13 0.82
Public employees/1,000 inhab. (1940) 20.03 9.5 2.0 25.4
Log income (2000) 7.7 0.9 6.8 8.8
Percent agricultural (2010) 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.45
Percent industrial (2010) 0.25 0.08 0.14 0.37
Percent agricultural (1960) 0.26 0.28 0.16 1.00
Percent industrial (1960) 0.21 0.12 0.01 0.23
Percent agricultural (1940) 0.24 0.19 0.19 0.53
Percent industrial (1940) 0.12 0.09 0.01 0.14
Percent party alternations (1974-2009) 0.24 0.19 0.00 0.50
Percent party alternations (1974-1993) 0.08 0.19 0.00 0.40
Percent party alternations (1994-2009) 0.37 0.27 0.00 0.80
Notes: This table provides the mean, standard deviation, 10th percentile, and 90th percentile for
rainfall and for the paper's main outcome variables. Rainfall is 1906-1910 precipitation during
non-harvest months as a percentage of long-run average precipitation, censored above at one.
Insurgency is a dummy equal to one if the municipality experienced insurgent activity during
1910-1918 and equal to zero otherwise. Agrarian reform is the percentage of a municipality's
surface area redistributed through agrarian reform. Log income is the log of mean municipal
income in 2000. Percent agricultural (2010) and Percent agricultural (1960) are the percentage of
the municipal labor force working in agriculture in the years 2010 and 1960, respectively. Percent
industrial (2010) and Percent industrial (1960) are the percentage of the municipal labor force
working in industry in the years 2010 and 1960, respectively. Percent Agricultural (1940) is the
percentage of municipal male population working in agriculture in 1940, and Percent Industrial
(1940) is the percentage of municipal male population working in industry in 1940. Percent party
alternations gives the percentage of elections in which the party controlling the mayorship
changed, during the time period listed in parentheses. Sources for all variables are provided in the
text.
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Table 3.2: First Stage
Dependent variable is insurgency
Drought measured by:
Percent normal
Across months
Non-harvest All mos.
(1)
-0.770***
(0.176)
[0.183]
F-statistic on drought variables
R-squared
Observations
19.1
0.449
210
(2)
-0.586***
(0.186)
[0.183]
9.9
0.422
210
Standardized Deviation
Station within 25km Station within 10km
Non-harvest All mos. Non-harvest All mos.
(3) (4) (5) (6)
-0.165**
(0.068)
[0.066]
6.0
0.406
182
-0.139**
(0.065)
[0.063]
4.6
0.398
182
-0.176**
(0.081)
[0.081]
4.7
0.467
120
-0.134
(0.082)
[0.083]
2.7
0.453
120
Notes: Rainfall is a drought severity measure, as described in the column headings, with lower values indicating more severe
drought. The dependent variable is insurgency, a dummy equal to one if the municipality experienced insurgent activity during
1910-1918 and equal to zero otherwise. All columns include controls for long-run average precipitation, long-run average
minimum and maximum temperature, slope, and elevation, as well as state fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. Conley standard errors corrected for spatial correlation are in brackets.
Rainfall
Table 3.3: Compliers
Dependent variable is insurgency. Sample is:
Close Fax More Less More Less More Less
Baseline U.S. agricultural haciendas indigenous
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Rainfall -0.770*** -0.650** -0.917*** -1.288*** -0.498* -0.646*** -0.935*** -0.649* -0.671***
(0.176) (0.254) (0.224) (0.293) (0.265) (0.243) (0.268) (0.334) (0.242)
R-squared 0.449 0.371 0.502 0.534 0.499 0.522 0.475 0.530 0.434
Observations 210 97 113 104 103 106 103 100 105
Mean Dep. Var. 0.59 0.68 0.51 0.58 0.62 0.57 0.62 0.51 0.67
Notes: Rainfall measures 1906-1910 precipitation during non-harvest months as a percentage of long-run average
precipitation. The dependent variable is insurgency, a dummy equal to one if the municipality experienced insurgent activity
during 1910-1918 and equal to zero otherwise. All columns include controls for long-run average precipitation, long-run average
minimum and maximum temperature, slope, and elevation, as well as state fixed effects. The samples are defined in the
column headings. Column 1 examines the full sample. Municipalities in states that are closer than the median distance to the
U.S. are examined in column 2, whereas municipalities in states farther than the median distance from the U.S. are examined
in column 3. Municipalities that had a higher percentage of their male population working in agriculture in 1900 than the
median municipality are examined in column 4, whereas municipalities that had a lower percentage of their population working
in agriculture as compared to the median municipality are examined in column 5. Municipalities that had a higher percentage
of their population living in an hacienda in 1900 than the median municipality are examined in column 6, whereas
municipalities that had a lower percentage of their population living in an hacienda as compared to the median municipality
are examined in column 7. Municipalities in which a higher percentage of the population spoke an indigenous language in 1900
than in the median municipality are examined in column 8, whereas municipalities in which a lower than average percentage of
the population spoke an indigenous language are examined in column 9. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 3.4: Placebo Checks
Insurgent
activity
(1)
Percent 1900 population Pub. employ. Police
agricultural in haciendas indigenous literate per 1,000 inhab.
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rainfall -0.770*** 0.089 -0.057 -0.044 0.057 -0.711 -0.260
(0.176) (0.122) (0.052) (0.063) (0.047) (1.108) (0.603)
F-statistic 19.1
R-squared 0.449 0.497 0.421 0.573 0.634 0.585 0.362
Observations 210 207 209 205 204 205 205
Mean Dep. Var. 0.58 0.50 0.10 0.06 0.23 3.22 0.98
Notes: Rainfall measures 1906-1910 precipitation during non-harvest months as a percentage of long-run average
precipitation. All columns include controls for long-run average precipitation, long-run average minimum and maximum
temperature, slope, and elevation, as well as state fixed effects. The dependent variable in column 1 is insurgency, a dummy
equal to one if the municipality experienced insurgent activity during 1910-1918 and equal to zero otherwise. The dependent
variable in column 2 is the percentage of male municipal population working in agriculture in 1900, in column 3 it is the
percentage of municipal population living in haciendas in 1900, and in column 4 it is the percentage of municipal population
that was literate in 1900. The dependent variable in column 5 is public employees per 1,000 municipal inhabitants in 1900, and
in column 6 it is the number of police per 1,000 municipal inhabitants in 1900. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 3.5: Agrarian Reform
Full More Less
sample agricultural in 1900
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: IV
Insurgency 0.218* 0.311*** 0.052
(0.111) (0.110) (0.234)
Panel B: OLS
Insurgency 0.100*** 0.146*** 0.087
(0.037) (0.054) (0.060)
Observations 210 104 103
Mean Dep. Var. 0.49 0.52 0.45
Notes: Insurgency is a dummy equal to one if the municipality experienced insurgent activity
during 1910-1918 and equal to zero otherwise. The dependent variable is the percentage of
municipal surface area redistributed by agrarian reform. Panel A reports instrumental variables
estimates, with insurgency instrumented by 1906-1910 precipitation during non-harvest months as
a percentage of long-run average precipitation. Panel B reports ordinary least squares estimates.
All columns include controls for long-run average precipitation, long-run average minimum and
maximum temperature, slope, and elevation, as well as state fixed effects. The samples are defined
in the column headings. Column 1 examines the full sample. Municipalities that had a higher
percentage of their male population working in agriculture in 1900 than the median municipality
are examined in column 2, whereas municipalities that had a lower percentage of their population
working in agriculture as compared to the median municipality are examined in column 3. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3.6: Public Employees
Teachers Local
All Federal State Local per 1000 taxes per
authorities/1000 inhabitants in 1940 students income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: IV
(5) (6)
Insurgency -5.648 -3.769 -0.811 0.298 -3.694 -0.001
(4.564) (3.276) (1.848) (0.750) (4.746) (0.001)
Panel B: OLS
Insurgency -4.134*** -2.880** -0.748 -0.827*** -0.400 -0.001
(1.571) (1.129) (0.638) (0.242) (1.325) (0.001)
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205
Mean Dep. Var. 20.03 16.27 2.436 1.104 53.89 0.002
Notes: Insurgency is a dummy equal to one if the municipality experienced insurgent activity
during 1910-1918 and equal to zero otherwise. Panel A reports instrumental variables estimates,
with insurgency instrumented by 1906-1910 precipitation during non-harvest months as a
percentage of long-run average precipitation. Panel B reports ordinary least squares estimates.
All colunms include controls for long-run average precipitation, long-run average minimum and
maximum temperature, slope, and elevation, as well as state fixed effects. The dependent variable
in column 1 is total public employees per 1,000 municipal inhabitants in 1940, in column 2 it is
federal employees per 1,000 inhabitants in 1940, in column 3 it is state employees per 1,000
inhabitants in 1940, and in column 4 it is local employees per 1,000 inhabitants in 1940. The
dependent variable in column 5 is school teachers per 1,000 school-age children in 2005, and in
column 6 it is municipal tax receipts per dollar of municipal income in 2005. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3.7: Economic outcomes today
Overall Agricultural Industrial Services Percent
log wage no water no electricity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: IV
Insurgency -0.292** -0.322 -0.289* -0.218** 14.095** 2.922*
(0.141) (0.274) (0.169) (0.109) (6.255) (1.657)
Panel B: OLS
Insurgency -0.109*** -0.082* -0.122*** -0.086*** 0.715 0.404
(0.021) (0.044) (0.021) (0.019) (1.603) (0.465)
Observations 734,127 53,363 222,267 458,497 210 210
Clusters 210 210 210 210 210 210
Mean Dep. Var. 7.72 7.13 7.73 7.78 11.12 3.32
Notes: Insurgency is a dummy equal to one if the municipality experienced insurgent activity
during 1910-1918 and equal to zero otherwise. Panel A reports instrumental variables estimates,
with insurgency instrumented by 1906-1910 precipitation during non-harvest months as a
percentage of long-run average precipitation. Panel B reports ordinary least squares estimates.
All columns include controls for long-run average precipitation, long-run average minimum and
maximum temperature, slope, and elevation, as well as state fixed effects. The dependent variable
in columns 1 through 4 is log income in 2000. The sample in column 1 includes all individuals
earning positive income, in column 2 it includes individuals working in agriculture, in column 3 it
includes individuals working in industry, and in column 4 it includes individuals working in
services. In column 5 the dependent variable is the percentage of households in a municipality
who lack access to running water, and in column 6 it is the percentage of households who lack
access to electricity. Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, are in parentheses.
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Table 3.8: Economic organization
Percent labor force in Percent male pop. in
Ag Industry Ag Industry Ag Industry
2010 1960 1940
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: IV
Insurgency 0.206*** -0.060* 0.171 -0.077 0.164* -0.094**
(0.077) (0.037) (0.117) (0.050) (0.086) (0.040)
Panel B: OLS
Insurgency 0.059*** -0.020* 0.086** -0.078*** 0.069** -0.036***
(0.020) (0.011) (0.043) (0.018) (0.380) (0.170)
Observations 210 210 190 190 188 188
Mean Dep. Var. 0.07 0.25 0.26 0.21 0.243 0.127
Notes: Insurgency is a dummy equal to one if the municipality experienced insurgent activity
during 1910-1918 and equal to zero otherwise. Panel A reports instrumental variables estimates,
with insurgency instrumented by 1906-1910 precipitation during non-harvest months as a
percentage of long-run average precipitation. Panel B reports ordinary least squares estimates.
All columns include controls for long-run average precipitation, long-run average minimum and
maximum temperature, slope, and elevation, as well as state fixed effects. The dependent variables
in columns 1 and 3 are the percentage of the municipal labor force working in agriculture in the
years 2010 and 1960, respectively. The dependent variables in columns 2 and 4 are the percentage
of the municipal labor force working in industry in the years 2010 and 1960, respectively. The
dependent variable in column 5 is the percentage of municipal male population working in
agriculture in 1940, and the dependent variable in column 6 is the percentage of municipal male
population working in industry in 1940. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3.9: Political competition
Percent alternations
74-09 94-09 74-93
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: IV
Insurgency -0.327*** -0.382*** -0.210*
(0.101) (0.143) (0.111)
Panel B: OLS
Insurgency -0.028 -0.050 0.006
(0.031) (0.048) (0.037)
Observations 205 205 203
Mean dep. var 0.244 0.369 0.088
Notes: Insurgency is a dummy equal to one if the municipality experienced insurgent activity
during 1910-1918 and equal to zero otherwise. Panel A reports instrumental variables estimates,
with insurgency instrumented by 1906-1910 precipitation during non-harvest months as a
percentage of long-run average precipitation. Panel B reports ordinary least squares estimates.
All columns include controls for long-run average precipitation, long-run average minimum and
maximum temperature, slope, and elevation, as well as state fixed effects. The dependent variable
is the percentage of elections in which the party controlling the mayorship changed, during the
time period listed in parentheses in the column headings. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
178
Table 3.10: Violence today
Homicides Police Drug trade Guerrillas
92-08 deaths homicides 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: IV
Insurgency 0.441 -0.578 -0.008 0.130
(0.564) (0.745) (0.042) (0.158)
Panel B: OLS
Insurgency -0.080 -0.194 -0.014 0.032
(0.168) (0.382) (0.015) (0.056)
Observations 210 210 210 210
Mean dep. var 1.544 0.750 0.058 0.118
Notes: Insurgency is a dummy equal to one if the municipality experienced insurgent activity
during 1910-1918 and equal to zero otherwise. Panel A reports instrumental variables estimates,
with insurgency instrumented by 1906-1910 precipitation during non-harvest months as a
percentage of long-run average precipitation. Panel B reports ordinary least squares estimates.
All columns include controls for long-run average precipitation, long-run average minimum and
maximum temperature, slope, and elevation, as well as state fixed effects. The dependent variable
in column 1 is the average municipal homicide rate between 1992 and 2008, in column 2 it is the
number of police deaths caused by confrontations with drug traffickers since late 2006, in column
3 it is the average rate of drug trade related homicides since late 2006, and in column 4 it is a
dummy equal to 1 if guerrilla insurgents were present in the municipality in 2008 and equal to
zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3.11: Droughts in other periods
Insurgency % ejido % agricultural log income % alternations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rainfall 1906 -0.793*** -0.182* -17.490** 0.153** 0.240***
(0.230) (0.089) (8.382) (0.072) (0.072)
Rainfall 1960 0.425 0.161 12.114 -0.038 -0.082
(0.289) (0.186) (12.781) (0.141) (0.148)
Rainfall 1965 -0.014 0.134 47.100 0.075 -0.332
(0.456) (0.406) (33.486) (0.261) (0.307)
Rainfall 1970 0.247 0.245 -21.345 -0.112 0.135
(0.715) (0.280) (19.224) (0.150) (0.234)
Rainfall 1975 0.072 0.251 -26.571 0.412 -0.244
(0.527) (0.513) (32.687) (0.257) (0.146)
Rainfall 1980 0.586 0.077 3.426 -0.411* 0.155
(1.002) (0.368) (16.466) (0.205) (0.289)
Rainfall 1985 0.245 -0.299 -20.326 0.064 0.219
(0.424) (0.368) (30.188) (0.180) (0.247)
Rainfall 1990 0.116 0.112 29.701 -0.079 -0.336
(0.547) (0.308) (19.970) (0.173) (0.267)
Observations 210 210 210 733,153 205
R-squared 0.467 0.460 0.340 0.357 0.358
Notes: Rainfall measures precipitation during non-harvest months as a percentage of long-run
average precipitation for the respective period. All columns include controls for long-run average
precipitation, long-run average minimum and maximum temperature, slope, and elevation, as well
as state fixed effects. The dependent variable in column 1 is insurgency, a dummy equal to one if
the municipality experienced insurgent activity during 1910-1918 and equal to zero otherwise.
The dependent variable in column 2 is the percentage of municipal surface area in the ejidal
sector, the dependent variable in column 3 is the percentage of the municipal labor force working
in agriculture in 2010, the dependent variable in column 4 is log income in 2000, and the
dependent variable in column 5 is the percentage of elections held between 1974 and 2009 in
which the party controlling the mayorship changed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Figure 3-1: Drought Severity
1906-1910 rainfall as
percentage of nornal rainfall
- <60%
60% - 80%
80% to 99.9%
>100%
State Boundaries
Notes: 1906-1910 precipitation as a percentage of long-run average precipitation is plotted, following the
scheme given in the legend. State boundaries are in black.
Figure 3-2: Insurgency
0
Insurgency
No
Yes
State Boundaries
Notes: Insurgency during 1910-1918 is plotted, following the scheme given in the legend. State boundaries
are in black.
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